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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE CHALLENGES OF COMMUNICATING A LOW PROBABILITY AND HIGH
CONSEQUENCE RISK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE PRE-CRISIS
AND EMERGENCY-RISK COMMUNICATION
The Crisis and Emergency-Risk Communication (CERC) model is effective in providing
communication recommendations for public health agencies and shows potential for use
by other agencies with similar crises characterizations. The current study explores the
challenges of earthquake scientists in communicating earthquake risk during the pre-crisis
stage in order to grasp experts’ experience and gain insight into the complexity of
communicating earthquake risk. The researcher integrates the in-depth knowledge with the
recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. This study employs
qualitative interviewing with earthquake scientists (N = 21) from the Southern California
Earthquake Center (SCEC). Categorized under general challenges, communication
challenges, and communicating probability challenges, findings from this study indicate
that earthquake scientists face eight unique challenges, such as communicating uncertainty,
emphasizing their responsibility as solely hazard communicators, and keeping public
attention during earthquake quiet periods. Implications for earthquake scientists during the
pre-crisis stage of CERC are discussed and recommendations are provided.
KEY WORDS: risk communication, Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication,
earthquake forecasting, communicating uncertainty, hazard communication.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Earthquakes are complex crises that pose distinct communicatory challenges for
scientists. An earthquake occurs when parts of the earth slip past one another (Wald, 2014).
Earthquakes are unique from other natural disasters as they are unpredictable, usually occur
in sequence, and are temporally and spatially variable (Mulargia & Geller, 2003). Given
the nature of earthquakes, the communication environment is characterized by complexity,
uncertainty, and time sensitivity. Such a phenomenon poses exceptional communication
challenges for scientists tasked with communicating the probability of the event to occur
to parties that lack such advanced and technical understanding of earthquakes.
A similar communication environment has been illustrated by the Crisis and
Emergency-Risk Communication (CERC) framework that essentially captures the essence
of such crisis-events. CERC merges the areas of risk communication and crisis
communication and is founded on the basis of temporal sensitivity. The researcher sees the
potential of the recommendations provided by the framework in the context of earthquake
communication. This study explores in-depth the communication challenges to be expected
with earthquakes to aid earthquake scientists in crisis and emergency-risk communication
during the pre-crisis stage where scientists play the largest role.
Effective communication during the pre-crisis stage of crisis development is pivotal
to preventing harm, yet there are immense barriers in this endeavor. While experts may be
communicating probabilistic statements to stakeholders and the public, interpretation of
those probability statements varies greatly as non-experts may have difficulty
understanding risk in the formats provided by scientists, such as numbers (Slovic, 2010).
Further, experts may prefer to receive their risk information in the form of a probabilistic
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statement to increase their accurate interpretation of the risk, while non-experts would
prefer their messages of risk in a more simplified and relevant form (Slovic, 2010;
Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014).
Imperative to effective risk communication during the earliest stages of crisis
development is the realization that risk messages are being disseminated to various nontechnical audiences who will respond to the messages in variable ways based on their
interpretation (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). The issue is further
problematized considering that less credible sources of information have been known to
sway the public’s perception of the risk and increase public outrage (Sandman, 2012). Such
was the case when Iben Browning made erroneous and unscientific predictions that a large
magnitude earthquake would occur on the New Madrid Fault (Spence, Herrmann,
Johnston, & Reagor, 1993). While researchers have come a long way in developing suitable
and helpful crisis developmental stages, there is still a great deal of research that needs to
be done in the initial stages of crisis development where risk is housed. The researcher
seeks to better understand the experience of earthquake scientists, who provide expert
opinion and technical information to non-expert audiences.
Earthquake scientists were faced with the grave importance of pre-crisis
communication following a devastating earthquake that struck L’Aquila, Italy in 2009. As
a result of the earthquake disaster, six scientists and one public official were charged with
multiple manslaughter. The scientists and public official were not blamed for inaccurate
prediction of the earthquake, rather the Italian court found the scientists guilty on failing to
appropriately communicate the risk information to the public. Although the scientists have
since been acquitted of their charges, the event caused scientists world-wide to pay
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attention. Dr. Thomas Jordan, lead seismological author of the comprehensive report
written directly following the event, entitled Operational earthquake forecasting: State of
knowledge and guidelines for utilization (from hereafter referred to as the ICEF final
report), says the event was a failure “not of omission but of commission” (T. Jordan,
speech, 2013). The scientists were charged with “providing civil authorities and the public
with information that was ‘incomplete, imprecise, and contradictory’ about the nature,
causes, and future developments of seismic hazards” (T. Jordan, speech, 2013).
Following the eye-opening aftermath of the failed communication of the L’Aquila
case, earthquake scientists proclaimed “the principles of effective public communication
have been established by social science research and should be applied in communicating
seismic hazard information” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 363). Earthquakes communication has
largely been understudied by social scientists. Thus, reliable recommendations for
communicating

about

earthquakes

are

sparse.

Recommendations

founded

in

Communication literature would enable earthquake scientists to follow the standards put
in place by Communication scholars and aide them in their understanding and integration
of effective communication in earthquake forecasting. The subsequent section further
outline the rationale for this study.
Rationale
Of all human experiences, risk is one of the most complex and varied between
individuals and across groups. Although risk is well-known to the human nature, part of
the human existence, and fundamental to survival, individuals do not perceive risks the
same (Slovic, 1987). For instance, while scientists have a more specialized understanding
of a risk, allowing numbers and evidence to guide decision making, the lay public also

3

makes considerable contributions with their understanding of risk as they incorporate a
richer and more contextually-based approach to the risk at-hand (Slovic, 2000). Human
decision-making and risk perception differs based on various factors including previous
experience with the risk, numeracy comprehension, comfortability with uncertainty, and
feelings towards the risk. A commonly used definition of risk perception as “people’s
beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social and cultural values
and dispositions that people adopt, towards hazards and their benefits” (Lee & Jones, 2004,
p. 25) alludes to the variability in humans’ interpretations and experiences with risk. Risk
communication, thus, plays an imperative role in risk perception and subsequent action.
The means by which risk is communicated – that is, the manner in which risk is discussed
and presented - is the foci of risk management because risk perception is apt to change
based on risk communication.
A stark difference in risk perception particularly exists between experts and nonexperts (Sandman, 2012; Slovic, 2010). Experts are a person(s) perceived as attaining
specialized understanding for the topic at-hand and who usually hold high social
credibility. Experts are often asked to provide their judgements regarding a risk to nonexperts. Non-experts are a person(s) not perceived as attaining specialized understanding
of the topic at hand and who do not hold high social credibility on the topic. Non-experts
include the lay public, organizational stakeholders, and any interested parties. Researchers
seek to understand how communication can improve between these two groups given the
differences in their risk judgment experiences.
Of all experts, earthquake scientists arguably face the most difficult risk
assessment, judgement, and subsequent communication. Earthquake scientists are experts
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on earthquakes and earthquake related topics and are inclusive of seismologists, geologists,
earth scientists, and any other expert having knowledge and taking part in earthquake
science, technology, and decision-making. The role of an earthquake scientist is to provide
factually-based statements regarding the risk of an earthquake when providing predictions
and issuing warnings; however, their role is proving to be increasingly more complex due
to how non-experts may interpret earthquake scientists’ risk messages. Often the intended
message is ‘lost in translation’ as non-experts may have difficulty interpreting earthquake
scientists’ numerical representations of the earthquake risk.
Communicating earthquake risk is a complex endeavor for experts because nonexperts may not have experience with earthquakes like they would with other natural
disasters. Members of the lay public may compare earthquakes to other natural disasters
with which they are more familiar such as tornadoes or snow storms (Nigg, 1982). Unlike
other types of natural disaster forecasts, short-term earthquake forecasting yields extremely
low probabilities, and higher probability forecasts are often delivered in a 30-year
timeframe. Nigg (1982) asserts, “While it may be possible for individuals to take greater
precaution during this lengthy period, it may also be more difficult to keep people’s
attention aroused for any extended period of time” (p. 28). Thus, earthquake scientists face
exceptional difficulty in conveying accurate and appropriate messages to non-experts
surrounding earthquake risk.
Earthquakes are increasing in frequency due in part to man-made practices, such as
the injection of wastewater in hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracking,” and deep
mining (Petersen et al., 2016). There is an increased need for better understanding how to
communicate about these large-scale events with potentially fatal outcomes for the
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communities affected. Specifically, better understanding of the complexity of earthquake
forecasting and the experiences of scientists and other technical experts who are providing
risk communication surrounding these events is imperative and timely.
The CERC model (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012) is a widely used and reputable model
that emerged as a means by which to understand and guide communicatory response during
the crisis life cycle. The model has been used extensively by both scholars and practitioners
to illustrate communication expectations throughout the lifecycle of a crisis. Veil,
Reynolds, Sellnow, and Seeger (2008) assert that CERC is not a theory per se, but a
beneficial framework of risk and crisis communication perspectives. As the framework has
been mostly used in the context of public health, the model would benefit from application
in other contexts and further development.
CERC originally emerged in the public health context as a call from the Center for
Disease Control (CDC) for better management during public health emergencies. “CERC
was developed as a tool to educate and equip public health professional for the expanding
communication responsibilities of public health in emergency situations” (Veil et al., 2008,
p. 27s). Reynolds (2002) asserts that risk communication and crisis communication should
be integrated in response to the CDC’s call that health communication must be tactical,
broad-based, receptive, and conditional on crisis type. Since its inception, CERC has been
used in a variety of public health contexts including the water contamination crisis in West
Virginia (Manuel, 2014); the influenza pandemic (Reynolds & Quinn, 2008); and building
capacity and resiliency for minority populations (Quinn, 2008). The manner in which
CERC has thus far been utilized is largely within the context of public health. Thus,
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conceptualizing CERC within the earthquake risk context will be appropriate and necessary
to understanding CERC’s wingspan and utility.
Experts play an important role throughout the lifecycle of a crisis, however their
expertise is most vital during the pre-crisis stage. During the pre-crisis stage is when
experts are discussing the earthquake risk with one another and choosing how and what to
say to stakeholders and the public. Experts can act as communication leaders helping to
facilitate the communication needs of CERC. Reynolds and Seeger (2005) highlight eight
facilitation aspects of the pre-crisis stage, namely: (1) monitoring and recognition of
emerging risks; (2) general public understanding of risk; (3) public preparation for the
possibility of an adverse event; (4) changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm;
(5) Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat, such as evacuation notices,
take shelter warnings, product recalls, etc.; (6) alliances an cooperation with agencies,
organizations, and groups; (7) development of consensual recommendations by experts and
first-responders; and (8) message development and testing for subsequent stages. The precrisis stage is pivotal during the life-cycle of the crisis because it is the stage experts, as
communication leaders, can play the largest role in preparing and educating the public and
providing warning messages so that individuals have time to take the appropriate measures
to protect themselves. Currently, earthquake communicators do not adhere to a
communicative guide based on the principles of effective communication for earthquake
risk communication.
The aim of the current study is to explore the complexities earthquake scientists
face in communicating earthquake risk during the pre-crisis stage of crisis and emergencyrisk communication. Such exploration seeks to grasp earthquake scientists’ complex and
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multifaceted experience of communicating about earthquakes, and combine and make
usable the in-depth knowledge with the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. This study
employs qualitative in-depth interviewing with earthquake scientists (N = 21) to understand
the current challenges they perceive in communicating technical and probabilistic
statements to diverse publics including the lay public and stakeholders. In an effort to meet
these objectives, the researcher answered the following research questions:
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC?
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they
face in communicating with non-experts?
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with
communicating probability to non-experts?
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model?
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Earthquake risk is increasing as humans extract natural resources and subsequently
face environmental consequences. Technological advances in communication help to
reduce per capita earthquake risk, however little is known about the challenges experts
experience in communicating such technical and intricate information to non-expert
audiences. As earthquake communication is similar to the environment in which CERC
describes, the researcher sees the potential of CERC as a useful tool for earthquake
scientists providing recommendations for communication during the pre-crisis stage and
helping to facilitate earthquake communication. A literature review ensues on the current
state of earthquake forecasting; the CERC model; communication leadership inherent to
CERC; and expert and non-expert risk perception and communication.
The Current State of Earthquake Forecasting
According to the ICEF final report, “earthquake forecasting and prediction involve
statements about the location, time, and magnitude of future fault raptures” (Jordan et al.,
2011, p. 325). Earthquakes commonly occur closely in time and space as earthquake
“clusters” or sequences. A main shock is the term for the biggest earthquake to occur in an
earthquake sequence. Foreshocks are the earthquakes that occur prior to the main shock
and aftershocks are the earthquakes that occur after the main shock. Background seismicity
cannot be set apart from the individual events in a sequence, although they are unrelated to
the main shock. “Background seismicity can add considerable uncertainty to the process
of delimiting of foreshock and aftershock sequences in space and time, as can the
overlapping of seismic sequences” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 325). Almost all big earthquakes
are followed by aftershocks, and “the number of aftershocks is observed to increase
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exponentially with the magnitude of the main shock, and the aftershock rate is observed to
decrease approximately inversely with time” (p. 326). It is only in retrospect that scientists
are able to identify the earthquakes for what they are in the sequence.
Mulargia and Geller (2003) argue earthquake prediction can be defined four
different ways and say, “The absence of a clear and agreed-upon definition is one of the
main reasons for the lack of consensus on earthquake predictability within the scientific
community” (p. 14). The first definition they offer for prediction they call the ‘time
independent hazard.’ Earthquake scientists who use this definition view earthquakes as
random events in time and use existing knowledge on typical earthquake locations and
typical frequencies to narrow future long-term seismic hazard. The second definition,
called the ‘time-dependent hazard,’ assumes that earthquakes occur due to rifts in the
Earth’s crust induced by tectonic strain. As such, earthquake scientists who use this
definition of earthquake prediction believe earthquakes can be calculated as a function of
time. The third definition earthquake scientists employ is the ‘forecast’ definition. This
definition implies that “earthquakes are probabilistically predictable at medium and short
term with better than random accuracy due to their tendency to cluster in time and space”
(Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 15). The final conceptualization of prediction is known as the
‘deterministic prediction.’ Deterministic prediction most closely mirrors the type of
prediction CERC requires. Earthquake scientists employing this conceptualization attempt
to provide predictions based on “high accuracy and reliability in size, location and time, so
that drastic actions such as evacuations can take place” (p. 15). However, the authors
caution, “It is widely accepted that such predictions are presently impossible, since
physical models of earthquakes are lacking and since reliable, unambiguous empirical
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earthquake precursors have never been identified” (p. 15). Thus, a great deal of uncertainty
is inherent to current earthquake forecasting methods.
Messages about the potential of an earthquake always carry a weight of uncertainty
because they are based upon the probability of the event to occur. Probability inherently
implies uncertainty. Jordan et al. (2011) assert, “Because uncertainty is expressed in terms
of probabilities, both deterministic predictions and probabilistic forecasts need to be stated
and evaluated using probabilistic concepts” (p. 328). The probability of an earthquake to
occur is almost never zero because natural variability in the system behavior includes
aleatory uncertainty that occurs when, for instance, conditions of the system change often
from additional information being added to the system. For example, say the authors, a
forecast based on long-term seismicity rates would produce a 0.01% chance of an
earthquake to occur, while another forecast with the same information but with some
additional information, such as recent foreshocks, would yield a probability of 1%. Thus,
both probability gain and information gain can occur despite that absolute probabilities
remain low. Epistemic uncertainties highlight these validity errors that occur in the
forecasting method (Jordan et al., 2011).
A difficult task with earthquake prediction is the decision of casting an alarm.
According to Jordan et al. (2011), there are two approaches to making the decision of
casting an alarm. The first is to find a diagnostic signal to predict the earthquakes or “to
identify a diagnostic precursor that ensures with high probability that a target event will
occur in a specific domain” (p. 328). The authors say, however, “the search for a diagnostic
precursor has so far been unsuccessful” (p. 328). The second approach to casting an alarm
of prediction is through examination of the probabilistic forecasts. Alarms are cast based
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on probabilities rising above the advised threshold for alarm, however, such thresholds are
seldom reached because short term forecasting probabilities remain extremely low.
Therefore, the authors assert, “such predictions always contain less information than the
forecasts from which they were derived” (p. 328).
The quality of an earthquake prediction is assessed primarily through reliability and
skill. Reliability refers to how well the model’s results match the observed frequency of
forecasted events. Skill refers to the accuracy of one forecasting method over another.
Often errors occur in the evaluation of the method quality. Predictions are stated generally
and qualitatively because “they are more likely to be found reliable just by chance” (p.
329). Jordan et al. (2011) caution this approach and advise determining operational fitness
or the methods quality and its consistency and value to decision makers when making
predictions. Jordan et al. (2011) say that earthquake forecasts should consist of two key
components: (1) earthquake advisory which is expressed in terms of the probability of the
threat, and (2) set procedures that institute how probability should be translated into action
and preparedness (Jordan et al., 2011). The authors further advise that statements should
translate the inherent uncertainty in probability forecasts asserting, “Probabilistic
forecasting provides a more complete description of prospective earthquake information
than deterministic prediction” (p. 328).
The decision of casting an alarm based on low probability is complicated by the
economic consequences of a false alarm. As short-term forecasts consist of very low
probabilities, many question the usefulness of such information (Wang & Rogers, 2014).
The debate over OEF has spawned the question: when is the probability of an earthquake
too small to communicate? Marzocchi, Iervolino, Giorgio, and Falcone (2015) argue that
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instead of asking when the probability of an earthquake is too small, the area of interest
should be the expected loss from the generated probabilities. They argue that “a
comparison of such a risk metric with some risk thresholds for individuals and/or for
communities may help in understanding whether the risk is tolerable or not, and in choosing
the optimal risk management decision” (p. 1674).
In their endeavor, Marzocchi et al. (2015) utilized OEF with another tool called
Operational Earthquake Loss Forecasting (OELF) during a two year period in Italy. OELF
converts OEF into a risk assessment using a specific standard such as collapsed buildings,
displaced persons, number of injured persons, and fatality rates. The authors found
“probabilities of a large earthquake, as derived from short-term clustering models, may
lead to individual risk of death is comparable or above a threshold taken from the literature,
beyond which the risk may be considered intolerable” (p.1677). Given their two-year
observance, the authors’ results support the basic idea that seismic risk assessment includes
more than a probability statement. Rather, the probability must be paired with expected
loss. Communicating just the hazard is more limiting than communicating the hazard and
the expected loss because the hazard alone “does not allow (1) direct comparison with other
risks and (2) any kind of cost-benefit analyses” (p. 1677). The authors acknowledge,
however, that developing plans to manage unacceptable seismic risk is a challenge of its
own, beyond the scope of their current study, and requires the aid of experts in risk
communication.
Considerations should be made regarding the vulnerability to hazards and disasters
(Nelson, 2014). Vulnerability denotes the manner in which a hazard or disaster will affect
human life and infrastructure. Vulnerability to hazards and disasters include one’s vicinity
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to a hazard, population density in the area closest to the event, scientific comprehension of
the hazard, public education and cognizance of the hazard, the extent of existence of earlywarning systems and modes of communication, availability and readiness of emergency
infrastructure, construction styles and building codes, and cultural dynamics that influence
public reaction to warnings (Nelson, 2014). Tiedemann (1994), too, outlines the costbenefit considerations related to earthquakes. His method and analysis, rather novel at the
time, involved thorough stocktaking, conducting a vulnerability analysis and analyzing
cost-benefit considerations. Tiedemann (1994) finds cost-benefit-conscious risk
optimization is the most significant gain when socio-economic consequences are weighed.
The author goes on to note, “it is evident that relying on the presently available earthquake
building codes is not sufficient to judge and minimize the impact of an earthquake on
society also because direct and indirect earthquake damage are not considered” (p. 6712).
This section detailed the current state of earthquake forecasting. In general, the
current state of earthquake forecasting creates a communication environment that is
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and temporal sensitivity. Such a communication
environment has been illustrated by CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). A review of the
nature of crises and the CERC framework follows.
The Nature of Crises
The nature of crises are too complex to neatly describe and define. Crises are
difficult to understand because they are unpredictable, vary based on the players involved,
and are problematic to conceptualize and operationalize. Many risk and crisis researchers
provided definitions and approaches to studying crises (e.g., see Coombs, 2007; Fink,
1986). Researchers’ conceptualizations of crises converge on the idea that crises can vary
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in nature and are indiscriminate to context. That is, crises are considered to be anything
from small-scale organizational mishaps and issues to larger-scale natural disaster and
terrorist events (Coombs, 1999). As large-magnitude earthquakes have the potential to
destroy buildings, lead to fatalities, and cause economic standstill, earthquake crisis is
characterized as a large-scale crisis event.
There are three different types of crises as conceptualized by Parsons (1996).
Immediate crises are those that are sudden and leave the organization with little to no time
to prepare and provide warning. Emerging crises develop slower and allow the
organization time to prepare enabling organizations to mitigate negative effects. Finally,
sustained crises are those that linger for long periods of time, lasting weeks, months, or
years. Crises have been conceptualized differently and, thus, crisis response is dependent
on such conceptualizations. Generally, however, the strategies to cope with crises vary
based on time pressure, extent of perceived control, and magnitude of the crisis (Burnett,
1998). Risk and crisis researchers have established stage models to help better understand
and manage crises.
Stage Models of Risks and Crises
Although there are different types of crises such as environmental, technological,
organizational, cyber, and chemical, all crises are theorized to develop in characteristic
stages (Benoit, 1995; Fink, 1986; Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The lifecycle of a crisis is
best characterized by Fink’s (1986) definition as the “anatomy” of a crisis (p. 20). Fink
(1986) was among the pioneers of addressing the importance of crisis management, and he
saw the lifecycle of a crisis – or the breakdown of how a crisis unfolds – as the crux of
crisis management. After Fink, other scholars developed their own crisis stage models (see
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Benoit, 1995, Smith, 1990, Mitroff, 1994, Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Stage models help
communicators anticipate the information needs of stakeholders and the lay public
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2012).
Sellnow and Seeger (2013) assert three assumptions of all stage models. First,
models take a developmental approach to crisis, meaning that certain actions taken, as
prescribed by the model, will result in certain outcomes. Second, models are created
through constant analysis of actual former crises whereby researchers take a grounded
theoretical approach to understanding crisis phenomena. Lastly, the stage models suggest
that social phenomena is ordered by, reliant on, and sensitive to time, and thus characterize
time as an inherent property of crisis development.
Stage models are useful for both researchers and practitioners of risks and crises.
Stage models outline the lifecycle of a crisis and provide guidance to risk and crisis
managers on what strategies to employ at the various stages (Ritchie, 2003). Further, these
models equip organizations with knowledge of how a crisis unfolds so that they can prevent
the crisis from moving onto the next stage, use the information to create more effective
crisis communication plans to reduce the impact of potential crises, or prevent the crisis
altogether (Ritchie, 2003). Social scientists have addressed the importance of effective
communication to crisis management in their models, however, no stage models have
placed their concentration on communication as has CERC.
A Communication Focused Model: CERC
A comprehensive, communication focused, and reputable crisis life cycle model
amongst practitioners and researchers is the CERC model (Reynolds, 2002; Reynolds and
Seeger, 2012). CERC emerged after the September 11th terrorist attacks and the anthrax
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scare, providing a crisis plan specifically focused on communication strategies (Sellnow &
Seeger, 2013). CERC is best characterized for prioritizing communication throughout the
lifecycle of the crisis. While several crisis cycle models exist (e.g., Fink, 1986; Mitroff,
1994; Smith, 1990), none focus exclusively on communication strategies during the crisis
life cycle as does CERC. Thus, this framework is particularly useful during crisis events
because it places communication as priority during a crisis above all else. Just as the crisis
moves through stages, the communication should too. The phases of the crisis models let
the communicator know what to expect so that he or she can effectively deal with the
media, stakeholders, and general public (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012).
CERC Merges the Communication Areas of Risk and Crisis
CERC is different from other crisis life-cycle models because it merges risk
communication and crisis communication. Reynolds and Seeger (2005) argue, while the
communication domains of risk communication and crisis communication are usually
discussed and applied separately, the anthrax crisis brought about new forms of
understanding communication to the public. Specifically, anthrax was a case where risk
was continuously pending and time for risk assessment and discussion was limited, and,
yet, public relations were necessary. In this sense, both risk communication and crisis
communication were of upmost importance to manage simultaneously.
Risk communication is an exchange about potential outcomes, including the
probabilities of outcomes occurring, and it is used to help people make decisions (Reynolds
& Seeger, 2012). Risk communication involves scanning the environment for potential
threats, discussion amongst experts, persuading the public about the risk and making
healthy

decisions,

producing

warning

messages,
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and

providing

post

event

recommendations. Risk communication “facilitates decision making and risk sharing”
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 45), and one of the primary goals of risk communication is
informing the public so that they can make better decisions (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).
Emergencies provide a communication environment that is temporally hypersensitive and intended to keep the public informed in order to protect the health and safety
of the populace and the environment. During emergencies there is a heightened sense of
fear, uncertainty, and urgency present as the event is largely unexpected. Communication
is useful in helping to reestablish public trust in the organization’s ability to manage the
event (Veil et al., 2008). Crises by their very nature create an environment of chaos and
may have a devastating effect on the public’s psychological, emotional, physical, and
economic well-being (Seeger & Reynolds, 2007). Consequently, communication is a
pivotal component of emergency response (Veil, 2007).
A crisis is an unusual occurrence that cannot be foreseen but can be expected
(Coombs, 2010). Specifically, Coombs (2010) honors the role that stakeholders play in cocreating the meaning of a crisis and says a crisis is “the perception of an unpredictable
event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an
organization’s performance and generate negative outcome” (Coombs, 2007, p. 2-3).
Following suit, crisis communication is “the collection, processing, and dissemination of
information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Crisis
Communication has more public relations elements interwoven. Compared with risk
communication, crisis communication is more time sensitive. The purpose of crisis
communication is to “prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby
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protect the organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage” (Coombs, 1999, p.
4).
CERC is founded in risk and crisis communication principles and grounded theory
approaches (Veil et al., 2008). Although CERC is not considered a theory per se, it is a
useful framework for understanding the communication environment of ongoing crisis
events. CERC was developed through constant analysis of past risks and crises and, as
such, places significant weight on lessons learned. Further, paradigmatically, this particular
framework provides both breadth and depth of risk and crisis phenomena. Reynolds and
Seeger (2013) say that the model provides a complete and interwoven approach to risk and
crisis.
Reflecting on the manner in which scholars have positioned CERC in the literature,
two primary approaches are noted. First, CERC is positioned in the literature for its utility
to practitioners (e.g., see Reynolds et al., 2007; Ritchie, 2003) and, thus, is discussed either
retrospectively or prospectively. Retrospectively, scholars discuss how the model was
applied and focus on the logistics of the model, and emergency-risk response. When
scholars discuss the model prospectively, they discuss how the model can be applied,
focusing on crisis planning. Second, CERC is positioned in the literature as a theoretical
discussion (e.g., see Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Veil et al., 2008). Although CERC is not a
theory per se, scholars have written about the crisis and emergency-risk environment, its
characterizations, the benefits of blending risk communication and crisis communication,
and the communication needs such an environment elicits. This study discusses CERC
prospectively and positions CERC as a helpful framework for earthquake scientists to
determine the needs of the disparate publics.
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Propositions of CERC
Veil et al. (2008) expanded on CERC to include six propositions of the model. First,
Veil et al. (2008) say that “risks and crises are equivocal and uncertain conditions that
create specific information needs and deficiencies” (p. 31s). Second, the authors assert,
“Ongoing, two-way communication activities are necessary for the public, agencies, and
other stakeholders to make sense of uncertain and equivocal situations and make choices
about how to manage and reduce the threat(s) to their health” (p. 31s). Third,
“Communication processes (channels, needs, information, etc.) will change dramatically
as a risk evolves into a crisis introducing new risks and as a crisis evolves to post crisis and
recovery” (p. 31s). Fourth, say the authors, “Risk and crisis communication are highly
interrelated such that risk messages before a crisis occurs influence perceptions,
expectations and behavior after a crisis erupts. In turn, these crisis responses then influence
subsequent risk messages” (p. 31s). Fifth, “Communication is consequential to specific risk
and crisis management outcomes by promoting self-efficacy” and, lastly, the authors say,
“Risks and crises affect a wide variety of publics with variable needs, interests and
resources, which in turn impacts their communication capacities, needs and activities” (p.
31s).
CERC is a Five-Stage Model
The CERC model has five phases, namely: pre-crisis, initial, maintenance,
resolution, and evaluation. Although this study focuses specifically on the pre-crisis stage,
the researcher believes it important to first provide a brief synopsis of all stages so that a
more complete understanding of the model is formed. The pre-crisis phase is regarded as
the incubation stage (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The focus of the pre-crisis stage is
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effective risk communication. The second stage of the CERC model, the initial phase, is
when the crisis actually occurs. During this time, the CERC model would recommend that
spokespersons communicate with empathy, being sure to provide messages particular to
the victims of the crisis. Further, during this phase, communication should be simple and
the focus should be to reduce stakeholder and public uncertainty by providing messages of
self-efficacy and information about what is known about how and why the crisis occurred.
The maintenance phase encourages that spokespersons be active in continuing to
communicate with the public and stakeholders reassuring these audiences about the
strategies that have been employed to improve the situation. Listening to stakeholder
concerns, feedback, and advice is also pivotal during this time, and during this stage is
when the public should be educated about the risks (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The
resolution phase is when new understandings to the risk are provided. Specifically, during
this phase, communication should be reflective on approaches taken and persuade the
public towards new policies implemented as a result. Communication emphasizing future
strength, renewal, and reinforcing the organization’s identity are key during the resolution
phase. Lastly, the evaluation phase occurs when the social buzz around the crisis has
calmed and all response strategies to the crisis have been taken. During the evaluation
phase, the organization reflects on the crisis in order to learn and strengthen their crisis
plan for the future. Stakeholders, as well, reflect on the crisis and ways in which they were
impacted in order to prevent or reduce such consequences on their organization in the
future. For the complete model, please refer to Appendix A.
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The pre-crisis stage.
The pre-crisis stage is dedicated to preparing for crisis response through
communication and education campaigns. CERC is built on the premise that effective and
timely communication strategies are pivotal to crisis management. Pre-crisis messages
should provide information of the potential crisis, ways to prepare, and persuade the public
and stakeholders of the risk and encourage appropriate self-protection actions if the risk
were to manifest. Statements of probability from experts are provided most often during
the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model as the risk has yet to manifest. According to the
model, communicators should be prepared by facilitate a host of responses during this
stage. Table 2-1 provides the pre-crisis stage of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).
Table 2-1
Stage I of the Working Model of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 52)
Communication and education campaigns targeted to facilitate:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks
General public understanding of risk
Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event
Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy)
Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat
Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups
Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders
Message development and testing for subsequent stages

During the pre-crisis stage, CERC recommends organizations take action in some pivotal
ways (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Specifically, the model recommends that organizations
outline the types of disasters they are likely to face. In doing so, they can better
conceptualize the threat they face. Second, organizations are recommended to anticipate
and develop preliminary answers to questions. Third, organizations should draft initial
messages. These messages do not need to be perfect as specific details can be filled later
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when more information is known. Fourth, the model suggests that organizations identify
spokespersons, resources, and resource mechanisms well ahead of time. Fifth,
organizations should practice following the response plan and refine the plan as needed.
Sixth, organizations are encouraged to foster alliances and partnerships to ensure that
experts are speaking in a coordinated manner (using one voice). Lastly, the model
recommends that organizations develop and test communication systems and networks.
Reynolds and Seeger (2012) also outline negative events that can occur during crisis and
emergency-risk

communication.

Difficulties

during

crisis

and

emergency-risk

communication include (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012, p. 15):


Demands for unnecessary treatment



Needless social and organizational disruption



Disorganized and occasionally destructive group behavior



Bribery and fraud



Reliance on special relationships for favors and treatment



Increased drug, alcohol, and tobacco use



Increased multiple unexplained physical symptoms



Unreasonable trade and travel restrictions



Loss of agency credibility and lower levels of government trust.

The authors assert that effective communication can buffer these trials. The aim of this
study seeks to uncover challenges unique to earthquake scientists as they face of the most
trying crisis and emergency-risk environments, earthquakes.
Reynolds and Seeger (2012) assert that during the pre-crisis stage is when
communication objectives should target information dissemination, provide effective
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warning messages, and create education campaigns in order to inform the public and the
response community of the present risk. Some of the main roles of the communicators and
experts during this time are to “provide warning messages regarding and imminent threat”
and “develop and test communication systems and networks” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012).
Other important roles during this time include finding effective ways to communicate the
same message multiple ways in order to serve diverse audiences (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger,
& Littlefield, 2009).
Experts’ messages of probability are most relevant to the pre-crisis phase of the
CERC model. Risk and crises are interrelated (Veil et al., 2008), so naturally risk
communication is relevant to every stage of the crisis models because risk is always present
(Sellnow & Seeger, 2012). Risk communication is most relevant, however, to the earliest
stage of a crisis because experts and practitioners have the chance to use communication
strategies to prevent the crisis, prepare the lay public, and mitigate the consequences of the
crisis. Moreover, during the pre-crisis stage of a crisis are when people are seeking to
relieve their uncertainty regarding the risk and, thus, turning to experts for more
information. Risk messages presented before the crisis greatly influence publics and
stakeholders’ perceptions, expectations, and actions (Veil et al., 2008).
CERC assumes that the person or persons using this framework in practice are in
positions of leadership. The model is tailored for use by risk and crisis communicators who
act as leaders. With the responsibility of communicating earthquake hazard and risk to
others, earthquake scientists become communication leaders. A literature review of crisis
and emergency-risk communication leadership ensues.
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Crisis and Emergency-Risk Communication Leaders
Leadership is an underlying premise of CERC. A crisis is an unexpected event
which dramatically shifts old perspectives, approaches, and ways of doing that existed in
the previous system. A crisis is also socially constructed through messages; that is, a crisis
in-and-of itself is not a crisis until it is perceived, agreed upon, and voiced as one (Venette,
2008). So, leaders, or those persons whose voices are heard, listened to, and valued, play a
key role in how a crisis is perceived and subsequently handled. Stemming from Ulmer,
Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2015) definition, leadership during risk and crisis is a process in
which a person or persons are able to manage uncertainty inherent to risk and crisis, and
use appropriate communication strategies towards diverse groups and publics to achieve
their goals and complete tasks. Effective leadership becomes crucial during times of risk
and crisis because uncertainty abounds.
Reynolds (2004) assert that crises change the way in which leaders should
communicate with their publics. Natural disasters create a unique social environment, and,
thus, the manner in which leaders typically communicate with their community will likely
be different during crisis events (Reynolds, 2002). During crises, the public desires that
leaders explain what they know (Reynolds, 2004). Via effective communication, leaders
can help to mitigate the negative consequences of such large-scale events by providing
appropriately tailored instructional and supportive messages. Reynolds (2004) assert, “As
a leader in a crisis you can have a real, measurable effect on the wellbeing of your
community through the words you say and the speed and sincerity with which you say
them” (p. 4).
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Reynolds (2004) asserts that leaders underestimate the amount of time they need to
spend on communication focused strategies during the pre-crisis stage. The author asserts:
Leaders who have faced a crisis in their community readily admit that in their
planning for a crisis they may have invested only about one percent of the pre-crisis
funding to public communication planning and then training about 10 percent of
their time in drills or exercises on the public education component. They then found
that when the crisis occurred they were spending about 90 percent of their time
dealing with decisions about communicating to the public. (Reynolds, 2004, p. 5)
In this sense, leaders must be prepared to facilitate communication and education
campaigns in the pre-crisis stage in order to better prepare themselves for crisis response.
Such preparation also involves deciding what information to provide, when, where, to
whom, and the reasoning behind providing it (Reynolds, 2004).
Reynolds (2004) outlines five communication mishaps to be avoided by leaders
during crisis and emergency-risk communication. First, the author asserts that mixed
messages from multiple experts should be avoided. Instead, it is important that experts
speak with a unified voice so that the public does not have to choose which person to
believe. Second, information should be provided from leaders in a timely manner. The
author warns that if such information is not provided on time, other parties whose interests
do not align with those of the public may persuade the public of incorrect information or
advice. For example, post the 9/11 attacks, numerous members of the public bought gas
masks because the CDC took about three weeks to investigate and issue a statement on
whether the masks were necessary for protection. Third, the author warns against
paternalistic communication whereby communicators fail to provide specific strategies for
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self-protection. Instead, the author asserts, leaders should help the public understand how
you came to the conclusions and advice you came to by providing reasoning behind the
conclusion(s). The author advises never to tell the public to ‘not worry’ as this comes across
as paternalistic and fails to consider the complexity of the situation at-hand. Fourth, the
author discusses the importance of actively monitoring real-time rumors or myths that may
persuade the public to take ineffective or inappropriate actions. Fifth, the author warns to
guard against power-struggles that make the public confused and have to choose between
leaders communicating on the risk and crisis. For example, such perceived power struggles
can occur when a governor and a mayor are providing two different press conferences at
the same time in different places. The author asserts that such actions ask the public to
choose to which person’s messages to attend and may debilitate public trust in the
organization.
Establishing Risk and Crisis Planning into Organizational Culture
An important arena of crisis leadership is the role that organizational culture plays
on dealing with and overcoming the crisis. Culture is the constructed norms, rules,
processes which are co-created through communication. These established norms, process,
and co-created realities are established and maintained in large part by the leader.
Regarding effective crisis leadership communication, it is important for the leader to
establish a culture that is ‘resilient’ to negative [inside or outside] forces to deconstruct it.
Alder (1997) conducted two case studies which examined the Mann Gulch and Storm King
Mountain fires to understand why the crises unfolded as they did. He found one of the key
reasons the men did not know what to do in the midst of the crisis is attributed to the
organizational culture of which they were a part. Specifically, in the case of the Mann
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Gulch fire, the organizational culture prior to the crisis was one in which there was little
communication between the members of the team. A lack of strong organizational culture
beforehand explained why communication, obedience, structured process, and trust were
missing during the crisis itself. Further, the leaders of the team failed to establish a
legitimate authority during the crises; that is, the leaders lacked in providing their team
with clear instructional communication messages during the crisis and, therefore, many of
the men were in a chaotic and disorganized state with no set processes in place for handling
the crises.
Establishing a Culture of Preparedness
Establishing a culture of preparedness should be of upmost importance to the leader
as soon as they enter their position. Leaders must realize that crises are inevitable events
in a system, and they can come in ‘all sizes’ or levels of repercussion. Threats will naturally
vary depending on the field in which the leader is housed. Nonetheless, active
environmental scanning of threats is necessary to successful outcomes (Mitroff, 2004).
A culture of preparation in an organization should be established during the earliest
stages of the crisis development. The leader should communicate to the organizational
members the importance of establishing crisis management and planning. Further, leaders
should encourage a culture of active preparation. Active preparation includes developing
early warning systems and identifying emerging issues early. Crisis preparation also
includes: “(1) recognizing danger signs through scanning the external and internal
environments; (2) identifying trouble spots or vulnerabilities; (3) developing a crisis
management plan (including a crisis management team); and (4) building organizational
credibility” (Hackman & Johnson, 2010, p. 435). Proactivity may also include tracking
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“media articles, industry reports and legislative actions on these potential issues” and
conducting “a vulnerability audit to identify internal weaknesses” (Gainey, 2010, p. 36).
Other activities include establishing a formal written crisis plan and appointing members
who would be well suited to lead the endeavor, and undergoing frequent training to put
processes into place.
Embedding a culture of risk and crisis planning can be challenging. Many leaders
fail to acknowledge their role as affected by crises (Gainey, 2010). Buckle (2003) proposes
that the manner in which crises are imagined should change. He asserts that this process
includes, “examining ways in which we share knowledge – vertically from governments
with communities across different disciplines; and from formal disciplines to traditional
knowledge” (Buckle, 2003, p. 121). Buckle’s view is especially pertinent as systems
become more interdependent on each other. That is, the more interwoven systems become,
the more likely it is that a crisis that occurs halfway across the world has an effect on other
components of the system near and far.
Communicating with Stakeholders
Inevitably, leaders will have to address stakeholders. Stakeholders in the context of
risk and crisis include, but are not limited to, the lay public; the media; non-profit
organizations; government officials at both the federal, state, and local levels; corporations;
and emergency response teams. Evident is that the aforementioned group of possible
stakeholders all come from varying fields, and thus may have varying levels of expertise,
hold different values, and have varying tolerance to uncertainty management (Gregory &
Dieckmann, 2014). Thus, risk and crisis planning for a leader means being able to wear a
variety of ‘hats’ when maneuvering through the network and meeting stakeholder needs.
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Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) emphasize the significance of leaders in
building strong relationships with stakeholders well before anything occurs. These
established relationships before the crisis help the leader to be perceived as credible,
personable, and open. Thus, when risk and crises emerge, the leader has built a reservoir
of goodwill amongst the stakeholders, enabling him or her to better ‘weather the storm’ of
the crisis.
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) also emphasize the role that communication
plays in leadership crisis. The authors assert that communication aids in creating the
impression the crisis is being actively managed to the best of the organization’s ability.
Further, communication throughout the crisis development helps to reduce stakeholder
uncertainty about the event. When uncertainty is high, stakeholders will look for
information anywhere they can to help relieve their uncertainty about the risk or crisis.
Consequently, it is best if the information which these stakeholders seek comes directly
from the organization rather than from some other unaffiliated source where information
can be misconstrued. As such, the leader should be able and willing to provide information
to stakeholders when appropriate. The provided information should be strategic in the sense
that the leader provides information to each stakeholder that is relevant to their particular
needs. When the communication flow between the leader and the stakeholders is constant
and well-established prior to the crisis, the stakeholder begins to build trust in the leader
and his or her organization and is likely to turn to the leader as their first source of
information during the crisis itself.
Leadership is pivotal to ensuring stakeholders feel involved in the process
especially during risk assessment. In the pre-crisis stage, communicating with stakeholders
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regarding the uncertainty present in an impending crisis can be difficult because
uncertainty must be comprehendible to diverse participants, discussed, and considered with
other important issues (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014). Lundgren and McMakin (2009) say
that stakeholders are increasingly seeking to be involved with the risk assessment – they
seek to understand how it is done and be directly involved with the decision making
process. Thus, the authors argue that it is not surprising to find organizations meeting and
discussing with stakeholders before making risk decisions. For instance, the leader of a
company may act as an emergency response manager, provide comfort to employees, hold
together the internal systems of the organization, speak to the media, and enact renewal
discourse.
A key way that leaders have engaged in the process of involving stakeholders is
through facilitated deliberation. Facilitated deliberation involves two methods that have
been particularly helpful to risk assessment namely, Citizens Juries and study circles
(Lundgren & McMakin, 2009). The Citizens Juries are “designed to enable citizens to
engage in informed discussions, generating findings for decision makers and the broader
community” (p. 241). The process of forming a jury involves randomly selecting a
representative panel of citizens to meet for four or five days and to hear from ‘witnesses’
and consider their various positions surrounding a risk. Citizens Juries are unique in that
“they are independent of the organizations that formed them. Sessions are open to
observers, and the final report is in the public domain” (p. 242). Study circles are
community groups, consisting of persons holding a variety of diverse perspectives that
come together several times a year to discuss risks and how they should be handled. These
meetings are usually facilitated by trained member and the focus is on discussing the risk
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issue from a variety of perspectives so that all ideas are out on the table (Lundgren &
McMakin, 2009). Proponents of the study circles say that the meetings help to reconnect
leaders with their community, and help to make the community become more involved and
understanding of the complex nature of risk decision-making.
Another way leaders have involved stakeholders is through third-party facilitating.
Third-party facilitating involves having a neutral member partake in the communication
exchange between discussing parties. The third-party facilitator acts as a moderator, asking
for respondents to clarify their messages, helping to continue the negotiation process. There
are three different types of third-party facilitating methods namely, facilitation, mediation,
and negotiation. Lundgren and McMakin (2009) assert that the goals of this general process
are the same regardless of method and “allow voluntary participation by the disputants in
a fair process, craft a creative and mutually satisfactory resolution, and enhance the parties’
relationships while enabling them to save face” (p. 243).
There are several advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder participation in risk
communication of which leaders should be aware and employ appropriately. Lundgren and
McMakin (2009) break down the benefits and drawbacks of stakeholder participation by
the eight types of communication interaction employed. I focus on four of the interactions
the authors outline as they specifically pertain to strategies that can be employed by
earthquake scientists – who act as leaders - when earthquake forecasting during the precrisis stage of the crisis cycle.
Formal hearings are advantageous because they are easy to form and allow for
groups dispersed across regions to participate. The drawbacks of formal hearings is that
they can increase hostility around the issue and may make some members upset. Lundgren
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and McMakin (2009) assert that this approach is the least effective of all approaches across
the crisis cycle. Next, advisory groups can be advantageous for leaders to enact because
these events afford the stakeholder more time to learn about the risk and help them make
better decisions. The drawback of advisory groups are that they require great effort from
the organization to implement and may include abundant amounts of time, money, and
staff. Third, risk-assessment interactions can be advantageous because they “increase the
chances of acceptable assessment” and provide a trustworthy review of the process (p.
247). The disadvantages of such an approach is that these interactions can be challenging
for technical experts to undergo, and the assessment requires that the audience has some
knowledge of the technical complexities of the risk. Lastly, decision-making interactions
are “the highest form of involvement” and are advantageous to employ because they can
lead to more agreeable decisions where people know what to do and when to do it. The
drawbacks of this approach are that it takes the control away from the organization and
may not always be legal (Lundgren & McMakin, 2009).
Communicating with the Media
The media is particular important stakeholder that leaders must address during risk
and crisis as they play a large role in shaping the narrative of the risk or crisis. Ulmer,
Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) say that while it may go against natural instincts to avoid the
media or provide short answers or worse yet ‘no comment,’ leaders should be at the
forefront of media stories. Specifically, the authors assert that leaders must be actively
engaged with the media during the entirety of the crisis development cycle. They say that
during risk and crisis events, it is especially important for the leader to emerge in the
spotlight and serve as the spokesperson. The authors further argue for the importance of
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being open and honest with the media. The media has to do their job, which is to provide
what they know to the public. So, it is the job of the leader to be at the ‘front’ of the story
because it provides the leader with more control over how the story will be written and
perceived. Speaking with the media and being open, honest, and willing to talk does not
mean that the leader is accepting blame or responsibility for what happened. Rather, this
act helps audiences perceive the speaker as being empathetic, active in finding solutions,
and being human (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2015).
Other important lessons for leaders communicating with the media include
disallowing the reporters to force responses onto the leader. This can be prevented by being
mindful during the conversation and avoiding getting angry during the conversation.
Further, when speaking to the media, leaders should express concern for those persons who
may be most affected by the risk or crisis. When the media asks leaders to provide an
answer to a question of which they are not sure, it is important that the leader does not
provide a pseudo answer or avoid the question. Rather, the leader is advised to be honest
with the reporter and tell him or her that while they do not know at the moment, they are
working hard on finding a solution. This type of response helps to shed the idea that the
leader is 100-percent certain and 100-percent confident during a time when uncertainty
prevails.
Crises as Opportunity
Finally, crisis can be seen as an opportunity on which leaders should capitalize.
Fink (1986) defined a crisis as “an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decision to
change is impending” (p. 15). Interestingly, Fink’s definition of a crisis paints it as both a
threat and an opportunity (Massey & Larsen, 2006). Therefore, a crisis should be studied
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not only in terms of how it is perceived but also how it is addressed (Massey & Larsen,
2006). This opportunity for positive growth post-crisis has been termed as renewal.
Specifically, Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger (2009) define renewal as a shift away from
previous approaches to newer and stronger ways of doing. Renewal is more than simply
the end of a crisis, it is the ability to seize the opportunity – in whatever form it may come
– to create a better and newer name for the organization after the crisis. Renewal for a
company can lead to increased sales, as was the case for Johnson and Johnson after their
1982 crisis involving their product Tylenol, and even policy change, as was the case for
the United States government in the September 11th implementation of the Patriot Act.
There are four characteristics of renewal discourse namely, organizational learning,
ethical communication, prospective vision, and sound organizational rhetoric.
Organizational learning refers to the leader displaying in both paradigmatic and behavioral
forms that the organization has learned from the event. Ethical communication refers to
communicating with integrity so that stakeholders have a great deal of trust in the leader
and the organization. This means the leader should be honest and accountable throughout
the life cycle of the crisis. Prospective vision is arguably at the heart of renewal as it asks
the leader to employ communication that is forward looking and optimistic. This means
the leader does not focus on what happened, but rather what could be accomplished. Lastly,
organizational rhetoric involves using persuasive strategies when communicating in order
to appeal to the audience and convince them that they should move beyond the event.
Organizational rhetoric also involves encouraging the audience to ‘see’ the event in the
optimistic and opportunistic way in which the leader and the organization sees it.
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In sum, leadership is an important and growing field in risk and crisis
communication research and an underlying premise to CERC. Leaders play a key role at
every stage of CERC, but they play the largest role in the pre-crisis stage where they
facilitate communication and education campaigns about the risk. Leaders are pivotal in
constructing perceptions of the risks and crisis to stakeholders. While leadership during
crisis can be difficult, stressful, and overwhelming, with effective communication
employed, the leader should capitalize on ways their organization can emerge from the
crisis renewed and with a better sense of purpose for the stakeholders and public they serve.
Expert Risk-Perception and Communication
Expert risk assessments could be vastly different from one another if experts
disagree on the conceptualization of risk and their calculated probability and magnitude of
harm (Bostrom, 1997). Risk assessment is the process by which experts calculate the
magnitude of the risk and its chances to occur. Experts are often asked to provide their
assessments to non-experts (e.g., government officials, the lay public, emergency
responders, insurance companies, etc.). Attending to non-experts with varying levels of
expertise in the area of earthquake forecasting can be a challenging task. This task is
exceptionally challenging considering earthquake scientists are trained in the natural
sciences and may pay little attention to the principles of effective communication outlined
by the social sciences.
Expert risk assessment involves two general areas: estimating the probability of the
risk and assessing the magnitude of harm. Bostrom (1997) asserts that “even restricting
risk to these two dimensions leaves the problem of how to combine the two undefined” (p.
103). For example, said the author:
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Defining harm as carcinogenicity and excluding reduction of ecological
functionality in this definition of harm could lead to different risk management
priorities than if both were included. Even if experts agree on the nature of the
harms to be included and the probability distributions of those harms, experts who
focus only on the worst outcome may reach different conclusions than those who
calculate and use average expected. (Bostrom, 1997, p. 103)
Disagreement amongst experts may occur in the simplest of stages over the
conceptualizations of the risk itself. Other problematic areas of expert assessment include
too strong of an emphasis on mortality rates over all other consequences, advancing risks
from the scientific laboratory to the real world, and how to operationalize risks using a
single all-explanatory dimension (Bostrom, 1997).
Expert assessment within the context of earthquake risk can vary, too, based on the
manner in which probabilities are assessed namely, using the Frequentist approach or the
Bayesian approach. Experts who take the frequentist approach define probability as “the
limit of the relevant frequency with which the event occurs in repeated trials under the
same conditions” (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 202). The Frequentist approach asserts that
data alone can provide objective understanding of the risk, and that by examining the
frequency of events, experts will be able to understand the likelihood of their future
occurrence. On the other hand, Bayesians, or those taking the Bayesian approach, define
probability as “degree of belief” (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 202). Bayesians use prior
experience and understanding in their analysis of the evidence. Further, Bayesians believe
that probability is not something inherent in a system, rather it is a consensus of judgement.
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Mulargia and Geller (2003) assert that both the Frequentist and the Bayesian
approach are insufficient for interpreting earthquake forecasts. Thompson (1990) also
claimed that neither approach is adequate for risk assessment. He asserted, “The objectivist
view makes it too hard for us to be right in making a risk judgement, while the subjectivist
view makes it too hard for us to be wrong” (para. 26). As a result, experts may find areas
of disagreement amongst themselves. Specifically, Bostrom (1997) said that experts
disagree because: “they rely inappropriately on limited data; impose order on random
events; fit ambiguous evidence into predispositions; omit components of risk, such as
human errors or common mode failures; [and] are overconfident in the reliability of
analyses” (p. 104). Kahneman (2011) concluded disciplined Bayesian reasoning can be
summarized in two points: first, experts should anchor their judgment of the probability of
an outcome on a reasonable base rate. Second, experts should “question the diagnosticity
of [their] evidence” (p. 154).
Risk assessment by experts is based on both objective and subjective criteria. That
is, while data and models help experts understand the risk objectively, risk assessment
involves a great deal of uncertainty upon which experts must make decisions. As Wynne
(1987) noted, many dimensions of risk analysis by experts involves informal judgement
and decision-making, and these expert judgements are perceived objective. Kahneman
(2011) conducted a synthesis of humans’ two systems of thinking that guide decision
making and risk judgement. He asserted, “Democracy is inevitably messy, in part because
the availability and affect heuristics that guide citizens’ beliefs and attitudes are inevitably
biased, even if they generally point in the right direction” (p. 145). He concluded that

38

research should inform the design of risk policies that combine the experts’ knowledge
with the public’s emotions and intuitions (Kahneman, 2011).
Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (2000) say that experts should be aware of their
own limitations with risk assessment. They advise experts to take into consideration “the
important qualitative aspects of risk that influence the responses of laypeople, and
somehow to create ways in which these considerations can find expression in hazard
management without, in the process, creating more heat than light” (p.120). Additionally,
Slovic (2000) said that technical limitations and divergence among experts play a role in
how risks are perceived. He warns:
Risk communicators must be fully aware of the strengths and limits of the methods
used to generate the information they are attempting to convey to the public. In
particular, communicators need to understand that risk assessments are constructed
from theoretical models that are based on assumptions and subjective judgments. If
these assumptions and judgements are deficient, the resulting assessments may be
quite inaccurate. (p.183)
Experts may fail to consider the influence of the behavioral and social conventions upon
which their judgements are grounded (Wynne, 1987).
Differences in risk assessment amongst even experts has led some scientists to the
conclusion that science is, at least in part, socially constructed. For example, while one
may assume that all experts, regardless of scientific field, will be able to judge risks
similarly based on their educational background, researchers have shown that crossdiscipline scientific differences in risk judgment exist. Barke and Jenkins-Smith (1993)
found that life scientists believe nuclear power and radioactive waste as much more
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dangerous than scientists of other disciplines. Consequently, many scholars have come to
the conclusion that science is partial to societal norms. That is, scientific findings are
influenced by theoretical, methodological, cultural, and temporal constraints. Scientific
findings are also influenced by institutional and political demands on scientists the
organizations they serve (Bostrom, 1997).
Ensuring that the earthquake scientists are not living in fear of broadcasting a
‘wrong call’ is important to being able to provide honest forecasts of the earthquake risk.
Gigerenzer (2014) described the act of ‘defensive decision making.’ Defensive decision
making occurs when “a person or group ranks option A as the best for the situation, but
chooses an inferior option B to protect itself in case something goes wrong” (Gigerenzer,
2014, p. 56). Defensive decision making most often occurs when the decision makers lack
the appropriate amount of information and lives in a ‘negative error culture’ or a culture
“in which everyone lacks the courage to make a decision for which they may be punished”
(p. 55). Forms of defensive decision making include failing to make a decision,
procrastinating in order to escape responsibility, and providing the second best option.
Defensive decision making has become increasingly common for experts because of legal
repercussions that could ensue (take for example, the devastating aftermath for scientists
in the wake of the L’Aquila earthquake). In a survey conducted of 824 emergency doctors
in Pennsylvania, ninety-three percent disclosed that they practice a form of defensive
decision making with their patients, called defensive medicine, in which they prescribe
tests or treatments that have the potential to harm the patient because of fear of legal
repercussions.
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In their study on communicating probability to diverse stakeholders, Gregory and
Dieckmann (2014) noted that problems in the communication process arise when scientists
are confronted with communicating to multiple stakeholders. The authors find that
scientists take three common approaches to communicating probability to diverse
stakeholders. The first common approach is the communicator will fail to communicate the
uncertainty of the risk altogether because he or she feels that the audience will not be able
to understand it or, conversely, the communicator will assume that the audience knows that
the uncertainty is implied when discussing risk and, consequently, fail to explicitly discuss
it. Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) found that the second common approach for
communicating probability is that the communicator will provide the probabilistic
information in an oversimplified manner, presenting the probability in a single-format
approach.
Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) assert there are nine different ways to present
uncertainty: verbal probability statement, verbal evaluative label, numerical probability
expression, frequency or odds, simple ranges, three-point ranges, figures, and box and
whisker plots. The authors assert, rather than using multiple formats to communicate the
probability so to meet the needs of the diverse audience, the communicator will typically
rely on just one format. Usually the format the communicator chooses is one in which he
or she is most comfortable with explaining or believes will generate the desired
interpretation. The single-format approach can be troublesome as it provides an oversimplified view of the risk, and presentation in this format could lead to stakeholders failing
to take the required action in order to mitigate the crisis or prevent the crisis from
happening. Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) say when scientists choose to communicate
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probability using multiple formats, stakeholders may interpret the information differently
based on the format they chose.
Communicating technical information is also challenging and involves
communicating the strength of the evidence. The strength of the evidence refers to
statements indicating how strongly the communicator feels about the information being
presented. For example, researchers may use hedging phrases such as ‘it is unlikely, but
possible,’ ‘it is rather unlikely,’ or ‘a lack of occurrence cannot be excluded’ to
communicate that contradictory or inconclusive evidence may be present and that they are
careful to not indicate their complete certainty. Other current approaches to communicating
the strength of evidence include, Institutional Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) five
group grading schema, California EMF degree of certainty, a GRADE system, and the
AGREE collaboration (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). These approaches vary in
their qualitative and quantitative presentation of information. That is, while some of the
formats present information in purely qualitative form, others are a mixture of qualitative
and quantitative providing a number inclusive with the marker indicating the strength of
evidence. While formats and templates exist for communicating the strength of the
evidence, it is not known how frequently they are used by scientists when communicating
the probability of an earthquake. Further, the effectiveness and outcomes of these formats
and templates needs further investigation.
Translating scientifically complex evidence into less technical information can be
compared to the experience bi-cultural persons experience when they go back and forth
from the worldviews of their audiences. The term, ‘code switching’ is usually associated
with Intercultural Communication literature to mean a bi-bilingual or multi-lingual person
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being able to go back and forth between their languages and the different worldviews that
come with the language. Within the context of risk and crisis communication, the
researcher finds the term code switching appropriate to describing the ability for risk and
crisis communicators to tailor their message based on their audience needs. Code switching
is also the ability of communicators to assess beforehand the worldview and experiences
of the audience prior to presenting their message. Navigating between the two different
“codes” of talk (technical and non-technical) is no easy task, but being able to effectively
do so can increase interpretation of information for the audience.
Risk communication challenges arise with communicating the main arguments
around the risk (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). While scientists may be comfortable
in dealing with inconsistent or contradictory evidence surrounding risk, communicating
such information to diverse audiences with varying degrees of expertise can be
problematic. “As in the other areas of risk communication, reporting inconclusive evidence
has to take into account insights into human information processing of probabilistic
information and uncertainty” (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014, p. 40). When
communicating risk, scientists should take into consideration that strength of evidence
usually does not include arguments associated with the risk. Information is often vital for
the public “who wish to consider whether a given classification of the strength of evidence
is reasonable” (p. 46). Evidence reporting must consider four important areas. First, the lay
public may have difficulty understanding how scientific institutions validate certain
sources over others and thus may be too trusting on evidence that is unreliable. Second, the
negativity effect takes hold during processing of risk communication. Third, incoming
information is always analyzed in the context of existing information and beliefs. And,
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lastly, people tend to place more weight on the probability of the event occurring rather
than the probability of the event not to occur.
Recently, evidence maps have been a helpful resource to stakeholders and the
public when assessing information (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). Evidence maps
help readers understand how experts came upon their judgements, and the maps do two
effective things when displaying evidence. First, the map outlines remaining uncertainty
that helps to remind the reader that there is still uncertainty present with the risk. Second,
the map provides information on the number of studies used to provide assessment for the
risk—allowing the reader to make a more informed decision. Evidence maps are helping
to make analyzing risk easier for stakeholders and the public, however, these maps are
rarely used.
The communicator often fails to account for the varying ways in which non-experts
will interpret the information. Members of the lay public interpret risk communication
differently based on various factors such as their previous experience with similar risks,
their age, media reporting of the risk (framing effects), cultural influences, and their
numeracy comprehension. Venette (2008) studied the newspaper reporting of the 2005
hurricane season in order to understand how the reporting may have reinforced
reconstructed decisions not to evacuate the affected area. Venette saw risk as a socially
constructed view of a probability of a negative event occurring. He found that the publics’
pre-existing beliefs and past experiences of similar risks will have more weight than risk
messages from scientists. As a result of his findings, Venette (2008) suggested some
important approaches to risk communication. First, he recommends that scientists should
be active in attempting to comprehend how the public will receive the messages they
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provide paying particular attention to understanding how the public will deem the risk as
affecting their lives. Second, he recommends that when scientist communicate the current
risk, they should not compare it to previous risk because people will taint the current risk
with the outcome and processes of the previous. Third, Venette suggests that scientists
should provide evidence to the public in a strategic manner so that the public takes action
because they perceive as doing it because they so desired. Lastly, Venette prescribes that
scientists and communicators conduct heavy audience analysis on their targeted audience
to better meet their communication needs. Audience analysis should be conducted in such
depth, he says, that scientists can predict the alternative constructions to the presented risk
that the audience may make.
Lastly, aside from knowing how to communicate probability, scientists must also
know when it is appropriate to communicate probability (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014).
There are times when communicating probability is not always appropriate. Gregory and
Dieckmann (2014) assert that “there are times when communicating probabilities may not
work well as part of the multi-party environmental decision-making process” such as
“when uncertainty is severe, when extremely low probabilities are at issue, or when the
assignment of probabilities fails to improve insights for decision-makers” (p. 61). During
these times, a statement of certainty may be better suited in order to motivate the audience
to take the desired actions. Or, it may be better to not communicate the uncertainty at all if
the risk is of low probability.
Regardless of the barriers experts may experience in risk judgment, experts have
more specialized knowledge of the topics they study and the appropriate resources and
tools to help them understand phenomena with better accuracy. While non-experts may not
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have academically-based understandings of risk, their risk judgements do carry value,
nonetheless. Although the aims of the current study are to explore expert risk judgment
(specifically that of earthquake scientists), it is important to ascertain the current state of
knowledge on non-expert risk judgment in order to fully understand why experts may
experience difficulty communicating to non-experts.
Non-Expert Risk Perception
Slovic (1987) emphasized the important role both scientists and the lay public play
in risk perception. He asserts, while scientists are guided by more rational decision-making
than the lay public, understanding numbers with better clarity and allowing numbers to
guide their judgements, non-experts have important contributions to risk perception that
should not be overlooked (Slovic, 2010). In order for effective crisis and emergency-risk
communication, experts should consider how their perceptions of risk may differ from
those of non-experts.
The public, albeit guided by emotion, past experience, and risk comparison, have
something to offer when it comes to risk perception. Slovic (1987) asserts:
Lay people sometimes lack certain information about hazards. However,
their basic conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the experts
and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk
assessments. As a result, risk communication and risk management efforts
are destined to fail unless they are structured as a two-way process. Each
side, expert and public, has something valid to contribute. Each side must
respect the insights and intelligence of the other. (p. 285)
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Slovic (2010) stresses that messages of probability are incorrectly interpreted because
human decision-making regarding risk is dependent on more than numerical
representations. Rather, human decision-making during risk is determined by a number of
forces including educational background, affect, and prior experiences with similar risks.
Perhaps one of those most prominent scholarly work of the differences in risk
perception between experts and non-experts is that of Peter Sandman. Sandman (2012)
argues that risk can be measured as a sum of hazard and outrage and that this equation can
help to understand the public’s apathy towards some risk opposed to others. Hazard is
essentially the statistical probability the event will occur. Outrage, on the other hand,
describes all of the other factors on which people base their perceptions of risk. For
example, some components of outrage include whether the disaster is natural versus
industrial, familiar or exotic, memorable or unmemorable, dreaded or desired, chronic or
catastrophic, knowable or unknowable, controlled by self or controlled by others, fair or
unfair, and morally relevant or morally irrelevant (Sandman, 2012). Sandman argues, while
scientists attend to hazard, the public attend to outrage. The author argues that such
conceptualization of risk, as a sum of hazard and outrage, can help to understand why
situations arise where experts perceive a hazard as high and the publics’ outrage is low, the
experts will be alarmed and the public will be indifferent.
Crisis and emergency-risk communicators should caution against discounting the
risk perception of non-experts. Sandman argues that the public’s perceptions of risk are as
objective as the experts’ technical conceptualizations. Non-experts’ risk perceptions are
less numeric, but they are grounded in scientifically-backed feelings of control and
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familiarity. Sandman (2012) also says that scientists who deem outrage as “irrational” are
failing to acknowledge the scientific evidence of outrage (p. 109). He explains:
We [social scientists] already know more about outrage genesis than, say,
carcinogenesis—not because social science is more powerful than natural science,
but because outrage is a simpler phenomenon than hazard. Outrage is increasingly
predictable and manageable. A scientist or engineer who persists in seeing it as
inscrutable is simply ignoring the data. (Sandman, p. 110)
Considering Sandman’s conceptualization of risk, communicators must reflect on the
public’s perception of the hazard even if they believe such perceptions are illogical or
unjustified. Communicative response must follow suite. That is, as the public perceive
some risks as more acceptable than others, communicative response should be based on
the manner in which these risks are perceived by non-experts.
Summary
This literature review provided insight into the current state of earthquake
forecasting and an exhaustive review of the CERC model. This literature review also
reviewed risk and crisis communication leadership as earthquake scientists act as
communication leaders during the earliest stage of the crisis. Lastly this literature review
included describing expert and non-expert risk perception and risk communication. All
reviewed components of this literature review help to inform the researcher on the topics
pertinent to providing context to earthquake scientists’ challenges and experience with risk
communication.
The current state of earthquake forecasting is one that is extremely complex and
unpredictable. Earthquakes are unique natural disasters in the sense that they are an
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ongoing crisis whereby one earthquake is usually followed by aftershocks. Further, those
earthquakes have varying levels of intensity such that the first earthquake in a sequence is
not always the largest magnitude. Lastly, earthquakes sequences are distributed differently
in time and space (i.e., the earthquake sequence does not occur simultaneously in time nor
space).
CERC is a crisis stage model that provides focus on communication throughout the
life-cycle of an event. The model has effective in the context of public health crisis and
emergency-risk communication response and shows promise for continued effectiveness
in other contexts, such as earthquake communication. CERC merges the areas of risk
communication and crisis communication. The model has five stages: pre-crisis, initial,
maintenance, resolution, and evaluation. During the pre-crisis stage is when experts, such
as earthquake scientists, play the largest role in facilitating communication.
In the process of communication facilitation in the pre-crisis stage, earthquake
scientists take on the role of crisis and emergency-risk communication leaders.
Communication leaders are conceptualized as persons who effectively manage uncertainty
surrounding the crisis event and/or risk and use appropriate communication tools to achieve
their goals. This literature review also discussed the importance of a healthy organizational
culture to effective communication. Leaders play a large role in how such organizational
cultures are developed and maintained. Leaders should also have healthy relationships
established with their stakeholders and follow guidelines for effective communication with
such stakeholders.
While experts have a more scientific understanding of these events helping to guide
their judgement, non-experts’ risk judgment is also valuable and cannot be discounted.
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Non-experts base their risk judgement on a variety of components such as their previous
experience with such risks and their feelings about the risk itself. Experts are cautioned to
refrain from holding superior views of risk judgement and rather seek greater
understanding into how non-expert audiences perceive the risks they communicate. The
subsequent section details the methodological approach of this study.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This chapter explains a study design that addresses the communicative experiences
and challenges of earthquake scientists who communicate scientific information
surrounding earthquake risk to the public and other stakeholders. Exploring the challenges
earthquake scientists perceive they face in communicating technical or expert information
to non-experts helps to understand their experience and provide communication
recommendations based on their particular challenges. Given the developmental nature of
the current study, a qualitative in-depth methodology is appropriate to uncover challenges
earthquake scientists face during the earliest stages of the crisis cycle. The current study
seeks to answer the following research questions:
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC?
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they
face in communicating with non-experts?
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with
communicating probability to non-experts?
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model?
Qualitative Interviews with Earthquake Scientists
The process of interviewing can be described as both a science and an art (Lindlof
& Taylor, 2011). It is through the process of interviewing that the researcher is able to
uncover systems of meaning, understand participants and topics in more depth, and build
knowledge inter-subjectively (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In order to capture individuals’
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lived experiences, in-depth qualitative interviews are most appropriate (Marshall &
Rossman, 2016). Paget (1983) eloquently describes the unique attributes of in-depth
interviewing:
What distinguishes in-depth interviewing is that the answers given continually
inform the evolving conversation. Knowledge thus accumulates with many turns at
talk. It collects in stories, asides, hesitations, expressions of feeling, and
spontaneous associations… The specific person interviewing, the “I” that I am,
personally contributes to the creation of the interview’s content because I follow
my own perplexities as they arise in our discourse. (p. 78)
Qualitative interviewing serves some pivotal purposes including: understanding another’s
worldview and perspective through their account; gaining insight into language forms used
by others; gathering information about a topic or a group that cannot be attained effectively
through other research means; probing about the past; authenticating, validating, or
remarking on information acquired from other sources; and efficiently collecting large
amounts of data (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).
Specific to this study, a qualitative approach is most appropriate for three key
reasons. First, gaining perspective from earthquake scientists on their communication
challenges is extremely important as there has yet to be coherent understanding of the
communicative experiences of experts on the topic of risk judgement. While researchers
have sought evidence in the form of quantitative surveys and experimental designs, there
remains ample uncertainty about expert and non-expert risk judgement and decision
making as it differs so widely amongst groups and between individuals within groups.
There has yet to be a rich and comprehensive understanding of the experiences of experts
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on risk judgement. Moreover, no such studies have examined earthquake scientists, a
population most vulnerable to this issue. Through the method of qualitative interviewing,
the researcher is able to gain an in-depth understanding, exploring the dimensions of this
complex, dense, and multi-facetted experience. Such an exploration is especially pertinent
to the experiences of earthquake scientists because they face some extreme risk judgement
experiences considering the enormous uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting, the
time gap between the risk judgement and the crisis event itself, and the various audiences
to which the earthquake scientists must communicate this complicated information.
Second, because this particular line of research examining earthquake scientists’
communicatory experiences is in its earliest stages, a qualitative approach enables to
researcher to explore the topic in great depth. The researcher is able to understand the
phenomena in-depth as the participants are not limited to survey responses based on preorchestrated operationalization of variables. In this sense, the researcher is able to fully
explore the topic at hand without the confines of preconceived conceptualizations and go
beyond the theoretical walls of understanding, if the data warrants. While a theoretical
framework is used in this study, CERC, the researcher is able to expand beyond this lens
and follow the path of the participants’ responses. The researcher is able to explore the
whole range of the phenomena – gaining more depth and breadth than a quantitative study
could provide (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In this endeavor, the researcher is able to build a
more contextualized understanding of the participants’ responses gaining a more holistic
understanding.
Third, the researcher is able to understand the phenomena through the eyes of the
participants (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Qualitative interviewing provides a unique
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experience in which the interview subject provides insight into his or her social world,
inviting the researcher to view the situation, issue, or topic through their inimitable lens
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). If executed properly, in the process of the interview, the
researcher is able to gain perspective of the difficulties, joys, and hardships of the topic for
the participant. Further, the researcher is able to probe for more information from the
participant if the response provided was unclear, insufficient, especially important to the
research study, or if new information emerged that the researcher found important to the
study.
Informant Interviews
There are several different types of interviews in Communication research that are
distinguished by their context, content, length of interview, type of discourse produced,
and the relational emphasis of the interview (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Informant
interviews are one such type and are used when the researcher seeks to gain deep and
extensive knowledge about their research topic. Given the nature of this study, the
researcher employed informant interviews. Informants provide the researcher with insight
“about the scene - the scene’s history, customs, and rituals; the local lingo; the identities
and actions of the key players; and so forth” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 177). Lindlof and
Taylor (2011) outline the attributes of a good informant as a veteran of the scene,
knowledgeable about the topic, respected by others because of their membership, and
possess understanding into the language and processes of the group. Informants can act as
gatekeepers of both knowledge and membership, and they can help the researcher gain
valuable insight and access into both realms. In the present study, earthquake scientists
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acted as informants as they provided the researcher with access into a social world she
otherwise would not have access or knowledge about.
The researcher can come across some challenges when conducting informant
interviews. Marshall and Rossman (2016) provide some noteworthy difficulties of
informant interviews or what they call elite interviews including difficulty contacting the
informant as they usually under time constraints or may be traveling. Another challenge
they note is that the researcher may need to accommodate to the wishes of the informant
during the interview. Typically, informants are familiar with the interview process because
they may have been interviewed in the past and thus may be “sophisticated in managing
the interview process” (p. 160). Another challenge in informant interviews is that the great
pressure placed on the researcher to be well versed and knowledgeable of the topic so that
they may be able to converse with the informant (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Or, if the
researcher is not well versed or knowledgeable on the topic, it is important they ask their
questions in such a way that involves sensitive and competent questioning (Marshall &
Rossman, 2016). Lastly, Marshall and Rossman, (2016) acknowledge the power dynamic
present in informant interviews that can cause tension or difficulty. These challenges are
often amplified when the world-view or cultural orientation of the researcher differs from
that of the informant. Being able to build rapport and build an open and engaging
environment helps to combat such challenges (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).
Interview Participants
For the current study, 21 members of the Southern California Earthquake Center
(SCEC) were interviewed inclusive of earthquake scientists and other persons who work
closely with earthquake scientists to provide risk messages. SCEC was selected because
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the organization attracts the leading scholars in the study of earthquakes. Membership in
the organization is diverse. Members are located throughout the United States, and other
earthquake-prone countries. Thus, the membership of SCEC provides a broad selection of
scientists whose knowledge and experience are relevant to this study.
The annual SCEC meeting was the ideal place for data collection for the aims of
the current study for three primary reasons. First, SCEC is at the center of earthquake
research and advancement, and the SCEC annual meeting is held in order to bring together
the SCEC community, foster relationships among its members, and discuss and overview
current problems and future steps in earthquake knowledge. Led by Dr. Thomas Jordan,
SCEC’s annual meeting is the main event related to SCEC membership and is a required
meeting for its multitude of reputable researchers and practitioners. Second, as the SCEC
director, Dr. Thomas Jordan has made a call to advancing the research on communicating
the uncertainty surrounding earthquake forecasting and the complex task that earthquake
scientists have in working with stakeholders in providing effective messages and ensuring
public safety. The researcher spoke with Dr. Thomas Jordan on a few occasions over the
phone and through email exchange, and the researcher worked with him on previous
research projects. Dr. Jordan has made it clear that the researcher’s current research aim is
important, timely, and necessary to advancing and improving earthquake risk
communication and its technologies, such as OEF. This study is especially appropriate
following the devastating aftermath of the L’Aquila earthquake where six scientists and
one public official were charged with manslaughter for failing to appropriately
communicate the risk to the public. Lastly, SCEC’s annual meeting brought together in one
place all of the SCEC members who come from various fields. This meeting allowed the
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researcher an invaluable and irreproducible opportunity to meet and interview the SCEC
members on the research topic. Further, as all members were in one location at one time,
the researcher was able to interview many more members than the researcher could if she
were to solicit and conduct these interviews through any other method.
The Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC).
The Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC) houses the leading earthquake
scientists from around the world. Specifically, SCEC was founded in 1991 and is:
A community of over 600 scientists, students and others at over 60 institutions
worldwide, headquartered at the University of Southern California. SCEC is funded
by the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Geological Survey to develop a
comprehensive understanding of earthquakes in Southern California and elsewhere,
and to communicate useful knowledge for reducing earthquake risk. (SCEC, 2015,
para. 1)
One of the most distinguishing features of SCEC is their emphasis on interdisciplinary
research on earthquakes. SCEC is a model organization for fostering and encouraging
interdisciplinary work. SCEC houses researchers from across the disciplinary spectrum
including communicationists, sociologists, computational scientists, geologists, and
seismologists.
SCEC has three primary goals. SCEC’s first goal is to collect information on
seismic activity occurring in California and around the world. Their second goal is to
incorporate the collected data on seismic activity into an inclusive, all-encompassing, and
physics-based understanding of earthquake phenomena (SCEC, 2015). SCEC’s third goal
is to actively promote research across disciplines to understand effective communication
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of earthquake risks to the public and society at large. That is, they seek to “communicate
understanding to the world at large as useful knowledge for reducing earthquake risk and
improving community resilience” (SCEC Annual Report, 2014, p. 2).
Interview Questions
Interview questions were grounded in the earliest stage of the CERC theoretical
framework in order to understand how earthquake scientists were meeting the
communication goals as outline by CERC. For example, questions in this category
included: To what extent does current technology allow for earthquake forecasting? And,
to what extent does the public understand the limitations of earthquake forecasting?
Additionally, questions were posed that inquired about the challenges the earthquake
scientists experience when communicating technical information to others. For example,
questions in this category included: What do you perceive are the key communication
challenges with earthquake forecasting? What forms of communicating probability to the
public do you believe to be better understood by the general public? Moreover, three
pivotal demographic questions were posed to better understand the context behind the
experts’ statements. Specifically, the following demographic questions were posed: (1)
How many years of experience do you have in your field? (2) How much experience do
you have with earthquake forecasting? And, (3) what is your current position? For the
complete questionnaire, please refer to Appendix B.
Recruitment Procedures
Upon approval from Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of
Kentucky, recruitment letters were emailed to earthquake scientists attending the 2015
SCEC meeting in Palm Springs, California. The researcher attained a list of members
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attending the meeting through the SCEC member’s online website. The research identified
potential research participants through purposive sampling methods in which participants
are chosen non-randomly and strategically on the basis of particular features (Frey, Botan,
& Kreps, 2000). To increase the sample size, the researcher asked participants of the study
to refer her to other persons who met the criteria for inclusion for this study, thereby,
employing snowball sampling. The list of qualified participants was developed and
contacted via email to participate in a recorded face-to-face semi-structured interview using
an interview guide.
Data Collection Procedures
Data was collected during the annual SCEC meeting held in Palm Springs,
California September 12, 2015 through September 16, 2015. Thus, all of the initial
interviews (N = 21) were conducted face-to-face in the Palm Springs Hilton Hotel and
Resort’s conference and meeting rooms. Stemming from the CERC theoretical framework
and from relevant extant literature, the researcher prepared 20 interview questions. The
researcher chose to enact an etic approach to the research process because she is acting as
a purposeful observer and not a participant (Gibbs, 2007). At the time of the interview, the
interview script was read. The researcher also included a brief reminder of the purpose of
the study, a reading of the informed consent statement, a verbal request for their consent to
participate, and offered a brief synopsis of the questions from the interview guide. Each
interview, lasted between 20 to 60 minutes. The researcher recorded all interviews using a
digital audio recorder in order to adequately capture all relevant content as well as the
handwritten notes of the researcher during the interview. The audio recordings were used
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as references for written notes and not all of the material was transcribed verbatim. Gibbs
(2007) says,
It is not necessary to transcribe all or even any of the information you have collected
in your project in order to analyze it. Some levels and forms of analysis can be done
quite productively without any copy of the interviews, texts or observations you
have recorded. (p. 11)
Transcribing only relevant data aids the researcher in focusing on the important aspects of
the interview rather than being preoccupied with small and insignificant aspects of the
interview material (Gibbs, 2007). At the conclusion of the interviews, notes were entered
into a word processor without personal identifiers. Audio files were subsequently reviewed
to ensure that no applicable details were missed (Gibbs, 2007).
To assure that sufficient information related specifically to communication
challenges was collected in the interview process, the researcher identified eight
participants whose position involved regular public communication. With IRB permission,
the researcher contacted each of these individuals and invited them to share additional
information related to their communication challenges. Initially, two of the eight
participants accepted the researcher’s invitation to share additional information about
communication challenges. This additional information is incorporated in the researcher’s
analysis. Subsequently, the researcher sent a follow-up invitation after which none of the
individuals responded with additional information. For the complete log of interview data
gathering activities, please refer to Appendix C.

60

Data Analysis Procedures
One such way researchers can organize their qualitative report is by creating “an
account structured around the main themes identified, drawing illustrative examples from
each transcript (or other text) as required” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 33). Thus, once the researcher
completed the interviews and transcribed relevant data from their written notes, she
conducted a thematic analysis among the responses. Thematic analysis included reading
and re-reading her interview notes and looking for themes, especially those that support
the theoretical framework (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The thematic analysis yielded
understanding into common strategies taken by scientists communicating technical
information and probabilistic statements to various stakeholders including the public. The
researcher also had another Communication expert examine the categories and emergent
themes to gain greater insight into other forms of interpretation of the analyzed data.
Due to the nature of the topic of this study and the researcher’s own paradigmatic
standing, the researcher sought to examine the data through multiple points of view and
without constraints. Thus, the researcher employed crystallization (Ellingson, 2009).
Crystallization acknowledges the complexity in the human experiences and the process:
Combines many different forms of analysis and multiple genres of representation
into a coherent text or series of related texts, building a rich and openly partial
account of a phenomenon that problematizes its own construction, highlights
researchers’ vulnerabilities and positionality, makes claims about socially
constructed meanings, and reveals the indeterminacy of knowledge claims even as
it makes them. (Ellingson, 2009, p. 4)
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With crystallization, rather than seeking one dimension of truth, scholars can embrace and
discuss multiple points of view all while remaining conscious of the context from which
the data came (Ellingson, 2009). In this pursuit, the researcher takes a reflexive approach
to the data, considers the temporal and cultural influences of the responses, contrasts their
understanding with other scholarly work, and seeks to understand the plausibility and
verisimilitude of the data to the informants’ perceptions (Ellingson, 2009). The researcher
examined a range of participants, reviewed organizational documents (some published by
the participants of the study), and incorporated extant knowledge to form a crystallized
understanding of the topic. Further, the researcher also looked for exemplars or evidence
from the interview data that supported and helped to advance the researcher’s argument
(Atkinson, 1990).
Validation Procedures
In order to gain validation of the interpreted data, the researcher employed member
checks (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Member checks are when the researcher discusses their
findings with the participants of the study to ensure the participants consent to the
researcher’s perceptions of the data collected. In this endeavor, the researcher did a couple
of different things. First, the researcher had the opportunity to present preliminary findings
of this study at the International Crisis and Risk Communication conference in Orlando,
Florida. In the audience were four earthquake scientists, three of whom were participants
of the study. The researcher was also presenting on a panel alongside another earthquake
scientist who witnessed the researcher’s presentation of her preliminary findings. Thus, in
total, five earthquake scientists along with a room full of other scholars from diverse
backgrounds, listened to the presentation and were asked to provide their feedback. The
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researcher also called select participants from the study (those whose work involved
regular earthquake communication) and inquired about their thoughts. Questions in the
member check process included: Do you believe this to be an accurate portrayal of your
experience? Is there anything you find untrue? What else do you believe is missing from
the researcher’s understanding of your experience?
Summary
In sum, the researcher took a qualitative approach which involved in-depth
interviews with earthquake scientists in order to understand challenges experienced by this
group when communicating risk during the earliest stage of the crisis cycle. In-depth
interviews allow the researcher to gain deep understanding into the topic as experienced
by the participants because the interviewee is able to describe in more detail his or her
perspectives and experiences (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Qualitative interviews align with
the interpretive paradigm and allow the researcher to explore the topic without
preconceptions, expectations, and preconceived conceptualizations of the communication
phenomena.
The researcher employed informant interviews with members of SCEC (N = 21).
The researcher collected data at the annual SCEC meeting as it brings to one location the
leading earthquake scientists. The researcher yielded rich in-depth data from the
participants. In order to ensure that she covered the basis of Communication issues in full,
the researcher identified participants whose position involved frequent public
communication. The researcher inquired about any communication-related challenges she
may have overlooked in the first interview process. Additional interview information was
subsequently incorporated in the findings. The results of this study are presented next.
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Chapter 4: Results
In addition to the usual complexity with which risks and crises can be characterized,
earthquakes pose a unique set of communication challenges for earthquake scientists. This
chapter summarizes the content generated by the subject matter expert in relation to the
four research questions that guided this study:
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC?
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they
face in communicating with non-experts?
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with
communicating probability to non-experts?
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model?
The interview process is fluid (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), and this study was exploratory in
nature. The researcher would ask a question and the participants would talk in length, often
entering other dimensions of the topic the researcher did not foresee. Thus, the results of
this study capture the common themes that resulted from the interview. The researcher
identified eight prominent themes based on the transcripts generated by the interviews with
participants in the study. Although the content for each theme overlaps somewhat with the
four research questions posed for this study, each theme aligned predominantly with one
of the first three research questions (see Table 4-3). Data generated in response to RQ 4
required input from multiple themes to answer.
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The researcher generated an overarching name for each theme to best categorize
the experience of earthquake scientists. Each theme contains evidence from the
participants. Some themes contain sub-themes in order to better capture components of the
experience in more specific terms. The themes represent the eight unique challenges or
experiences of the earthquake scientists in the endeavor of risk communication. The eight
main themes are as follows: Communicating Uncertainty, Earthquake Risk Perception and
“Not Writing on Blank Slates,” Hazard Communication versus Risk Communication
Responsibilities, Outrage Inciters, Boundaries of Earthquake Communication, Keeping
Public Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods,” The Economic Value of an
Earthquake Message, and Code Switching.
To paint a crystallized interpretation of the experience, the researcher also
incorporated extant knowledge, helping to create a more dynamic view of the data
(Ellingson, 2009). For each generated theme, the researcher provided exemplars from the
interviews, building upon extant knowledge, and using relevant published works to build
a more thorough understanding and create a crystallized picture of the experience. The
process of forming a crystallized picture of the phenomena can be achieved to the extent
desired by the researcher (Ellingson, 2009). The researcher drew from various published
sources related to the theme to help further explain problematic areas of risk
communication for experts. By reviewing the transcripts of multiple interviewees with
varying degrees of specialization in earthquake science as well as documents relevant to
earthquake probability and early warning, the researcher was able to identify the areas of
crystallization that are detailed in this chapter.
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Table 4-3
Interview Themes Aligned with RQs 1, 2, and 3
Research Question

Themes

RQ 1: General Challenges during the Pre-crisis
Stage

Earthquake risk perception and “not
writing on blank slates”
Boundaries of earthquake
communication
Keeping public attention
earthquake “quiet periods”

RQ 2: Communication challenges with
non-experts

during

Outrage Inciters
Code switching

RQ 3: Challenges with probabilistic statements

Communicating uncertainty
Hazard communication versus risk
communication responsibilities
The economic value of an earthquake
message

Note. RQ 4 is answered using a combination of all themes listed above.
General Challenges during the Pre-Crisis Communication Stage of CERC
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 1. For the first
research question, the researcher inquired about the general challenges earthquake
scientists faced. The researcher categorized “general” challenges as any hardships
unspecific to communication or probability earthquake scientists perceive they endure. The
following themes fell under this category: Earthquake Risk Perception and “Not Writing
On Blank Slates,” Boundaries Of Earthquake Communication, and Keeping Public
Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods.” These themes are explained next.
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Earthquake Risk Perception and “Not Writing on Blank Slates”
One of the general challenges the earthquake scientists expressed is accounting for
the varying ways in which the public and stakeholders could interpret their earthquake risk
message. The participants discussed how difficult it was to provide messages of earthquake
risk because their audiences already had preconceived notions of the risk. A general
challenge, thus, with earthquake scientists’ experience of communicating earthquake risk
was the idea of communicating to non-experts who already had ideas and various
experiences with earthquakes. Those non-experts were interpreting the risk based on a host
of influences of which the participants felt they had little to no control.
The participants all described their experience with this challenge. For example,
participant nine described the experience in the following manner:
I know you're not writing on blank slates. The people you’re trying to
educate already have opinions and so you can’t just tell somebody
something and they just believe you. You have to figure out what it is they
believe and then walk them from where they are to where you want them to
be. That’s a whole other level besides trying to explain things to people and
them having the numeracy or background to understand. But, if they already
have own belief, then I think none of us really have training on how to
effectively communicate.
Similarly, participant 21 said, “people don’t understand their hazards very well. It’s hard
for people to perceive their risks. You'll get different responses when you ask people to
perceive risk.”
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Regardless of the various perceptions the experts perceived that their audiences
held about earthquake risk, the participants found it important that the public and
stakeholders continue to receive earthquake risk information. For example, participant one
compared responses to risk communication of earthquake risk to the risk of smoking. The
participant explicated:
You can communicate the risk of smoking, and some people stop smoking,
other people keep smoking and say, ‘this is something I can manage.’ But,
we don’t have any other option. We have to communicate something, and
we have to communicate it in an appropriate way.
Thus, a pressing challenge was addressing differences in earthquake risk perception.
Although, the participants expressed that if audiences “already have their own belief” then
none of the scientists “really have training on how to effectively communicate,” the
participants felt it important that the message was out there.
In the case of L’Aquila, too, the scientists and government officials failed to
consider how the lay public would interpret their risk communication. L’Aquila was
receiving a swarm of smaller earthquakes prior to the main shock. The residents had dealt
with earthquakes in the area before and may have compared the risk of the present
earthquake to risks prior. The presented over-simplified message worked in the favor of
confirmation bias whereby the residents interpreted the messages in overly optimistic
ways. This may have been due, in part, to a lack of evidence to support the main argument.
Evidence reporting is important so the public can better comprehend the source of the
message, its credibility, and opposing arguments (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014).
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Considering ways in which non-experts may interpret risk messages is influenced
by a host of differences. Data from the participants highlighted a particularly prominent
influence in the context of earthquake risk communication: regional differences in risk
perception.
Regional differences in risk perception. As SCEC members came from all over
the world and are international and national participants of earthquake response, the
participants discussed the regional differences they noticed in risk perception. Regional, in
this case, refers to any area: international, national, or local.
The participants discussed ways in which regional differences made
communicating earthquake risk challenging. Participant one described the differences in
probability comprehension and infrastructure of different regions, saying:
For instance, messages in America are tailored very differently than the
messages in Italy. People in the United States are used to hearing messages
of probability. For instance, the weather is given as a message of
probability, and, in Italy, it is not. Also, in Italy, their buildings are much
older-- so a small earthquake can yield large consequences. For this reason,
we face completely different background knowledge of the people [based
on region] related to the meaning of probability.
Regional differences in risk perception also included the region’s experience with
earthquakes. For example, participant one said, “California for instance is much more
educated about earthquakes.” Similarly, participant 14 said,
An example of the issues we're currently dealing with are areas where
induced earthquakes are occurring primarily. In these areas, people are
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feeling earthquakes and they've never felt them before. So, they are
probably pretty low on their learning curve. But, at the same time, this is an
area that has high hazard from tornadoes and other wind events which they
do have to cope with, so it think it’s a matter of using the things they already
use and understand and translate it into a hazard they are less familiar with.
Participant 21, too, described how regional risk perception plays into earthquake
preparedness. Specifically, participant 21 said, “In California, you have a very high chance
of the ground shaking, in Kentucky you have some chance. You have to make sure
consequences aren’t devastating to you and your family. We want to help the public
prioritize their preparedness.” Likewise, participant 18 asserted,
I feel like in California, there is a pretty good balance now. There are drills
every year, there is material available, and there are websites available.
Other places in the country are harder because the earthquakes come less
often […]. It’s a little bit of an impossible task because the dangers are lower
in some places. We need to keep earthquakes on people’s minds, but not as
much as in California. It’s hard to strike that balance.
Participant 14 said, “It depends upon where you are in the country. I think in California, in
particular those who have experienced an earthquake in their memory, perhaps have a little
better understanding.”
Participant 12 was more optimistic about the public’s perception of earthquake risk.
The participant asserted, “My view is that the public taken in aggregate is much more
sophisticated than we give them credit.” The participant continued by providing an
example of a field poll in 2012 in California that is conducted every few years, on what
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people think is the biggest hazard for them personally. The participant stated, “every time
they do this, earthquakes emerge at the top of the list, as you can imagine. About seventy
percent of the population, as I recall, said it was the hazard they were most concerned
about.” However, the survey unveiled something interesting, asserted the participant.
The survey divided up their poll into Northern California and Southern
California, San Francisco and L.A. basically. They asked people, when do
you think the next big earthquake is going to occur? And, there was a
statistically significant difference in the answer between L.A. and San
Francisco - with L.A. saying it was going to come sooner. It was consistent
with the earthquake forecast we posed earlier which said that southern
California does have a higher probability than northern California for a large
earthquake. Whether people understand that or not, I do not know. But, their
intuition is correct: there is more hazard in Southern California.
While intuition may play an integral and scientifically immeasurable role in risk perception
(Slovic, 2010), publics of southern California may be primed to earthquake risk as they
experience more earthquakes and may be more familiar with messages of earthquake risk.
In sum, the earthquake scientists expressed they were not simply imprinting on
“blank slates,” rather differences in risk perception varied. Notable differences in
earthquake risk perception were especially prominent regionally. Another prominent
theme, entitled Boundaries of Earthquake Risk Communication, describes the
communication restrictions that the participants experienced.
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Boundaries of Earthquake Risk Communication
The participants noted the restrictions of their communication based on the
communication boundaries set up in different regions. In other words, the participants
described the experience of having to navigate between the various communication
systems and standards in place. If communication were to be viewed as something that
exists in open space, humans have created boundaries on who receives such information,
who sends it, and when it is received. Each boundary houses its own legislative rules that
govern communication rules and boundaries. Boundaries are usually set up in a couple
different ways. Most obvious of boundaries is that of nations (Anderson, 2006). That is,
nations create communication borders in which information is ‘imported and exported.’
Nation-states also include internal boundaries of communication so that there is a
procedure in place for what should be communicated by whom and when. Other ways
boundaries are created are through legal systems. Legal systems uphold nation-state
boundaries.
Participants described their experience with communication boundaries and the
impact on their risk communication. For example, participant one explained their
experience with such boundaries in the following manner:
Communication is not like in the U.S. where you only have the United
States Geological Survey. In Italy you have a very clear separation. You
have a seismology department that communicates scientific information
like the probability of earthquake or probability of ground shaking then
there is some other institutions like those of engineers that translate this into
a probability to be killed into, for instance, the risk of death. Both are linked
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to the civil protection so the Civil Protection receives information from both
sides and they have to communicate to the people in a coherent way.
Participant six also described their experiences with boundaries of communication.
Participant six explained that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) has the statutory
responsibility and that regional emergency services, both at the state and the regional level,
are “the ones that actually have to do it [communicate to non-experts].” Participant 15
described the communication boundaries set up in New Zealand, saying “we have a New
Zealand earthquake commission and they assume responsibility for preparing earthquake
messages. They have advertisements ready to reach public. In New Zealand, before
anything goes public on website, they check with stakeholders first.” Participant 16 further
described communication boundaries they noticed about New Zealand and stated imposed
limitations placed on earthquake scientists to communicate. The participant stated,
We provide forecasts when called on by a government agency. After a
recent big earthquake, we [earthquake scientists] were banned from saying
anything. We couldn’t say anything without it going through governor’s
office. But things loosened up afterwards.
Thus, earthquake scientists perceived they must be cognizant of boundaries of risk
communication when communicating about earthquakes and those boundaries varied by
country.
The participants also described boundaries in terms of legal protection for their
communication. For example, the earthquake scientists discussed the implications of the
L’Aquila earthquake disaster outcome as a lesson for scientists worldwide on different
boundaries and legal protection offered. Participant 18 said:
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I don’t think [the scientists] did anything wrong. The buildings collapsed,
and the seismologists were blamed. We can learn to blame somebody else
first. They should have done a number of things better. They didn’t defend
themselves. One of the lessons is our [America’s] legal system protects us.
Theirs [Italy’s] doesn’t.
Similarly, participant 11 shared similar sentiments:
After an earthquake, the public thinks FEMA comes in and repays them for
their losses, and that’s not true. So, keeping people realistic is a problem.
We also face issues with people struggling to gain control in the aftermath.
So, they'll blame the responders. These are the pressures we face.
Navigating communication boundaries was a prominent experience of the earthquake
scientists. These boundaries were exceptionally notable considering the aftermath of the
L’Aquila earthquake for experts in Italy. While this was standard procedure for Italy, such
consequences would be unimaginable in other nations who may have legal protection for
scientists.
In conclusion, the earthquake scientists expressed that one of their challenges was
understanding the communication boundaries in place for scientists. As many of the
earthquake scientists are global researchers working with seismological projects across the
world, what they can say and to whom differed depending on the communication structures
in place. Further, legal repercussions for communicating imprecise or contradictory
evidence was apt to change based on the nation. Another theme that emerged, entitled
Keeping Public Attention During Earthquake Quiet Periods,” describes the scientists’
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perceived challenge in maintaining the publics’ attention during periods of extremely rare
high-risk seismic activity.
Keeping Public Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods”
Earthquakes are unpredictable events. Short-term earthquake forecasts yield
extremely low probabilities, and long-term earthquake forecasts are typically delivered
within a 30-year time frame. Thus, the participants expressed a dilemma of ensuring people
are taking the threat of an earthquake seriously, despite these barriers. Specifically, one of
the challenges expressed by the participants was keeping the public’s attention during such
long periods of time and convincing them the threat of an earthquake is real and preparation
strategies are important now. “Quiet periods” is a term one of the participants used to
describe the times that the risk of an earthquake was extremely low and the public was
unlikely to be paying attention to earthquake risk.
Keeping the lay public’s attention during earthquake quiet periods can be a difficult
endeavor. Participant nine explained the situation as,
We can try to educate portions of the public that are paying attention to us
and that have enough education and background to understand it. However,
communicating to the fraction of the public that are not paying attention to
us most of the time, except when something happens, is hard.
Similarly, participant 20 said:
If you didn’t have some sort of exercise or drill, there would be no personal
relationship with earthquakes at all. They happen infrequently. I feel
scientists need a higher profile during those quiet periods in order to give
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the public some sort of intuition. So, when something happens, people have
a better understanding.
The participants discussed ways that campaigns have been helpful to eliciting excitement
and interest in earthquake risk. Thus, the researcher coded these portions of the interviews
as ways to help keep public attention during earthquake quiet periods. These sub-themes
are not considered challenges, but rather these sub-themes provide insight into the
earthquake scientists’ perceived ways of keeping public attention.
The first manner was how the earthquake scientists’ perceived campaigns as helpful
to preparing the public and keeping them engaged and informed. The other subtheme that
arose was how the San Andreas (2015) movie helped to bring the publics’ attention to
earthquakes. Thus, the researcher generated the second subtheme entitled, “Popular
Culture” to capture the influence that popular movies, television shows, and music can
have on risk perception. The two sub-themes are described in detail below.
Campaigns. When the researcher asked the participants about the effectiveness of
earthquake campaigns, all of the earthquake scientists discussed their positive impact. For
example, participant three asserted, “I think campaigns are immensely helpful to letting
people know this threat exists and giving people information about what they can do to
protect themselves.”
One campaign, in particular, was mentioned throughout the interviews: the Great
ShakeOut Earthquake Drill (from here after referred to as ShakeOut). ShakeOut is an
annual earthquake drill conducted in various regions in the United States and abroad
(SCEC, 2016). ShakeOut requires participants to “drop, cover, and hold on” among other
strategies for self-protection. Regions seeking to implement ShakeOut require “significant
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local or regional coordination, typically by an emergency management agency or an
alliance of many organizations” (SCEC, 2016).
Campaigns, such as ShakeOut, can be aligned with Earthquake Early Warning
(EEW), according to the participants. EEW is a current campaign that provides a warning
message minutes before the onset of an earthquake. For example, participant 18 said,
ShakeOut is effective. Most people have a better sense of orientation when
something happens. We are trying to develop earthquake early-warning
capability. The idea is that in the worst case, people are confused and not
thinking clearly, and don’t protect themselves as they should. So, the more
they can be prepared, and go through the motions of where they can find
answers, the better off they are when an earthquake happens.
Similarly, participant 19 described the ShakeOut campaign as a “gateway drug to broader
preparedness” and that their post-ShakeOut simulation survey results indicate that people
are taking further actions in preparedness after the ShakeOut drill. The participant further
added that “Surveys are voluntary after ShakeOut and we know we're likely getting those
who are more interested in the process and so it’s challenging. We know people are
reporting they are doing more than just the drill.” Of similar nature, participant 10 said,
Something like ShakeOut is an opportunity to test early warning and OEF.
So, it puts responsibility on the individual to think about earthquake risks,
and in particular, it puts responsibility on the government, FEMA, and other
similar organizations. And, in terms of taking responsibility and making
communities more resilient, the campaign is critical.
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Participant six asserted that ShakeOut has been effective in “getting people to talk about
earthquakes once a year. It was intended to educate people on an earthquake scenario.”
And, the progression of ShakeOut is one that is largely disconnected from the scenario,
such that members of the lay public are doing the drop, cover, and hold on apart from the
scenario. Participant six also explicated that “Drop, cover, hold on, is visually captivating,
with a very distinct picture. The visual helps towards the bigger picture of preparing for an
earthquake.” The drill also acts “as a psychological reinforcement because people see
others doing it and they do it” (participant six).
The participants expressed that ShakeOut has been immensely successful in
preparing the public for earthquakes. Participant seven said,
I am blown away by what ShakeOut has done. It’s more successful than we
ever envisioned. ShakeOut started relatively small – among schools and
then grew beyond Los Angeles. It’s amazing how it’s grown and how many
people know about it and how its translated earthquake risk to the public.
Participant eight said, “I think ShakeOut has been really successful. It puts people in a
tangible situation. It gives them specific actions to act out which is extremely useful.”
Participant 13 believed that ShakeOut was “very successful for two reasons.” Specifically,
they said:
One, it provided an opportunity for people to talk about it. Two, it has given
everyone the idea that you drop, cover, and hold on, and it becomes a snap
response, and that's a life-changing response. It has also been impetus for
organizations to talk about earthquake response and preparedness.
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ShakeOut provides information to companies to run the exercise. It is
helpful to management.
The participants also discussed ways to improve ShakeOut. Participant seven said,
“I hope people don’t become jaded by [the drill]. We have to find ways so people don’t
become complacent.” Participant eight believed the future of ShakeOut included providing
help to city planners. The participant said, “I think we need to take ShakeOut a step further.
There are efforts underway to help improve building codes by providing resources to city
planners so they could have sense of scale of evacuation and planning needed. And, give
people scenarios of the impossible to help them plan better” (participant eight). Participant
nine said,
ShakeOut is opportunity to have discussion of what happens next. We have
a lot of trouble conveying to people that maybe you want to wait to enter
the building until the aftershocks have diffused. Something like ShakeOut,
when you have people’s attention, you can give them more information.
Participant 12, “There are always issues about what’s the best way to do a ShakeOut. Now,
it’s not scenario-based. The original ShakeOut in 2008 was scenario-based; I think
scenario-based exercises are more real to people. So, that’s one of the debates we have had:
should we have more scenario-based ShakeOuts?” Additionally, participants discussed
other influencers to the publics’ perception of earthquake risk namely, the influence of
popular culture on creating accurate and inaccurate perceptions.
Popular culture. Interestingly, almost all of the participants brought up the San
Andreas movie in their interviews due in part to the movie’s release date close to the time
of the SCEC meetings. Thus, the researcher generated the sub-theme of Popular Culture
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to help explain ways in which non-experts’ attention to earthquake risk could be kept
during “quiet periods.” Sellnow (2010) says that popular culture is “comprised of the
everyday objects, actions, and events that influence people to believe and behave in
certain ways” (p. 2). Mediated popular culture is experienced through movies, television,
and music (Sellnow, 2010).
The San Andreas (2015) movie is about a magnitude 9 earthquake triggered by the
West Coast’s San Andreas Fault. The earthquake is so devastating that shaking can be felt
across the country all the way to the East Coast of the United States. According to
seismologist, Lucy Jones, who was interviewed by the National Public Radio (NPR), the
movie portrayed earthquake risk accurately in some ways and inaccurately in other ways.
Specifically, said Jones, the movie accurately portrayed the “triggering” effect of
earthquakes whereby one earthquake can “trigger” another one in a distant location. Some
ways in which the movie inaccurately portrays earthquakes is by implying that they can be
predicted, which according to Jones, they cannot (NPR, 2015 May 30). Other ways the
movie inaccurately portrayed earthquakes is by portraying self-protection strategies. Jones
asserts in the interview that the best protection is to “drop, cover, and hold on” in order to
protect oneself from flying objects (NPR, 2015 May 30).
Participant three described the influence of the San Andreas movie on an increased
earthquake hazard. Participant three said,
But really, we relied on news media to get the message [of increased hazard]
out there. The challenge is getting the media to get the message right. It was
either hurt or helped by the San Andreas movie. The day we released the
model, the San Andreas movie was released, and so that helped in the sense

80

that it got us more publicity. More people noticed our study because the
media was all over it. They were running our clips of our study with the
movie.
Participant one advocated “If we have training on how to communicate, there can be a
greater presence of scientists on screen.” Participant one also said that “People like to see
that” referring to public wanting to see more of the earthquake scientists on screen
communicating about earthquake risk. Participant nine said,
I think we could do better job of capturing peoples imagination more.
Obviously NASA does a great job of capturing the imagination of space
travel-- that has no real day-to-day bearing of people’s lives or well-being- but people get very captured by the science. Maybe if we could do better
job of that, perhaps earthquakes would feel more real to people and they
would take more action.
Some of the participants also noted how the recently released movie, San Andreas,
helped to both bring awareness to earthquakes and also created misperceptions about the
risk. Participant 10 said, “The San Andreas movie provided the opportunity for the subject
to be talked about. But it also causes a lot of damage because of the misconceptions.”
Similarly, participant three said, “The movie doesn’t get the science right, though. We may
have spent too much time talking about what the movie doesn’t get right and not about the
reality. That’s what we were dealing with today.”
In conclusion, general challenges the earthquake scientists experienced included
communicating to non-expert audiences with varying perceptions of earthquake risk. It also
included understanding their boundaries of communication. Keeping public attention
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during quiet periods involved campaigns. The earthquake scientists further discussed the
influence of campaigns, such as ShakeOut, in helping to prepare the public for the
possibility of an adverse effect. Some also discussed the implications of the San Andreas
movie on generating attention and excitement for earthquake risk albeit the misconceptions
it simultaneously created.
Communication Challenges with Non-Experts
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 2 which inquired
about the communication challenges earthquake scientists faced with non-experts. The
researcher categorized “communication” challenges as aspects of participant’s experience
with non-experts that was communication specific but unaligned with communicating
probability. The following themes fall under this category: Outrage Inciters and Code
Switching. The themes are detailed subsequently.
Outrage Inciters
“Outrage Inciters” describes the challenge earthquake scientists’ experience when
outside voices, such as local citizens, interfere with their risk communication to the public.
For example, one of the most publicized outrage inciters was Iben Browning. Browning
was a successful consultant and author who held interest in weather forecasting. Browning
predicted that a large-magnitude earthquake would occur on the New Madrid Fault on
December 3, 1990. His prediction was incorrect and widely criticized by the scientific
community. Nonetheless, he received wide-spread attention for his prediction and caused
public alarm (Spence et al., 1993).
Almost all of the participants discussed the negative consequences of outrage
inciters, particularly that of the local citizen in the period leading up to the L’Aquila
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earthquake. They felt that non-experts should not enter the conversation and sway
audiences of illegitimate information. Specifically, when asked about what lessons
earthquake scientists took away from the L’Aquila earthquake, participant 10 said, “one of
the lessons of L’Aquila is this local citizen was a problem, so scientists should have
oppressed this outsider.”
Participants believed the L’Aquila resident created a distraction from the scientists’
messages. Participant 17 stated:
We can’t allow an inform vacuum to develop. Giuliani, the local citizen
making predictions during the pre-crisis environment of L’Aquila, claimed
he could predict an earthquake, and it got a lot of attention. I think that led
them to ineffectively communicating the risk because of the distraction.
Participant 16, too, discussed the influence of outside voices at the time of the Canterbury,
New Zealand earthquakes. During the Canterbury earthquakes, there was a local citizen
who “became known as the moon man” because he believed that the phases of the moon
could be used to forecast Canterbury aftershocks. The participant continued to say that this
local citizen, like Giuliani in the prelude of the L’Aquila earthquake had “attracted some
following among public and even convinced some people to leave town” (participant 16).
These outrage inciters “always attract media attention and are believed to some
perspective” (Participant 16). Participant nine discussed the difficulty of the situation and
the repercussions of outrage inciters to earthquake scientists’ messages saying, “It’s very
hard to change beliefs. I think L’Aquila is extreme version of that where there’s someone
out there that is advocating for something very different than what scientists are trying to
say.” Another expressed communication challenge for scientists is that of code switching.
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Code Switching: Translating Hazard into Understandable Terms
Risk communication advocates to tailor your message to your audience needs
(Sellnow et al., 2009). The earthquake scientists, too, expressed the importance of code
switching and the challenges that come with it. By naming this theme Code Switching, the
researcher does not imply the theme to be grounded in the principles of the interculturallybased idea. Rather, the researcher found the term and its general connotation to be
appropriate to describe the experiences of the participants. Code switching can be an
automatic response, meaning the sender of the message is unaware that they are changing
their language based on their audience, or it could be deliberate meaning that the sender is
deliberately changing their message to meet their audience’s needs. Code switching is
important for earthquake scientists as they are often having to discuss with engineers,
reporters, and other stakeholders about the earthquake risk and must phrase terms that are
understandable to the receiver of the message. Further, code switching is important
because, often times, earthquake scientists are the first in line in a long line of receivers of
earthquake risk messages. That is, the earthquake scientists generate the earthquake risk
message depending on their forecast and passes the message along to others. Similar to the
game of “telephone,” the relayed message may get manipulated in the process and the end
message may result in something much different than what the earthquake scientists
intended. The devastating outcome of L’Aquila earthquake perfectly exemplifies this idea.
Thus, it is important for earthquake scientists to code switch appropriately, ensuring that
their intended message is received accurately.
The scientists talked about the difficulties of others understanding their technical
information presented and that sometimes they omit or present the information in different
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ways depending on with whom they are speaking. For example, participant three said,
“Probabilities are hard for humans and are particularly hard for people with no scientific
background, which is most of the public.” The earthquake scientists discussed changing
their message based on their audience. For instance, participant 20 discussed the difference
in communicating with engineers about building codes versus the public:
We make probabilistic maps for the building code. We make a map that’s
called, ‘two percent probability of exceeding 50’ Nobody understands what
that means. But it has a probability of being exceeded. Super hard to
understand except by those people doing building codes. We take
probabilities off when we're talking to the [general] public.
Participant 20 described discussing risks with non-experts and said, “Usually we just take
the probabilities off. We typically just show colors and no probabilities. In general, people
just want to know what their risk is relative to everything else.”
One participant discussed how they are implanting more simple language on the
USGS website. Specifically, participant 21 said:
The public needs to know the risk they face. Then they need to know how
to react before, during, and after earthquakes. So, that’s why we're trying to
learn more from social scientists. We just recently made a new section on
our website that’s called ‘101’ for non-experts.
Similar to how language proficiency improves with time and bi-lingual individuals learn
to better code switch, the earthquake scientists too expressed their communication with
non-experts as improving over time. For example, participant seven said:
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The way in which our research results are presented are much better
formulated now they were, let’s say, 20 years ago. So, now when we give
presentations to the public, we know how to present our graphics and we
know how to talk about what we do in terminology they will understand.
The biggest challenge in the pursuit of communicating the information to nonexpert audiences was providing information that was simple and accurate. Participant 19
elaborated upon their experience in the following manner: “a balance is trying to be
achieved between the simplicity of information and improving the accuracy of scientific
information being given.” Participant 15 said:
We are most comfortable with providing the numbers. There is a lot of
discussion in terms of how to translate the numbers into words, and we don’t
have agreement on that yet. There is still a lot of work on how to
communicate these small numbers and probabilities.
Participant 11 expressed, “What makes you a great scientist is being a great
communicator.” However, participant 10 described potential complexities that could arise
even with word choices when translating the probability into words,
I think what was missing in my opinion is when you use words like ‘likely’
or ‘extremely likely’ I think you have to be careful because what I find
likely and what other people find likely is different.
Similarly, participant 16 explained:
It is difficult to convert probability into words. The suggestion we receieved
was to use a scale of 90 percent or higher which means extremely likely, 50
percent means likely and five percent means unlikely. We've been told to
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use this type of scale. The problem is the words seem to be welded into the
numbers meaning that if you told someone there is a 5 percent chance of
their house catching fire, that’s not a serious threat. So, if you have low
probabilities, it appears as nonsense to people. This is the difficulty we face.
Thus, the participants realized the sensitivity involved with communication: even
providing certain words, such as “likely,” could elicit different risk perceptions.
Tailoring the message to the audience’s communication needs also depended on the
probability of the earthquake risk. Participant nine explained,
At the time you issue a forecast, depending on how dire the forecast, your
message is different. If the risk is low probability, a preparedness message
is appropriate that reminds everybody to be prepared. If the risk is higher
probability, like the aftermath of a large earthquake, and you want to keep
people out of large buildings, then the message is very different. Then the
message entails that the main earthquake is over, but we are still in an
ongoing sequence. I think there are different most important messages.
Other participants describe the difficulty of translating the hazard into risk.
Participant eight provided a common analogy they like to give of a house hanging at the
edge of a cliff.
I ask the audience, would you want to live in that house? And they say, no.
Right? Because it’s precarious, it could fall anytime. Well, do you expect a
scientist to tell you exactly the time and place where that cliff is going to
fall off at any given time? It's very simple physics, it is gravity working on
the ground. But the thing is, the land is held together in such a complicated
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way, even in that one spot, that you can’t expect a scientists to tell you
exactly when that will happen because it’s very complicated. So, with
earthquakes, imagine now it is slipping, so now it’s even more complicated.
So, you can’t expect a scientist to come in and say, okay this will slip at two
pm in five days. So when you put it in that context, people say oh, okay!
One of the participants brought up communicating the probability in terms of
comparison. Participant three suggested:
People must take risk into perspective with other risks in their lives. The
key to describing probabilities is to relate it to something else in their lives.
For example, people choose whether or not to ride a bike to work. Low
probability but high consequence.
For example, participant 14 believed:
It’s useful to do comparative analysis among other types of hazards. So it
can put earthquake hazard into context. I’ve been trying to find ways to put
the hazards into perspective, and it turns out by if you think about any
particular spot in Oklahoma, which is part of Tornado alley, the chance that
a tornado will go through that spot, is about the same as what we use for the
building codes, 1 in 2,500. So there may be some ways that we can make
some bridges there to explain what is going on. So by analogy to other types
of hazards that people have had experience with, might be a way of trying
to communicate these low probabilities hazards and why we should pay
attention to them.
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Participant 10 said that scenarios help people visualize the earthquake situation. But,
warned the participant, “Scientists worry whether the scenarios reflect epistemic
uncertainty, but I think they go some ways towards helping people visualize the range.”
Similarly, participant 13 discussed context based approaches but was dubious of
their effectiveness. Participant 13 stated,
A lot of it is simply people have a lack of context. Some people feel that it’s
important to put things into contexts with other hazards. I don’t know how
useful that is because, for example, I have no idea what the likelihood of
getting struck by lightning.
Participant seven, too, believed that the average person would have difficulty digesting a
message such as 50% probability in the next thirty years. “In that case, put it in more
deterministic terms or put it into more qualitative terms rather than quantitative. However,
I wouldn’t want anyone to get in trouble. Ultimately, put the message in action terms if
needed” (participant seven).
Moreover, the participant explicated why continuously disseminated probabilities
are advantageous to stakeholders as much as they are for scientists.
So, you negotiate with stakeholders and say, ‘okay if we get to this level
we’re going to do something.’ So, that way we turn the probability into
actions. But, those thresholds need to be continually revised and adjusted to
situations. Those thresholds depend on aversion to risk as much as the
hazard. That’s why it’s not just an issue for OEF, but it’s also an issue for
the stakeholders. (Participant 12)
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Participant 12 also advocated for the importance of feedback to assess the effectiveness of
earthquake messages.
I would roll out a system and in places where people are more informed
about the earthquake hazard problem and have a publicized event about this
system we are interested in to gain feedback from the community. These
systems that provide two way communication such as ‘did you feel it?’ have
been highly successful and people like to participate in those things. So I
think messaging could be built in.
The participants also discussed the challenges of code switching with media
correspondents. Participant 18 said,
Reporters are always trying to find something sensational. So, we have to
make sure whatever comes out, we are leaving people more informed rather
than less informed. If some press report comes out with some odd
perspective, we have to scramble. We need to have common message. If we
don’t agree with each other as experts, that is what the press likes to play
up. An argument among experts: it’s not understood or it’s something that
is being hidden. [Scientists] need to coordinate early and get the right
talking points.
Participant three said, “We rely on news media to get the message out there. The challenge
is getting them to get the message right.” Similarly, participant 14 said,
A lot of our communication works through the media as a filter. So, with
the media in particular, there’s a sensationalism that they may want. So we
have to get them to dial back from that. To guide them to resources to help
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people understand the risk. I think this is the reason why things like putting
down the roots is so valuable so that there is a messaging that goes out.
Participant 20 believed there needed to be “more communication and more anecdotes.”
However, the participant felt that the style of news stories oversimply the complexity of
earthquake risk. As a result, the participant suggested that more anecdotes were needed to
help clarify the complexity of earthquakes and the risk they pose. The participant
explained:
Unfortunately, anecdotes are not the type of language used in news stories.
It’s always, ‘the earthquake struck at this time.’ Okay, well it’s there at that
time, but they don’t explain that because of the waves it’s over there and
over there later. I think we should never miss an opportunity to change the
conversation. How these earthquake happen and how you feel them.
(participant 20).
Participant 11 touched light on the power of humanizing scientists and what it can do for
how others view scientists and their message. Specifically, participant 11 brought up how
during some tremors, a seismologist was being interviewed by the news for the first time:
“She was holding her toddler and being interviewed. And it was so reassuring for the
public” (participant 11).
Participant seven discussed how they believe working with the media is getting
better with time. They explained:
The media has gotten so much better, too; 25 ago, L.A. writers got it wrong
or sensationalized it. Now, stories are being written very well. There is
usually a partnership between the author and the scientists, so they don’t go
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off and write things on their own agenda. Things are much stronger now
than they were. But, we have to make sure people are not getting
complacent. (Participant seven)
In sum, participants described current ways in which they adjust their message to
meet their audience communication needs and worldview. The term “code switching” is
used by the researcher to categorize this experience. While the earthquake scientists
understood the importance of code switching, they experienced difficulty in doing so and
sought to find more appropriate means of getting their messages across. Technical
information was particularly difficult to translate into more simple forms for the earthquake
scientists.
Challenges with Probabilistic Statements
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 3. The researcher
inquired about the challenges earthquake scientists faced with probabilistic statements. The
researcher categorized “probabilistic” challenges as those which focused specifically on
communicating the likelihood of the risk. The following themes fall under this category:
Communicating Uncertainty, Hazard versus Risk Communication Responsibilities, and
The Economic Value of an Earthquake Message. The themes are detailed subsequently.
Communicating Uncertainty
The theme entitled “communicating uncertainty” refers to the difficulty the
earthquake scientists experienced when attempting to communicate the uncertainty
involved with the nature of earthquakes and in the outcomes of their models. In the process
of communicating uncertainty, the earthquake scientists perceived a struggle between the
desire to communicate uncertainty and maintaining credibility with their non-expert
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audience. That is, the earthquake scientists perceived that if they communicate uncertainty,
will non-experts decrease their trust towards scientists’ messages? Moreover, earthquake
scientists wondered if non-experts will perceive scientists to be less credible if they
communicate the uncertainty of their findings. Participant one described the experience of
communicating the uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting in the following
manner, “Your credibility is harmed. If you say something and something else occurs, it
ruins your credibility with the public.”
Communicating uncertainty in the realm of earthquake risk meant two different
things. First, communicating uncertainty for the earthquake scientists meant
communicating the uncertainty involved with the nature of earthquakes and it meant
communicating the uncertainty involved with the tools the scientists used to arrive at the
earthquake forecast. Participants expressed the dilemma involved in communicating
uncertainty. For example, participant one said:
I would like to emphasize again that this kind of issue is hotly debated in our
community because people realize that our credibility is it at stake. If we
communicate something that is misunderstood, our credibility could drop. This is
something people don't want.
Similarly, participant six said, “You get people who have heard us say we can't predict
earthquakes and then they say, well you can't predict anything. Then when we say there's
a ten percent chance today of the San Andreas earthquake, they discount it.”
The following sections explain one of the participants’ greatest perceived perils of
communicating earthquake risk: communicating the uncertainty surrounding the nature of
earthquakes and the uncertainty of the models used to generate forecasts. The researcher
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also generated further relevant sub-themes to communicating uncertainty namely,
perceived inter-expert variability in understanding uncertainty, and perceived variability
between experts’ and non-experts’ tolerance to uncertainty.
Communicating the uncertainty of the nature of earthquakes. Communicating
the uncertainty involved with the nature of earthquakes means being able to explain their
unpredictable nature. Earthquakes have no identifying precursor and, thus, are extremely
difficult to foresee in the short-term (Jordan et al., 2011). Earthquake scientists can only
make probabilistic statements years in advance that an earthquake is due in a certain region
and in a certain interval of time (Jordan et al., 2011). Forecasting in the short-term is nearly
impossible and earthquake scientists are only able to make very low probabilistic forecasts.
In essence, the public is largely unaware of the important considerations of earthquake risk
assessment (i.e., temporal decay, magnitude differences relative to the largest earthquake
in the sequence, and spatial distribution).
The participants noted the difficulty that arose with understanding earthquakes
given their unpredictable nature. Specifically, participants noted that earthquakes have no
diagnostic pre-cursor and, thus, are extremely difficult to forecast. For example, participant
12 explained the situation in the following manner:
We don’t have techniques that provide diagnostic precursors. In other
words, it would be nice if there was some signal that would happen. Instead,
what we have are statistical techniques that are validated for use and based
on seismic activity. What we know are that earthquakes are highly clustered
phenomena. In other words, if we have one earthquake, we are likely to
have more.
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Participant six expressed that due to the unpredictable nature of earthquakes, making
deterministic predictions may never be possible. Specifically, the participant said:
There are good theoretical reasons for believing there will never be any real
precursors to earthquakes. So having deterministic predictions that an
earthquake is going to happen tomorrow, I don't think will ever happen. I
don't see the research improving our ability to process all the information
quickly and make defensible statements. I don't see anything that's likely to
increase the probabilities because it goes back to the issue of all the
earthquakes seem to start in the same way.
Participant six noted that earthquake scientists can, however, rely on earthquakes to occur
in “earthquake-prone regions” and “every earthquake makes another earthquake more
likely.” As such, earthquake scientists can make forecasts with more confidence in those
regions. For example, participant six provided an analogy of the clustered-nature of
earthquakes stating,
It's essentially like predicting rain in Kauai. I don’t need to see the radar, its
Kauai, it'll probably rain today. The day after magnitude seven, we are
probably having magnitude fives. It would be a very rare magnitude seven
if it were not followed by some magnitude five. So, we can predict it without
knowing anything else.
Participant nine commented, too, on the clustered nature of earthquakes and said, “There’s
sometimes more ability to forecast than others. So, after large earthquake there will most
certainly be some aftershocks, we can give estimates of aftershocks sizes we think there
will be.” Thus, two characteristics of earthquakes the participants expressed was more
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predictable were the idea that earthquakes occur in clusters and earthquake prone regions
are likely to have earthquakes. When asked about the limitations of earthquake forecasting,
Participant 10 said, “It’s limited not by technology, but by our physical understanding of
the earth’s crust. We're not able to predict earthquakes with any certainty. We are able to
make very low probabilistic statements about the future.”
While earthquake scientists are comfortable with the idea that every earthquake
makes another more likely, one of the participants explicated this is not common
knowledge for non-experts. Specifically, participant 10 explained the difficulties of
communicating the nature of earthquakes:
If I tell you the most likely time for an earthquake is right after an
earthquake, you’re much more comfortable with the idea that with the first
earthquake you've somehow released stress and energy, but that's not what
we see in the data. So, communicating that after a new earthquake, the risk
of another is going to shoot up is challenging.
Participant three believed the public was aware of aftershocks but they did not know much
more. Participant three explicated, “All the public knows is there is such a thing as an
aftershock. And they know that an aftershock can be largely damaging. But that’s about
it.”
Another unique characteristic of earthquakes expressed by the participants as
difficult to communicate was the temporal nature of earthquakes. The temporal nature of
earthquakes refers to the hyperbolic decay that is characteristic of earthquakes. Participant
10 explicated that while the public may understand that earthquake scientists are unable to
predict earthquakes with certainty, “When it comes to time-dependent earthquake
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forecasting, I think the public doesn’t understand temporal decay.” Participant six
explained temporal distribution characteristic of earthquakes in the following manner:
People don't understand the nature of the temporal distribution. So, if there
is a 10 percent chance of an earthquake in the next three days, what that
actually means is that there is a really high probability right now. But, that
probability is dying off with time, and three days from now the probability
is essentially all gone. That's a hyperbolic decay.
Participant 20, too, explained the temporal nature of earthquakes, saying:
Earthquakes evolve over time and happen in miles…and those waves
propagate to you at different times. So, your intensity is different than
others’ intensity. Our entire language of earthquakes are one number, one
size fits all. And, that’s not how earthquakes are. It’s a function of space
and time that produces effects at different times with different amounts of
intensity and the amount of damage that happens is a function of the
engineering of infrastructure.
Participant six explained most people compare earthquake risks to the “weather
conditions they are used to hearing” which use a different distribution and does not take
into consideration temporal decay. Misinterpretation of hyperbolic decay includes the
public believing that there is an even probability of an earthquake for the next three days,
or that the most likely time for an earthquake is three days from now. Participant six
explains, “Both of those have been misinterpretations that have been made of those
statements. I have advocated that we need to spend more time explaining the nature of the
time decay.”
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Communicating the uncertainty of models. Participants disclosed that in addition
to communicating the uncertainty surrounding the unique nature of earthquakes, they
experienced difficulty communicating the uncertainty of their models to non-experts.
Participant 10 expressed the situation in the following manner, “How do you communicate
the range of possibility and the uncertainty of our models? I think we don’t train scientists
how to communicate uncertainty.”
Participant 16 explained that earthquake scientists typically work with the two
different models to arrive at their findings. “So, there are basically two sorts of models.
There are the short-term models on aftershocks. Then the other sorts of models that are
based on precursory seismicity patterns and they’re more long term” (participant 16).
Regardless of the model, however, uncertainty abounds. Participant three said,
“The problem is all models are an approximation of the real system. So, all models are
ultimately wrong, but are right in certain ways.” Participant nine explained the extent of
uncertainty in the process:
I think we’ve been phrasing it in terms of providing a range. For example,
we will say, ‘we think there will be two to seven earthquakes of magnitude
five or greater.’ I think people can understand that the range is our
uncertainty. I think it’s a lot more difficult in situations where we’re talking
about aftershocks – we’re talking about multiple events and we’re trying to
say something quantitative about how many events. But, in situations where
we’re talking about something that may or may not happen and having to
give a probability is difficult. And then communicating that there is
uncertainty in our computation of that probability.

98

Participant six, too, advocated:
I don't think we should not be kidding how much we don't know. I think we
should be communicating how random the process is, and, in fact, we
understand it very well. People need to hear that we understand it because
that reduces the fear. The focus on certainty should be the focus on the
random.
In this sense, expressed participant six, explicating the randomness would, in essence, be
expressing the certainty of the model used to generate the forecasts. Participant six said:
The big earthquakes are infrequent enough that when people try to look for
patterns with limited data, human beings are very good at finding patterns
in random distributions. So, we think we found something and then you
have to wait years before you confirm it with other earthquakes and then
you discover that in fact it was coincidence. So, we have been misled a lot
of times because of that.
Low probabilities. Given the nature of earthquakes and the difficulty to predict
with certainty, earthquake scientists are often dealing with very low probabilities an
earthquake will occur. For example, the participants described that the likelihood for a
short-term earthquake forecast to reach five percent probability was extremely rare. Most
earthquake forecasts yielded probabilities to the order of 1 percent or less. Thus, another
component of communicating uncertainty of the nature of the risk involves being able to
work with and communicate low-probability statements.
The participants discussed the difficulty of communicating low probabilities to
non-experts. For example, Participant 10 described it as “So, even when there is lots of
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activity, it will still be below five percent. Our models now show, instead of a one percent
probability of an earthquake, now we have five percent.” Similarly, participant 12
explicated the situation in the following manner:
The probability of having a big earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, let’s
say during the week of the SCEC meeting, is something on the order of 10
to the minus seven in average probability. But, if we had seismic activity
occurring on the San Andreas Fault, let’s say an earthquake of magnitude
four had occurred near the San Andreas Fault, then those probabilities
would jump up by a factor of a thousand. Now, that still means they would
be a tenth of a percent. That’s still a small probability.
Participant nine said, “Right not we can give a probability that something might happen.
We cannot say anything with any certainty. We are constantly misjudging between
something will happen and nothing will happen.”
Communicating such small probabilities to other audiences is extremely
challenging. For example, participant 15 said: “I think the main thing is people find it
difficult to understand probabilities, especially small ones.” Participant 14 asserted,
“Dealing with heavy tail probabilities is really a challenge for people to internalize a hazard
they don’t see. Earthquakes are mysterious you get no warning, and being able to convince
people they are real, even though they have no experience with them is a big challenge.”
Participant 13 explicated that earthquake probability are particularly troublesome for others
to interpret, saying:
The users are making different kinds of decisions based on their preknowledge. If you’re talking to reporter or government official or fire chief
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or emergency responder - probability may mean nothing to them. They
don’t have a lot of familiarity with very small probability and almost none
with earthquake probability.
Further, the participant discussed the difficulty of communicating such small chances of a
big event occurring to engineers and public health officials helping to create more resilient
infrastructures in preparation for earthquakes. For example, participant 14 described the
challenge of working with such small probabilities by explaining the process of building
the earthquake design elements in building codes. Participant 14 said building earthquake
design elements in building codes involves acknowledging that they are preparing for an
event that has the probability of occurring once every 2,500 years. Participant 14 continued
to say:
We are working with low probabilities that something will happen even
during the lifetime of a structure or a person’s life. Nonetheless, should they
occur, they would be extremely serious. So, this is the tradeoff. For
example, trying to get people to deal with the 100 year flood - that’s an
enormous probability from an earthquake standpoint! 1 in 100 chance per
year is big in our business. Occasionally, we'll have things that will rise to
that level and maybe we can learn things from working with these other
communities where the hazard is much more.
Learning from communities whose hazard is increased may help to understand how to
handle similar situations.
Low probabilities are extremely difficult to communicate: one may either get the
reaction of apathy or, conversely, one may give the reaction of fear of such an unlikely
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event. With probabilities that small, it is difficult to get people to pay attention. However,
if such an event were to occur, it could have detrimental effects should the individual not
take action to protect oneself. Participant 14 said,
We are concerned about extremely unlikely things. But the extremely
unlikely things are where the big effects are going occur. So all these heavytailed distributions. So, the ordinary earthquakes maybe get people’s
attention, but they don’t really present a hazard. It’s the very unlikely event
that we really worry about.
Participant nine said,
“On a more practical side, if people understood a little more about the
science and what we are trying to do and kind of what we know and don’t
know, they might have better sense of what’s going on. Have more of a
sense of the uncertainty.”
Participant 11, too, believed that the “whole story must be told” regarding earthquake
science and risk. The participant said, “I think there is an overall need to have people
understand context of earthquakes. I don’t think you can have a successful campaign that’s
just around elevated probability, this would be too narrow.”
The participant believed that painting the “whole picture” included adding science
to the curriculum, having science be talked about in news so that people “understand it,
believe it, have it personalized, and can take actions.” The earthquake scientists concluded
with “This is something we have to continue to promote.”
Expert and non-expert acceptance of uncertainty. Another noteworthy subtheme the researcher generated was the level of acceptance for uncertainty in earthquake
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forecast messages the participants perceived between themselves and the lay public. The
earthquake scientists perceived that the public has lower levels of acceptance for
uncertainty and preferred more deterministic statements than did experts. Participant 11
explained the situation in the following way, “When you’re talking about probability,
scientists want to say, ‘here's what we don’t know’ but that for the public to trust science,
they get confused – they really want some confidence in what you’re saying.” Similarly,
participant nine said, “A lot of the public does understand we can’t predict with certaintythat we have to give them something in between. My sense is there is not a lot of
quantitative understanding.” Participant five noted, too, scientists are much more accepting
of uncertainty and even question forecasts made with too much certainty saying, “We’re
always criticizing each other if we see there is not enough statement of uncertainty.”
While the earthquake scientists perceived that the public had lower levels of
uncertainty acceptance than did they, one of the participants noted that it was a balancing
act for scientists in terms of ensuring their non-expert audience felt confident to take
actions based on the forecast. Specifically, participant seven said,
Scientists have to be careful not to present a picture to the public that things
are so bad because this is often not the case. Things may be bad in certain
area, but there are always things you can do to mitigate your risk.
Probabilities are really important, and it’s how we keep each other honest.
We’re always stating how much we know, but we’re always criticizing each
other if we see there is not enough statement about uncertainty or error and
the probability. Most of the public doesn’t understand probability or they
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may misinterpret it or think if the probability isn’t really high, why do
anything about it?
Participant one said, we “must be honest” and “we shouldn’t over emphasize or under
emphasize our knowledge.” However, said participant one, “finding the balance is a
challenge. The balance between communicating that we can’t predict earthquakes but that
we aren’t completely clueless.” The participant continued to say that science is:
A continuum of knowledge. On one end is being able to predict earthquakes
and on the other is knowing nothing. Although we cannot predict
earthquakes, there is a large space in that continuum in which we exist. So
we know a great deal, but it’s difficult communicating this. (Participant one)
The earthquake scientists perceived themselves as having more acceptance for uncertainty,
however, they did not want their criticism of determinism to overshadow their messages to
the public about earthquake risk. Thus, there was a delicate balance for earthquake
scientists as they attempted to communicate what they knew, maintain their credibility, and
make the public feel confident in taking action while also ensuring that they are not
oversimplifying the complexity of earthquake risk.
Expert-to-expert challenges. Participants expressed that the problem of
communicating uncertainty was an internal problem (between experts) as much as it was
an external problem (expert to non-expert). A challenge that emerges in the earlier stages
of communicating technical information is coming up with a consensus of the risk at-hand
among experts. Once an expert has determined there is a risk of an earthquake, he or she
may consult with other experts in order to gain reinforcement, approval, or feedback of
their risk assessment. Experts may not agree with one another, take time to provide a
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consensual assessment of the risk, and may disagree on the best forms to communicate the
probability. Attaining agreement amongst experts can be a grueling and time-consuming
task in any discipline, however, it is especially pertinent to earthquake scientists due to the
immense uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting.
Participant one explained their experience:
Probabilistic illiteracy is not only among the public it is also among our
community. Usually seismologists are trained for determinism in the sense
that they are trained to find the physical law that can predict exactly what is
going on. So, probabilistic models are not very well used among our
community. Some people do not fully appreciate what probability is and
how it can be helpful. For this reason, they won’t communicate any
probability at all.
When discussing the challenges in communicating probability to non-experts, participant
10 noted, “It’s a real challenge. I mean it’s already a massive challenge to communicate to
even people on the same level, people not too far removed from it, exactly what our models
are.” Similarly, participant 12 said, “Probabilities are tricky business. In some ways, it is
very simple, but in some ways it is very complex. So, even the scientists that are deeply
involved in this problem, I would say sometimes mess up in understanding probability.”
When asked about the challenges of communicating probability, participant 14 asserted,
“that’s the problem we haven’t solved… and [laughter] even people in the sciences have
not solved with probability.”
Recently, scientists debated about disseminating more deterministic statements of
earthquake risk when such determinism is impossible. In August of 2015, scientists at

105

NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory released an article in which they assert a 99.9%
probability of a magnitude five or greater earthquake in Los Angeles by April of 2018
(Donnellan et al., 2015). The NASA scientists came to this prediction using the GutenbergRichter law which states that for every 1,000 magnitude three earthquakes, there are 100
magnitude four earthquakes, 10 magnitude five earthquakes, one magnitude six earthquake
(Mulargia & Geller, 2003). The forecast, however, was “immediately disputed by the U.S.
Geological Survey, the nation's lead agency overseeing earthquake science, which says
there is an 85% chance of such a quake” (Lin, October 2015, para. 3). Usually the forecasts
generated are low, and thus any highly predictive statements are considered illegitimate.
The USGS claimed that such high certainty predictions could not be made and that
the NASA scientists implied time to Gutenberg-Richter relationship when no such time
component exists. USGS scientist, Lucy Jones, stated in an interview for the Los Angeles
Times, “He's [referring to Donnellan] put a time feature into this, and Gutenberg and
Richter did not have time in the equation" (Lin, October 2015, para. 17). In the interview,
Lucy Jones goes on to discount the published research on the grounds of the lack of
uncertainty in a 99.9% prediction saying that, “we don’t believe this is proven well enough
to be worth any change in advice to local governments. It’s not justified. It’s not tested.”
(para. 23). Thus, advocates against NASA’s recently released evidence are weary of such
information and hesitant to disseminate such certainty surrounding earthquake prediction.
In conclusion, one of the biggest challenges the earthquake scientists faced in their
endeavor of communicating earthquake information was communicating the uncertainty
involved in the process. Specifically, the earthquake scientists faced complications
communicating the uncertainty of the nature of earthquakes and the uncertainty of the
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models used to generate their earthquake forecasts. Further, the earthquake scientists were
aware that the issue of understanding uncertainty was as much an internal problem
(amongst experts) as it was an external problem (expert to non-expert). Another prominent
theme that the researcher generated from the interview data was the distinction the
earthquake scientists made between seeing their role as communicating hazard and not
communicating risk. This theme is discussed in further detail next.
Hazard versus Risk Communication Responsibilities
Another theme that the researcher generated from her interviews was the distinction
the earthquake scientists made between communicating hazard and communicating risk.
The difference between seismic risk and seismic hazard is an important one from which to
distinguish in earthquake forecasting. Seismic hazard is a forecast of the intensity of the
natural event at a specific location during a specific interval of time. Conversely, seismic
risk is a forecast of “the damage to society that will be caused by earthquakes, usually
measured in terms of casualties and economic losses” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 327). Jordan
et al. (2011) assert that risk depends on the hazard but is also dependent on a community’s
exposure (i.e., its population’s understanding of the risk and the actual built environment).
Risk is also dependent on the community’s vulnerability to additional hazards taking place
such as fires and dam failures. Community resilience is the term for “how quickly a
community can recover from earthquake damage,” and resilience is inversely related to
risk (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 327). Thus, risk quantification can be extremely difficult and
complex as it involves “detailed knowledge of the natural and built environments, as well
as highly uncertain predictions of how regions will continue to develop economically” (p.
327).
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Almost all of the participants discussed explicitly their responsibilities as scientists
in these terms. They made it clear that the role of an earthquake scientist is one in which
they communicate the hazard. The risk, on the other hand, was up to government officials
or other stakeholders to communicate. Participants one and 12 explained the difference
between hazard and risk and explained the role that scientists played with the two.
Participant one said,
The situation is a little bit complicated because scientists only calculate
hazard. Hazard is assessing the probability of the ground shaking. But,
that’s not all— there is also another aspect to this, what we call risk. It’s not
just probability to have the ground shaking but also the probability for
individuals to get killed from an earthquake.
Participant 12 compared risk and hazard, saying:
Risk is a much more subjective issue. Taking risk actions means making
risk decisions and those decisions must be balanced among many issues like
political considerations and other difficult things to quantify. And, one does
not want to make those decisions.
Participant 16 took the example of L’Aquila earthquake disaster to illustrate the
communication responsibilities of scientists, saying:
I think it’s important to have a separation of scientific advice from the use
of it. I think in the L’Aquila situation, it was mixed up. There should have
been some sort of quantitative statement of hazard from the scientists and
not just a judgement from civil defense people. I think we need to be quite
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formal in separating roles. A scientist’s role is not the same as the
government’s role.
Similarly, participant 15 said, “I see our goal as providing information and then it’s up to
other people to see that information and distribute it further. Our goal as scientists is to
make information available.” And, participant 18 asserted, “The managers are there to
make decisions. Scientists should be separated from taking actions. As far as talking to the
public, some scientists should never talk to public. Decisions of risk should not be made
by scientists.” Similarly, participant one said:
They [stakeholders] have different responsibilities because they are the
decision makers - we are not. Their job is even more critical because it’s not
only enough to communicate what's going on but also possible actions
people can take. So we have communication problems at different levels,
but we are working on that. It is really challenging.
Participant 14 went on to discuss whether or not scientists should cross the line
between risk and hazard, asserting:
I think we can do it in a generic way in the sense that we can identify
building types that are going to be more vulnerable, and through working
with earthquake engineers and others to describe what those solutions might
be. But, I don’t think we could go all the way to risk, that’s a risk. In some
ways, we're going to have to go there in terms of scenarios. I think that’s
important in terms of communication. For example, if we take a case of
small city in a state like Oklahoma, that currently has high hazard because
of earthquake that are being induced. They need to have something that
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describes what would happen if a large earthquake were to occur. They have
a lot of old and historic and unreinforced buildings. So just providing
ground motions is not enough. We have to go all the way through to help
them understand what the issues may be and what they can do.
In this sense, communicating risk would be dependent on the audience’s experience with
the hazard and would dictate the extent scientists should go with communicating risk.
Participant 17 said, “Policy makers want to know, what to do, and we can only provide an
answer to part of that which is telling them what the earth is likely to do. So, people who
understand what the risk is have to be involved such that government gets the information.”
Participant one said that while risk is difficult to communicate and not the responsibility
of the scientist to do so, it is incredibly important for scientists to communicate the hazard.
Participant one said,
Scientists only know part of the story and that is the hazard. They don’t have
to claim to have a solution. But, hazard should be communicated. Take for
example the case of Ebola. I wouldn’t want a medical doctor to hide the
probability of me contracting Ebola, no matter how small it is. Someone
else should not be deciding that information for me.
Communicating hazard meant being able to outsource a probability of the ground shaking
and make this information available to the public. However, such information is currently
unavailable and there have been discussions among the scientists whether or not to make a
continuously operating system communicating hazard available to the public.
As a means of separating hazard and risk communication responsibilities, the
earthquake scientists discussed the current deliberations around implementing Operational
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Earthquake Forecasting (OEF), a system that would provide constant communication of
seismic hazard (Jordan et al., 2011). This system would be “an open source of authoritative,
scientific information about the short-term probabilities of future earthquakes, and this
source needs to properly convey epistemic uncertainties in these forecasts” (Jordan &
Jones, 2010, p. 573). The goal of OEF is to “provide the public with authoritative
information on the time dependence of regional seismic hazards” (Jordan & Jones, 2010,
p. 571). While OEF works on the basis of low probabilities for short-term prediction, it
provides transparent and timely information to the public regarding the current status of
seismic activity. Earthquake scientists would discuss with stakeholders to establish
thresholds for warning messages based on the probabilities (Jordan & Jones, 2010). Such
threshold warnings would likely seldom be cast because reaching even a 5% (level B)
threshold is rare. Thus, say Jordan and Jones (2010), “reliable and skillful earthquake
prediction—i.e., casting high-probability space-time-magnitude alarms with low falsealarm and failure-to-predict rates-- is still not possible (and may never be)” (p. 573).
Regardless, such a system would allow individuals accessing the information to make their
own decision based on the current probability of short-term earthquakes.
Proponents of OEF also claim the age for advanced communication systems, like
OEF, in the seismic field is now. Jordan and Jones (2010) assert, “In this age of nearly
instant information and high bandwidth communication, public expectations regarding the
availability of authoritative short term forecasts appear to be evolving rather rapidly” (p.
573). Jordan and Jones (2010) also caution what can happen if authoritative information is
unavailable in such an age of continuously available information. Specifically, the authors
warn against “information vacuums” which can occur when authoritative information is
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unavailable and rumors surrounding earthquakes and false information begin to become
prominent beliefs in the social sphere (p. 573). Information vacuums can be dangerous to
earthquake scientists’ messages. For example, if an earthquake scientists were to disagree
with a local citizen’s popularized prediction that an earthquake was highly probable, the
public may believe earthquake scientists are denying the truth. Specifically, Jordan and
Jones (2010) say:
These rumors [about an increased earthquake risk] pose a particular challenge for
seismologists because they posit that we will deny the truth; to many people, an
official denial suggests a confirmation, the best defense against such tautology is to
demonstrate that the scientific information is always available through an open and
transparent forecasting process. (p. 573)
While a large body of scientists agree with implanting OEF and believe in its goals, there
are other scientists who provide a counter argument to its effectiveness. Wang and Rogers
(2014) released a published article in response to Jordan and Jones’ (2010) call for OEF,
and argued that the public may gain a false sense of security if such continuous information
of low-probability earthquake hazard was released. Specifically, Wang and Rogers (2014)
highlight two main problems they foresee with OEF. The first, they say, is that OEF is
based largely on analyses of earthquake clustering or potential foreshock sequences which
sometimes do not occur before the onset of earthquakes. For example, they note the 1976
Tangshan and 2010 Haiti earthquakes who all arrived without recognizable foreshock
sequences. They assert, “OEF would have had difficulty forecasting anomalously high
probabilities prior to these events” (p. 569).
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Second, Wang and Rogers (2014) warn against OEF and its overall practicality
considering social-economic consequences. The authors assert, “a change from practically
impossible (0.001%) to very unlikely (5%) is not useful for saving lives. The most
objective measure of the usefulness of a short-term forecast is whether it can guide preseismic evacuation of unsafe buildings” (p. 569). With a 5% probability of an impending
earthquake or even the extremely rare probability gains of up to 40%, it would be “a
gamble” to decide to evacuate-- one “which society and economy could hardly afford” (p.
569). The authors conclude that OEF would ultimately discredit reliable long-term
earthquake predictions and would disrupt economic functions. The authors propose instead
that organizations, communities, and the government should make increased efforts to
retrofit or replace buildings to conform to earthquake resistance provisions (Wang &
Rogers, 2014). They say countries that have implanted this strategy have benefited, and
“As a result, fatalities due to building collapse were relatively small given the size of the
earthquakes” (p. 570).
The current state of earthquake forecasting is one in which short-term earthquake
prediction with high certainty is impossible. Discussions over how to improve earthquake
prediction despite this barrier involve implementing advanced communication
technologies, such as OEF. However, seismologists disagree on the helpfulness of such
technologies. Expert risk judgement aids in the evaluation of generated probabilities from
earthquake forecasts.
Despite the controversy, participants were vocal about the benefits of OEF.
Participant 12 noted, “there is no scholarly debate here. The best protection against
earthquakes is better and more resilient buildings. Some say that OEF detracts from this
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because it places focus on short term action versus long term action. I don’t agree.”
Advocates for OEF are optimistic about the public’s probabilistic comprehension. For
example, participant 12 noted:
We should make probabilistic information public all the time. For example,
at the race track people know to expect probabilistic statements and they
can use them in that context. So, I think the public can handle statements of
probability. What we don’t want to do is spring these statements on them
during a crisis. Through usage and repetition is how the public becomes
better with this.
According to participant 12, OEF was “popularized through a series of publications
in the past 5 years or so.” OEF emerged because
The problem was everyone was looking for earthquake prediction to
provide the information to society they needed to prepare for earthquake.
And, prediction was defined as being very high probability statements that
earthquake were going to happen. And, seismologists were not able to figure
out, and still haven’t figured out, how to predict earthquakes with high
probability. And, so, everybody sort of wasn’t thinking about the possibility
to provide society with at least some information. So, if you had a big
earthquake, what was the probability of having a big aftershock? And, that’s
really the beginning of OEF is providing that type of information.
(Participant 12)
There are two objectives to OEF namely, transparency and hazard risk separation.
The Transparency Principle of OEF essentially states that scientists must provide the public
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with validated and authoritative scientific information (Jordan et al., 2011). Participant 12
explained the transparency principle,
We shouldn’t hide anything we know scientifically, even if what we know
cannot be stated in simple terms. What that means in practice is that we
really have to deliver probabilities to the public. That’s the way we
characterize our information and, so in its purest form, that’s the
information that’s available.
Participant 13 said,
We don’t put out information consistently only after big event happens. So
we don’t put out information a lot. We always get questions about
aftershocks and we say something general. One of the goals of an
operational system is that it’s always there. It’s like weather forecasting.
You can always get a daily forecast. We get sense of how to understand that
forecast in terms of reliability. I think the more continuous information
people get, that’s how we get people familiar with what we know, and what
we can do.
The Hazard-Risk Separation principle is based on the notion that estimating the
probabilities of having an earthquake or estimating hazard is a scientific problem. Risk is
seen as being subjective and, thus, not the responsibility of the scientists to assess. Instead,
risk is the task of each individual receiver of the information to determine for him or herself
(Jordan et al., 2011).
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Participant six explained the benefits of OEF saying that it allows scientists to
communicate what they know instead of focusing on what they do not know. Participant
six asserted:
Most of this can be quantified. That's the idea behind what we call OEF. We take
how much time explaining uncertainty? I think that scientists feel like they need to
express every qualifier and every statement of uncertainty that by the time we get
done, we spend too much time focusing on what we don't know. (Participant six)
Other participants discussed the eventual outcomes of OEF. Participant eight hopes
through OEF, scientists “can provide forecasts that increase people’s awareness” and
through the process of providing continuous information it would “get people thinking and
maybe make sure people are prepared. Maybe it would create the dialogue between
scientists and the public.”
OEF is an effort to provide the most complete information possible from earthquake
scientists at any given time. The main goals of OEF are to provide transparency of
information, keep scientists’ responsibilities to communicating hazard. With OEF,
scientists can discuss appropriate thresholds with each stakeholder given their needs.
According to participant 12, “Well defined procedures should be in place well before a
crisis.”
The participants also touched on the idea that OEF became a popularized idea
following past failures of earthquake communication. The participants perceived the
L’Aquila earthquake crisis of 2009 as an “opportunity” for OEF (participant 12). OEF
would be a way for the individual users to assess their own risks and benefits of the
presented forecast and it would protect scientists. Participant 12 said,
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The notion of formalizing it into a system that is there and operating, not
just after aftershock sequences, did not take hold until after the L’Aquila
earthquake. Frankly we deliberately used L’Aquila as an opportunity to lay
out an operational system even if the info had low absolute probability
because we knew we could get high probability gain.
Participant 14 discussed how there was a “large increase in awareness of earthquakes
following large crises. These crises events were important in terms of informing the public
about earthquake safety issues and really beginning to get people to focus on things they
need to do in the long term.”
Given how the earthquake scientists saw their responsibilities as those of
communicating hazard and not risk, the participants provided recommendations for risk
communicators who translate messages of hazard into risk. Participant one described the
way they believed earthquake probabilities should be communicated by placing them in
context because “People are not able to perceive low probabilities.” For example, says
participant one, “if I were to hear the statistic that there is a one percent chance of having
a flight accident, I may never get on a plane.” For this reason, participant one advocated
that numbers should be put into context. “No adjectives. Instead, we should put things in
terms of how they do the lottery. For example, 1 per 1000 chance or 1 in 100 chance. The
public is familiar with this type of context.”
Jordan et al. (2011) provide some important recommendations for the future of
earthquake forecasting. Among the recommendations, the authors say that objectively set
thresholds should be established and should aid in justifying actions taken in the decision
making process. Such a recommendation is critical because, as of late, there is no formal
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procedure in place for translating earthquake probability into particular actions to employ
in order to mitigate harm. Participant 12 explicated the process as:
You can’t evacuate a city because you have 1% chance of an earthquake.
So, one of the things we need to do is formulate a series of things that can
be done… kind of like a menu of actions that can be taken.
The participant continued to explain that earthquake scientists would generate earthquake
hazard probabilities and help their stakeholders formulate thresholds based on their
particular needs.
Thresholds are not specified by people that do OEF, those thresholds are
negotiated with the stakeholders in advance. So, that information is
provided in advance and there is a negotiation. Moreover, those actions have
to be fine-tuned to the [OEF] system. (Participant 12)
In conclusion, the participants of the current study described another of their
challenges as that in relation to their identity as a scientist. The earthquake scientists
described themselves, in large, as being responsible to generate the numbers related to
earthquake science. They did not want to engage in the process of risk assessment. They
felt that risk communication was too subjectively anchored for them to take part and make
a difference, and they felt as if this was the duty of others such as emergency mangers or
government.
Given the outcome of L’Aquila, the scientists push forward the idea of OEF in
which continuous information of earthquake hazard would be available for stakeholders
and the public to access. The participants argued that OEF would help to ensure that they,
as scientists, have done their part in providing messages of hazard. It was then up to each
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individual user of the information provided to assess his or her own risk. Another theme
the researcher generated from the research data was the economic value of an earthquake
message. The theme is discussed next.
Economic Value of an Earthquake Message
Another theme expressed by the participants was the economic value of a message
or the financial and infrastructural consequences of an earthquake forecasting message.
The participants inquired about the impact of their forecasting message on the economic
structure of the region. For example, when asked about what types of message testing
would be most helpful regarding earthquake forecasting, participant 10 asserted, “One
thing that would be gratifying for scientists is accurate predictions of risk or [predictions]
linked to some sort of economic value or something like that.” Similarly, participant 15
expressed, while scientists are “working on producing the numbers” because they “need to
find out what do people and our stakeholders want,” the participant expressed the
frustration that while they can produce the numbers, “the outcome of the numbers can mean
lots of different things them [referring to individual stakeholders]” and some sort of
outcome of the message would be helpful.
The participants suggested that each individual has different costs associated with
a risk. For example, participant 20 said:
How do uncertainties translate into real issues for a person? For example, I
could give a statement and it could be a false alarm. And then, how does
that uncertainty translate into a cost to you? You might want to know if
you’re going to have shaking and if it’s going to affect you directly.
Participant 20 explained,
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So, if you could boil [cost] down to set of few questions like: how much
does it cost for you to take this action and for it to have turned out to have
been unnecessary? And how much does it cost for you to have not taken
this action and it turns out there was an earthquake? And how much time do
you need to take action? From those questions, you can do the math. It
becomes a yes-no function of time. At this moment in time, should my
device be yelling ‘open the fire house doors’ which may or may not be the
same thing the device next door is saying.
Participant 16 believed that the best risk preparation was “to have safe buildings.” They
believed that “the campaigns being done are great in terms of drop, cover, and hold.”
However, they believed that practically speaking, “there is a certain level where there are
bound to be fatalities. So, we also need to make our cities safe.” However, participant six
asserted that deciding to evacuate in a business economy could have huge economic
consequences that it may not in other countries with less weight on their economy. Every
country has a different economic structure such that evacuation would have different
economic consequences associated depending on the country. Participant six recommends
that earthquake scientists are able to “take the scientific information and package it with a
probability and hand it to an emergency manager who understands all that social science
and can make a decision on which ones are worthwhile.”
The economic value of a message also meant that each individual user would have
different needs associated with their cost. Although the earthquake scientists did not see it
as their role to prescribe an action to the hazard, they did discuss that this would be a
challenging task. Participant 18 described the difficulty of this process,
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It’s not as determinist as people think. There are a range of scenarios, there
are different levels of danger people might be in, the options they have, the
preparation, and how they should react. I think it’s hard to give a recipe of
what people should do and shouldn’t do.
For example, participant 10 said:
We can develop consensual recommendations, but it is so complicated
hashing out who is responsible for what and when and in what kind of
situation and what do you do with the information, and making sure
whatever you communicate is well understand by the person
communicating it as well as integrating best practices and lessons that we
have from communicating risk is a challenge. Perhaps most important is
make sure people aren’t freaked out, that people don’t panic. Make sure
they are confident, and whatever message you communicate leads to some
action but, again, that may be difficult to test because it is hard to quantify.
Similarly, participant 20 said, “we can be wrong about what's going on and what you should
do. The right probability product isn’t the same for everybody. Think for example, an
engineer versus an insurance company. They have different risk interests.” Participant 11
responded, “One of the most challenging things is knowing what mitigative actions are the
right ones to give. People are looking to scientists to tell them what happened, but they
look to emergency management to keeping them whole.”
In conclusion, the earthquake scientists faced challenges in understanding the worth
of communicating earthquake messages for their stakeholders and the public. They
expressed that they would find helpful a representation of the costs and benefits of their

121

earthquake message. In this endeavor, they sought to know when the probability of
earthquake was too small to convey or, in other words, when it was not economically
advantageous to convey a probability. Further, the earthquake scientists expressed the
difficulty in outlining which action to prescribe as it correlated with the probability of an
earthquake occurring and its economic consequences.
Earthquake Scientists’ Communication and CERC
For the final research question, the researcher inquired about the extent scientists’
perceptions of their communication aligned with the communication prescriptions of the
pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. CERC advocates that communicators should be
prepared to facilitate the following: monitoring and recognition of emerging risks; general
public understanding of risk; public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event;
changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy); specific warning
messages regarding some eminent threat; alliances and cooperation with agencies,
organizations, and groups; development of consensual recommendations by experts and
first responders; and message development and testing for subsequent stages. The
researcher used a combination of the themes to help answer RQ 4. The details of the
findings of RQ 4 are provided next.
Monitoring and recognizing emerging risks. During this stage, communicators are
advised to identify and address the types of crises they are most likely to face (Reynolds &
Seeger, 2012). Challenges in the endeavor of monitoring and recognizing emerging risks
included forecasting an unpredictable natural disaster, and expert-to-expert discrepancy in
risk judgment. Limits of earthquake technology, as described by the participants, was not
the problem to effective earthquake response. The participants indicated that earthquake
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technologies allow scientists to provide estimates about the location, magnitude, and timing
of earthquake risks. Importantly, however, participants indicated that monitoring and
recognizing emerging risks was not limited by technology, rather it was limited by the risk
itself. This finding is best exemplified by participant 10 who said, “[Forecasting] is limited
not by technology, but by our physical understanding of the earth’s crust. We're not able
to predict earthquakes with any certainty. We are able to make very low probabilistic
statements about the future.” Thus, the main challenge with adhering to CERC’s first step
of the pre-crisis stage, monitor and recognize emerging risks, was dealing with the
unpredictability and uncertainty of earthquakes.
Problems with monitoring and recognizing emerging risks was further
problematized by expert-to-expert challenges of communicating the hazard. That is, in the
process of facilitating monitoring and recognizing emerging risk, the earthquake scientists
experienced a discrepancy among experts in risk recognition. Even though earthquake
prediction is an “impossible” task (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 15), the earthquake
scientists expressed that not all of their colleagues had the same understanding of the
limitations of earthquake science. Some participants explained the discrepancy was due, in
part, to the challenge of understanding probability, even at the expert level and that
scientists are trained for determinism.
General public’s understanding of the risk. During this stage, communicator’s
should facilitate providing answers to anticipated questions of the general public regarding
the risk. Challenges in the endeavor of facilitating answers to anticipated questions to the
general public’s questions resides primarily in the public’s lack of understanding of the
limitations of earthquake forecasting and differences in earthquake risk perception. The
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earthquake scientists expressed that they perceived the public as largely unaware of the
limitations of earthquake forecasting. For example, participant nine said, “A lot of the
public doesn’t understand we can’t predict with certainty and that we have to give them
something in between.” In addition to lacking familiarity with low probabilities, the
earthquake scientists further perceived that the public did not understand that there was
uncertainty inherent in the generated forecast.
Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event. During this stage,
communicator’s should facilitate the use of preparation strategies and tools for protection.
Challenges in facilitating the use of preparation strategies and tools for protection included
appropriately using popular culture references of earthquake risk and ensuring that
vulnerable audiences receive the message and are taking preparation strategies. The
earthquake scientists expressed that current information campaigns are aiding educating
non-experts. For example, one of the participants expressed, through the ShakeOut drill,
she encountered stories of members of the lay public correcting previously held
misperceptions of earthquake preparedness, such as standing at the doorway during
shaking. The participants perceived that information campaigns can make a positive impact
on earthquake forecasting because campaigns such as ShakeOut would draw attention to
earthquake risk during quiet periods. Such campaigns are helping to not only correct
misperceptions of earthquake preparedness and action, but they are also aiding in helping
to keep people’s attention on earthquake risk during “quiet times” (participant 20).
Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy). During this
stage, communicator’s should facilitate preparedness actions to increase public safety. The
earthquake scientists perceived that campaigns were extremely helpful in instilling positive
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behavioral changes for self-protection. Challenges that emerged in the process of
facilitating preparedness actions to increase public safety include preventing participation
bias and supplementing current campaigns, such as ShakeOut, with other information to
increase self-protection during earthquake emergency risk and crisis. One of the challenges
with earthquake preparation and response is ensuring that all members of the population –
especially those most vulnerable – feel equipped and efficacious to enact self-protection
behaviors. The earthquake scientists perceived that current campaigns, such as the
ShakeOut drill, were extremely effective in helping the public feel self-efficacious during
earthquakes. Specifically, information campaigns, such as ShakeOut, provided the general
public with step-by-step instructions for behaviors for self-protection should an earthquake
occur. ShakeOut provided simple instructions for protection and was widely disseminated
throughout earthquake prone regions in the United States, such as California. The
earthquake scientists perceived that non-experts felt more efficacious in taking actions as
a result.
The earthquake scientists expressed that such campaigns could be coupled with
earthquake forecasting messages and have positive implications for individual selfprotection, organizations, and building community resilience. For example, the participants
believed that popularized campaigns, such as ShakeOut, were an opportunity to introduce
other earthquake technologies to the public and educate the public on earthquakes.
Participant 10 believed that, “Something like ShakeOut is opportunity to test early warning
and OEF… And, in terms of taking responsibility and making communities more resilient,
it is critical.” Participant 13, too, articulated the benefits of information campaigns. The
participant said that because of ShakeOut people have the “idea that you drop, cover, and
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hold on and it becomes a snap response - and that's a life changing response” (participant
13). Further, the participants believed that such campaigns gained people’s interest on
earthquake risk and prompted them to visit OEF websites. Explicated by participant 13,
“[ShakeOut] has also been impetus for organizations to talk about earthquake response and
preparedness…We always get questions about aftershocks and we say something general.
One of the goals of an operational system is that it’s always there.”
Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat. During this stage,
communicator’s should facilitate providing the public with messages of an impending
threat and encourage them to take action. Challenges in this endeavor included dealing with
unauthorized communication and developing warning messages that were convincing
enough to the receivers of the message to take action given the low probabilities
earthquakes yield. According to the participants, the most important information to
communicate in an earthquake forecasting messaging depends largely on the audience’s
needs. Thus, the earthquake scientists expressed that one of the challenges of
communicating earthquake risk is deciding what is most important for the receiver of the
message. The earthquake scientists explained that every stakeholder and individual
member of the public has varying “costs” associated with their needs. For example,
participant 20 explicated the challenge in the following manner:
How do uncertainties translate into real issues for a person? For example, I could
give a statement and it could be a false alarm. And then, how does that uncertainty
translate into a cost to you? You might want to know if you’re going to have shaking
and if it’s going to affect you directly.
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Specific warning messages regarding some imminent threat should be negotiated with
stakeholders in advance.
OEF was proposed in order to get around the issue of deciding when warning
messages should be issued as every stakeholder has different costs associated with risks.
While OEF provides continuous information regarding up-to-date earthquake hazard, the
challenge is deciding which action to prescribe with the probability. Some scientists
question the usefulness of continuously provided low probabilities to prescribing actions
(Wang & Rogers, 2014). However, as participant 12 stated, “You can’t evacuate a city
because you have one percent chance of an earthquake. So, one of the things we need to
do is formulate a series of things that can be done… kind of like a menu of actions that can
be taken.”
Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups. During this
stage, communicator’s should facilitate communication and information sharing between
agencies, organizations, and groups to coordinate response. Earthquake scientists
expressed that successful coordination involved collaboration between experts, first
responders, insurers, engineers, public health officials, and communication specialists.
Alliances are especially important for earthquake scientists as they did not see their role as
having to translate hazard into risk. Put simply, earthquake scientists saw their role as
providing numerical representations of the hazard to interested parties who would then
translate the numerical representation into risk for themselves. The earthquake scientists
perceived that warning messages were the responsibility of state and local officials.
Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders.
During this stage, communicator’s should facilitate partnerships between agencies to
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ensure coordination of message dissemination and providing unified and coherent
messages to the public. The earthquake scientists expressed that collaboration between
experts and stakeholders was imperative to working towards developing stakeholders’
thresholds for action. As earthquake forecasts yield extremely low probabilities, each
stakeholder has different thresholds for action. The participants also expressed that going
about such collaboration could be confusing considering communication boundaries. Due
to the outcome of the L’Aquila earthquake where six scientists faced legal repercussions
due to their collaboration with government officials, the larger earthquake scientific
community is cautious to providing earthquake hazard messages. The participants
expressed that boundaries of communication make it difficult to collaborate because the
earthquake scientists were confused by which agencies act as earthquake response.
Confusion about communication boundaries was experienced at the national and
international level, meaning that earthquake scientists were confused about which agencies
they could collaborate with in the United States and which agencies they could collaborate
with in other countries.
Message development and testing for subsequent stages. During this stage,
communicator’s should facilitate the development and testing of communication systems
and networks. Current message development and testing centers around OEF, a system
providing constant probabilities of earthquake hazard. The participants of this study
expressed that as risk perception varies between individuals and across groups, providing
automated earthquake hazard would be similar to providing a weather forecast (participant
13). The earthquake scientists indicated that avenues ripe for exploration regarding future
message testing include assessing the economic value of a message. In other words, they
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understood that each stakeholder and user would assess the hazard statement based on their
own experience with the risk and their own calculation of the costs and benefits of taking
action. Future research regarding message testing for subsequent stages should involve
examining behavior associated with statements of probability issued in various ways (e.g.,
expression of chance, expression of dividend, expression of narrative, etc.).
Summary
The researcher identified several themes which captured the experiences of
earthquake scientists in their perceived endeavor of communicating earthquake risk to nonexpert. The participants described three primary challenges that the researcher categorized
as “general” challenges experienced during the pre-crisis stage of CERC. One general
challenge was the varying ways in which risk is perceived. The participants were aware
that their risk messages were being put in context of the individuals’ preconceived notions
of the risk. Specifically, the participants discussed two prominent factors in which risk
perception can vary in particular to earthquake perception: cross-cultural and regional
perceptions of risk and vulnerable audiences and risk perception.
A second general challenge participants’ experienced was navigating their
boundaries of earthquake communication. The participants described that communication
rules and regulations changed according to region and country and, thus, challenging was
to understand and maneuver across these communication boundaries while still providing
their messages to those who need it. A third general challenge the participants’ expressed
was keeping non-experts’ attention on earthquake risk even during times no tremors or
earthquakes were present. Due to the unique nature of earthquakes and their low probability
yielding characteristic, the earthquake scientists felt that non-experts only paid attention to
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earthquake risk once a tremor or earthquake occurred. The participants found it important
that non-experts attention was on earthquake risk even during earthquake “quiet periods.”
The participants described three primary challenges that the researcher identified
as communication challenges. Specifically, the participants experienced difficultly
handling a communication environment inclusive of outrage inciters that they perceived as
harmful to non-expert’s willingness to take appropriate action. The participants also
experienced difficulty code switching with non-experts. Code switching involved
translating their technical information into more understandable and simple language for
non-experts. They found code switching especially trying given the complexity of
earthquake risk and the insufficient manner and extent to which “simple terms” can
describe such phenomena. Given the prominent themes the researcher generated from the
interview data and supplemental sources, several conclusions and implications can be
drawn. The researcher discusses her conclusions and implications subsequently.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications
Earthquake scientists are calling for the application of the principles of social
science research to aid them in earthquake risk communication (Jordan et al., 2011). The
aim of the current study was to explore the experiences of earthquake scientists and the
challenges of operational earthquake forecasting based, in part, on CERC’s pre-crisis stage
and provide recommendations for crisis and emergency-risk communication. Earthquake
scientists are usually the first source of information during the pre-crisis stage, and they
help facilitate communication before the onset of the earthquake event. CERC provides
recommendations from which earthquake scientists can draw when charged with
communicating to diverse publics. This chapter identifies several conclusions and
implications based on the results of this analysis. The first section details conclusions based
on the findings and the researcher provides a recommendation for earthquake scientists to
employ when communicating during the pre-crisis stage. The second section outlines
implications, as well as limitations and avenues for future research.
General Challenges and Recommendations
Publics hold different perceptions of earthquakes. In this sense, earthquake
scientists noted that earthquake risk perception functions no differently than it does in other
risk situations in that non-experts may hold vastly different perceptions of the risk. As
participant nine put it, “if they already have their own belief, then I think none of us really
have training on how to effectively communicate.” Three particularly notable conclusions
can be drawn about the challenge of risk perception in the context of earthquake risk: (1)
the public will compare earthquakes to other natural disasters; (2) earthquake perceptions
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may be more or less accurate based on region; and (3) experts consider the statistical threat
of the event whereas non-experts tend to base their perceptions on outrage.
The publics’ perceptions of earthquake risk is often based on their experiences with
natural disasters about which they are more familiar (e.g., tornadoes or snow storms; Nigg,
1982). Participant 14 asserted, for example, that some members of the public may be
experiencing an earthquake for the first time so “they are probably pretty low on their
learning curve.” Problematic is that earthquakes are different than other natural disasters
in ways that non-experts are unfamiliar. As experts, earthquake scientists must recognize
that non-experts are perceiving the risk based on other risks with which they are more
knowledgeable and familiar. Raising awareness of earthquake risk through educational
efforts and campaigns can help to improve and create more accurate risk perceptions and
prepare the public for self-protection.
Participants also noted that earthquake risk perception differs across regions, and
in some regions were better versed on earthquake risk than others. The participants
suggested this may be due in part to the region’s previous experience with earthquakes. In
addition, participants also claimed that people have different “background knowledge”
about earthquakes. As participant 21 put it, “In California, you have very high chance of
ground shaking, in Kentucky you have some chance.” As such, earthquake scientists must
assess their local non-experts’ experience with earthquake risk to understand which
messages are more appropriate than others.
Finally, the complexity of risk perception arises primarily from the differences in
how experts and non-experts perceive risk. Sandman’s (2012) breakdown of risk into
notions of hazard and outrage helps explain these challenges in communicating earthquake
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risk more fully. He notes that whereas experts focus on hazard, the public focuses on
outrage. Sandman (2012) cautions experts not to dismiss factors of outrage as unscientific
and meaningless. On the contrary, such feelings about the risk are as real to these
individuals as are the hazard calculations made by the experts.
Sandman’s (2012) definition helps to understand why experts will overestimate risk
when hazard is high and outrage is low, and experts will underestimate the risk when
outrage is high and hazard is low. Such a conceptualization can help to explain the events
of L’Aquila where the experts perceived the hazard as low, but the non-experts perceived
the outrage as high. Further, risk communication best practices may help earthquake
scientists move beyond offering accurate risk assessments by translating statistical
information in ways that resonate with non-experts.
In sum, although non-experts lack the technical expertise calculate to risk
probability, experts must communicate in ways that address the outrage factors on which
they base their risk perceptions (Sandman, 2012; Slovic, 2012). Participant 12
acknowledged the value of understanding the public’s “intuition” regarding the probability
of earthquake risk in their region. The pivotal takeaway is that expert risk assessment, albeit
accurate, has the potential to fail unless it addresses non-experts’ interpretations of risk.
Thus, based on the findings of this study, the following recommendation is proposed for
earthquake scientists:
Recommendation #1: Consider non-experts’ experience with the risk and how
non-experts may compare earthquake risk to other natural disasters with which
they are more familiar. Regional differences in risk perception may be most
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notable. Expert risk assessment must consider public perception of the risk into
their risk management efforts.
Another challenging aspect of communicating low probability and high
consequence risk is dealing with the repercussions of miscommunication. Earthquake
scientists found the repercussions for miscommunication to be ambiguous and to vary by
region. Many of the earthquake scientists identified themselves as part of the international
community of earthquake scientists as they discussed their work outside of their native
country. Evident, however, is that different regions of the world handle miscommunication
of earthquake risk differently; the best example of this is the devastating outcome of
L’Aquila. While Italy found the sanctions against the scientists appropriate, such an
outcome was perceived as unwarranted by the international earthquake scientific
community given the unpredictable nature of earthquakes and the low probabilities with
which scientists must work. Repercussions of miscommunication can also lead to stifling
the scientists from risk communication. Thus, it is not surprising that scientists desire to
provide only the numerical value of the risk (as found by the theme, “Hazard and Risk
Communication Responsibilities”) rather than having to translate the technical information
(as found by the theme “Code Switching”).
Given the unpredictability of earthquakes, earthquake communicators should not
be held responsible for inaccurate forecasts. Scientists can only fully comprehend an
earthquake sequence retrospectively and forecasting is not the same a predicting. Thus,
blaming scientists for inadequate earthquake forecasting is unreasonable. Based on the
findings of this study, the researcher proposes the following second recommendation for
earthquake scientists.
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Recommendation #2: Be cognizant of the communication systems in place and the
potential repercussions for miscommunication.
Considering the unpredictability of earthquakes, keeping public attention even
during the “quiet periods” was deemed significant to risk preparation in the pre-crisis stage.
Campaigns were perceived to be extremely effective in helping the public prepare a
possible earthquake. As participant 20 explained, non-experts often have no personal
relationship with earthquake risk because these risks happen so infrequently. Exercises and
drills, via campaigns such as ShakeOut, provide the public with “some sort of intuition” so
they can be prepared if an earthquake were to occur (participant 20). Such educational tools
are also appropriate considering the fact that the number of earthquakes are increasing due
to hydraulic fracturing (Petersen et al., 2016) in areas unfamiliar with earthquakes.
Current campaigns have been extremely beneficial for several reasons. First, the
participants said that campaigns provided opportunity for members of the public to talk
about the risk. Given the sporadic and rare nature of large-magnitude earthquakes,
campaigns helped keep the risk on peoples’ minds. Second, the participants reported that
such campaigns could be seen as an initial step or “gateway drug” towards further
education and preparedness. For example, the earthquake scientists explained that after
ShakeOut drills, participants of the drill are invited to take a voluntary survey to assess
their preparedness, thus providing a nudge towards further preparedness efforts. Other
current efforts to connect preparedness strategies to current campaigns include pairing the
ShakeOut drill with EEW whereby drill participants would receive a text message within
minutes or seconds before an earthquake and would know to drop, cover, and hold on.
Third, current campaigns give users a “snap” response of what to do during an earthquake
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(e.g., drop, cover, and hold on; participant 13). When crises occur, individuals may feel
confused and distraught. By practicing the ShakeOut drill during the pre-crisis stage,
publics will be reminded of the self-protection strategies to employ during the crisis itself.
Lastly, the scientists expressed that campaigns were an impetus for organizations and
stakeholders to create earthquake crisis plans. Given the various benefits to campaigns for
self-protection during earthquake crisis, the use of campaigns should be continued and
experts should seek ways to bridge further preparedness strategies with current campaigns.
The researcher also advocates that earthquake scientists use popular culture (e.g.,
movies, music, television shows, art) to help earthquake education efforts. During the
interviews, the earthquake scientists brought up the movie, San Andreas (2015), and
discussed how both positive and negative outcomes for earthquake science resulted. On the
one hand, the movie helped to generate excitement about earthquake risk and brought
attention to it. On the other hand, the movie helped create further misconceptions about
earthquake risk. Since popular culture has the ability to elicit both accurate and inaccurate
public knowledge outcomes (Sellnow, 2010), the researcher suggests that earthquake
scientists are involved in promoting accurate knowledge outcomes using popular culture.
Scientists should be invited to clarify both the accuracy of the representation and the
misconceptions the reference generated. Participant nine discussed how NASA captures
the publics’ attention and informs accurate science through film (e.g., The Martian).
Similarly, earthquake scientists could capitalize on popular culture references to increase
non-experts’ understanding of earthquake risk. Based on the findings of this study, the
researcher proposes the following third recommendation for earthquake scientists.
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Recommendation #3: Use campaigns and popular culture as opportunities to
capitalize on interest and educate and prepare the public.
Communication Challenges with Non-Experts and Recommendations
The researcher inquired about the communication challenges earthquake scientists
perceived they faced in communicating with non-experts. The researcher categorized
communication challenges as those components of participants’ experience with nonexperts that were particular to communication but unaligned with communicating
probability. The earthquake scientists experienced two key challenges in communicating
with non-experts: outrage inciters and code switching technical information.
Outrage inciters refers to communication that emerged during the pre-crisis stage
from those persons or agencies that are not official sources of information but caused
significant changes in the publics’ risk perception. Oppressing unauthoritative voices, like
outrage inciters, eliminates participants from the conversation and creates a false sense of
security for the public (Herovic, Sellnow, & Anthony, 2014). Striking a balance between
allowing outside voices to be part of the scientific debate and maintaining more credibility
than outrage inciters is important. This balance is especially pertinent for risk
communication because of the subjective nature of risk. That is, each stakeholder and
member of the public must assess his or her own risk given the information. Those
individualized risk assessments differ and are based on the available information. The user
should have freedom of choice in determining his or her own risk depending on the
information available in the communication environment.
Perhaps one of the reasons outrage inciters, such as Mr. Giuliani and the Moon
Man, gained legitimacy, at least for a short period of time, is because they were not

137

discredited by the larger scientific community. During a time of great uncertainty, the
public looks for information from all outlets. If authoritative information is unavailable,
they may turn to less credible sources to gain understanding. Prelli asserts that part of the
reason trends in science continue is because scientists are collectively determining who is
part of the group and can make claims. Prelli (1989) states:
The reasonableness of a scientist’s rhetorical objectives also can be
rendered ambiguous by questioning the individual’s relationship to the
broader scientific community. To the extent that the rhetor’s connection
with the scientific community becomes confusing, so does the legitimacy
of the rhetor’s aims and claims. (p. 136)
During greater times of earthquake uncertainty, scientists can help the public consider
outrage inciters as illegitimate and unreliable.
Outrage inciters cause a unique communication environment that has the potential
to make scientists feel vulnerable. Interestingly, while credible sources, like earthquake
scientists, communicate with the public using probability statements to ensure that the
uncertainty of their forecast is delivered, outrage inciters do not take the same precautions.
Instead they communicate with certainty when there is no scientific evidence to support
their claims. They also oversimply complex matters to make their points easily understood,
despite their inaccuracy. When these outrage inciters gain visibility with the public,
earthquake scientists may feel vulnerable and frustrated. Ignoring outrage inciters and the
unwarranted claims they make to the public is not advisable. Rather, earthquake scientists
should address these claims early and often with rebuttals that are both evidence-based and
translated into language that can be comprehended by the public.
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The takeaway for scientists in cases of dealing with outrage inciters should be to
provide information as quickly as they can and to discredit outrage inciters. Earthquake
scientists have the authority and command to direct the public’s attention away from
outside voices or deem them illegitimate (Prelli, 1989). Such actions help the public who
is viewing messages to discredit outrage inciters. Based on the findings of this study, the
researcher proposes the following fourth recommendation for earthquake scientists.
Recommendation #4: Publicly challenge communication from outrage
inciters. Do not ignore it or omit it.
A core issue with risk communication is translating scientific and technical
information such as probability into more understandable language for non-experts.
Earthquake risk is no exception. Converting technical earthquake information into more
simple forms was deemed challenging because the process involves ensuring accuracy
despite the simplification, conceptualizing the simplified terms on which probabilities are
based, and employing humility in the process.
Earthquake scientists discussed current code switching efforts in order to simplify
the complexity of earthquake science to non-expert audiences. For example, earthquake
scientists have taken out the probabilities in order to simplify the message when
communicating to non-experts. Other ways earthquake scientists have code switched
technical earthquake information involves color-coded formats to help increase accurate
interpretation (participant 20). Earthquake scientists have also incorporated a “101” of
earthquake science on their website to help simplify the technicality of earthquake risk.
Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) assert that representing probability in more than one
format aids in individuals choosing the format which makes the most sense to them and
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taking the desired action. While multiple formats have the potential to confuse audiences,
different formats of the same message help to meet the needs of a diverse audience
(Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014).
Code switching involves providing descriptive terms that represent the probability;
however, such descriptions can have varying meanings for the audience. Even translating
probability into words such as “likely” or “unlikely” becomes problematic as members of
the public have different interpretations of those words (participant 10). These terms
become exceptionally difficult for non-experts to interpret when one considers the low
probabilities on which these thresholds are based. Asserting that an earthquake is likely on
the probability of five percent may seem like “nonsense to people” (participant 16) and not
enough evidence for emergency responders and government officials to issue warning
messages. For this reason, while earthquake scientists believe a formal procedure for
translating numbers into words is needed, there are no current agreements on appropriate
means of meeting this goal (participant 15).
Providing explanations of terms and using examples and narratives to describe
statistics can only be afforded in the pre-crisis stage when experts facilitate education and
preparedness. Code switching involves considering the ways in which non-experts process
statistical information. Slovic (2010) describes how humans are not biologically
programmed to receive risk information in the form of numbers. Slovic asserts that
evolution has not prompted us to comprehend the risks associated with guns, fast-food, and
smoking like it has with snakes, spiders, and heights. Further, he asserts, evolution has not
prepared us to be sensitive to large-scale impacts; rather, we are most sensitive to small
scale (e.g., we are better able to comprehend the risk of one death over thousands). Slovic
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(2010) promotes “new modes of discourse” in risk communication (p. 83). Specifically,
the author asks for “new ways of describing the experience, new strategies for translating
statistics into stories, and new ways of articulating the meaning of both numbers and
nerves” (p. 83). He suggests that probabilistic information be presented through images
and storytelling. Through more qualitative means of communicating probability, the
information can help people better understand what this risk means to them personally.
Such explanations cannot be afforded during the crisis itself, as time is limited. By
effectively explaining terms and statistics in the pre-crisis stage, experts prepare nonexperts for the later stages of CERC when they must provide messages of evacuation or
self-protection.
Employing humility helps non-experts relate to experts and aid in message
receptivity. Participant 11 mentioned the power of humanizing scientists and what it can
do for how non-experts view scientists and their message. Particularly, participant 11
explained that seismologist, Lucy Jones, was holding her toddler during a live televised
interview where reporters were asking Jones about earthquake risk. Lucy’s publicly
broadcasted message, with toddler in hand, to the public elicited a favorable response.
Lucy’s message likely generated a favorable response because it aligns with the idea that
open, honest, and willing communication with the media results in positive outcomes. The
spokesperson is likely to be perceived by the public as empathetic, active in attempting to
solve the problem, and humanizing (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2015). Based on the
findings of this study, the researcher provides the following fifth recommendation for
earthquake scientists.
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Recommendation #5: Present the same message different ways. Provide
definitions behind terms such as “likely” and compare terms so that non-experts
understand the difference. Use examples and narratives in addition to the statistic.
Employ humility.
Challenges with Communicating Probability
The researcher inquired about the challenges earthquake scientists face in issuing
probabilistic statements of earthquake risk. Effective probability communication to nonexperts was deemed to be the primary concern and biggest perceived challenge of experts.
The following themes helped to answer the question: communicating uncertainty, hazard
versus risk communication responsibilities, and the economic value of an earthquake
message.
One great debate in science is the one between certainty and uncertainty. While
Isaac Newton developed laws that helped outline the predictability of the natural world,
not all forces follow this same line of predictability. For example, at the level of atoms and
particles, the quantum world does not abide by such instruction and certainty. According
to Quantum Theory, scientists cannot say with certainty what will occur. Werner
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, too, is based on the notion that the world runs on
probability and that nothing is certain (Spradlin & Porterfield, 1984). In this sense, the
search for certainty unveils uncertainty. For scientists, this means that the outcomes of
experiments and models are not completely predictable and there will always be elements
of uncertainty.
Communicating earthquake risk illustrates the complexity involved with
communicating uncertainty to non-experts. Of all fields of science, the field of earthquake
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science is an ideal example of the complexity in communicating science because of the
nature of earthquakes. According to Mulargia and Geller (2003), there is great difficulty in
using statistical models to find truth of earthquake phenomena because the problem “is
aggravated in earthquake physics by the intrinsic impossibility of reproducing the
experiments at will in forward time, and by the long time scale of geological phenomena”
and because models used to explain the data are “mostly ad hoc quantitative descriptions
of a single or at most a few cases involving a handful of data and a large number of free
parameters” (p. 5). Experts attain advanced statistical training that non-expert audiences
may not receive (Gigerenzer, 2014). Non-experts may lack the general understanding of
the limitations of science and, thus, the limitations of earthquake scientists in providing
deterministic statements regarding earthquake risk.
Although uncertainty is inevitable in the pursuit of earthquake forecasting,
uncertainty is often overlooked or ignored when communicated (Wiedmann, Boener, &
Schutz, 2014). The issue is further complicated because members of the lay public prefer
more deterministic statements to aid them in their decision-making, yet such determinism
is difficult for earthquake scientists to achieve in the scientific forecasting process. The
case of the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy earthquake crisis demonstrates the implications of poor
probability communication. L’Aquila civilians did not take actions to protect themselves
because they received messages from public officials that an earthquake was ‘unlikely.’
The public officials who made this public announcement had misinterpreted the inherent
uncertainty in the earthquake scientists’ messages of probability.
Participants discussed dimensions of uncertainty in the context of earthquake risk
communication that were exceptionally difficult to communicate to non-experts. Two
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themes emerged: communicating uncertainty regarding the nature of earthquakes and
communicating uncertainty regarding the models used to generate earthquake forecasts.
Uncertainty surrounding the nature of the earthquake refers to a couple of different things.
First, the nature of earthquakes is one in which reliable precursors to earthquakes do not
exist (Jordan et al., 2011). Therefore, earthquake scientists can only make predictions about
an earthquake being due to strike a certain region within an interval of time. Second,
earthquake prediction differs from other natural disasters in two key ways: (a) the public
is largely unaware of earthquake prediction abilities and technologies and (b) earthquake
prediction is provided months or years ahead of the prediction whereas tornadoes and snow
storms can be predicted within days or hours (Nigg, 1982). Uncertainty surrounding the
models used to generate earthquake forecasts is another important component to
communicate. Highly reliable earthquake predictions may never be possible (Jordan &
Jones, 2010). Non-experts are often largely unaware of the reasons behind the
impossibility. Earthquake scientists seek to roll out OEF in the hopes of providing
continuous and authoritative hazard information and defending themselves against
information vacuums (Jordan & Jones, 2010). No doubt, there are a multitude of benefits
to OEF for earthquake scientists and the greater good. In this endeavor, however,
earthquake scientists must ensure that uncertainty is accounted for beyond just a
probabilistic statement.
For some earthquake scientists, uncertainty communication meant losing
credibility. Scientists must not shy away from communicating the uncertainty of
earthquake forecasting and its limitations. There becomes this delicate dance experts must
learn to perform of communicating the inherent uncertainty in the earthquake forecasting
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process while also asserting their authority on the topic. While earthquake scientists cannot
provide deterministic statements, they are far more familiar with the earthquake forecasting
process than non-experts, given their extensive training, schooling, and experience in the
area. The earthquake scientists’ skill and expertise is needed on the topic and they should
express their credibility when necessary. While earthquake scientists risk losing credibility
in the process of explaining what is not known or what is yet to be known, they could also
earn credibility in the endeavor of communicating uncertainty. That is, explicating
uncertainty may be a means of gaining credibility with non-expert audiences. If nonexperts understand the uncertainty of the process, perhaps non-experts will be less likely
to believe outrage inciters – who often provide more deterministic predictions - during
higher risk and crisis periods. Non-experts will understand the complexity of the matter
and may be less willing to accept local citizens, like those seen in L’Aquila and Canterbury,
who often sway public opinion away from reliable risk communication.
Experts should develop consensus during the risk assessment process. As
participant one said, “The illiteracy about probability is not only among the public it’s also
among our community.” This finding is consistent with the general notion that coming up
with a consensus of the risk at hand even between experts is problematic due to the varying
ways in which the problem is conceptualized and the methods with which experts approach
the data (Bostrom, 1997; Mulargia & Geller, 2003). Gigerenzer (2014), too, asserts that
medical doctors face statistical literacy issues and how to best communicate complex
information to their patients in the process of helping them make medical decisions. As
uncertainty abounds with earthquake forecasting, it is important for earthquake scientists
to acknowledge their limitations, discuss with one another their findings and find common
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ground, and explicate their uncertainty. Thus, the recommendation to communicate
uncertainty in ways that are understood begins with ensuring experts feel comfortable,
knowledgeable and confident with uncertainty communication and that they have received
the proper statistical training. Additionally, as argued by the participants, learning about
earthquake risk, particularly probability, should begin in elementary school. Educational
programs and institutions should include statistical training in their curriculum. Statistical
training must include, too, the inherent error in models and must teach how experts may
employ defensive decision making (Gigerenzer, 2014). Based on the findings of this study,
the researcher provides the following recommendation for earthquake scientists.
Recommendation #6: Communicate probability and uncertainty in ways that are
enable the publics to understand both the degree of the risk as well as what can
scientifically be known and what cannot be known.
Due to the enormous amount of uncertainty inherent in earthquake forecasting, and
the participants’ perceived responsibilities of risk communication and hazard
communication, earthquake scientists are encouraged to take on the role of communication
leaders. Stemming from Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2015) definition, this study
conceptualized communication leaders as persons who are able to effectively manage
uncertainty related to the risk and crisis and apply appropriate communication strategies to
achieve their goals. While earthquake scientists play a role at each stage of the crisis life
cycle, they play the largest role during the pre-crisis stage when communication and
education campaigns help the public prepare. Advancements such as OEF allow scientists
to play their role in making hazard information available at all times while also protecting
them from the negative implications of communicating risk.
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More than just providing an automated system that offers constant feedback,
scientists should be encouraged to redefine their role as one in which they are
communication leaders. Communication leadership is pivotal within the context of
earthquake risk and crisis because messages surrounding crisis help to shape how the public
perceives the event (Venette, 2008). To redefine their role as communication leaders,
earthquake scientists would need to feel confident taking control of the narrative when
inaccurate representations of the earthquake risk are being presented. Taking control of the
narrative would be appropriate in times when outrage inciters (such as the case in L’Aquila)
communicate risk and crisis information inaccurately to the public.
Second, redefining earthquake scientists’ communication role would mean
establishing healthy organizational culture in which internal communication is trustworthy,
open, and ongoing. Alder’s (2007) case studies on the Mann Gulch and Storm King
Mountain fires helped illuminate the consequences of poor communication. Alder (2007)
found that because healthy and open communication among members was not part of the
organizational culture, members were in a disorganized state and failed to establish and
provide clear instructional messages. Healthy organizational cultures are pivotal to the
success of managing risks and crisis when they arise (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). As
communication leaders, during the pre-crisis stage, earthquake scientists should stress the
benefits of implementing crisis management plans and encourage active preparation. Such
preparation should also include scanning communication products (media, corporate
reports, policy) and conducting audits within the organization “to identify internal
weaknesses” (Gainey, 2010, p. 36).
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Further, because outrage inciters are likely to emerge during risks and crises as the
public and stakeholders seek information to relieve the uncertainty, earthquake scientists
should prepare by establishing guidelines for dealing with unauthoritative and scurrilous
information. Communication emerging from outside of the organization should generally
be invited into the conversation but evaluated with caution. Earthquake scientists should
be careful not to provide a communication environment of mutual exclusivity as unwanted
outcomes can result as evidenced by the L’Aquila earthquake disaster (Herovic, Sellnow,
& Anthony, 2014).
Additionally, earthquake scientists need to take on a communication leadership role
because they are the most informed about what is occurring. Participant 20 said scientists
need “a higher profile during quiet times” in order to “give the public some sort of
intuition.” Participant 20’s response elicits another important avenue where scientists act
as communication leaders: scientists are responsible for keeping earthquake hazard on
people’s minds even during “quiet periods.” Acting as a communication leader of hazard
means that scientists are not only keeping the hazard on people’s minds, but also helping
to ensure that it is interpreted correctly and not lost in translation (Slovic, 2010). Based on
the findings of this study, the researcher proposes the following recommendation for
earthquake scientists.
Recommendation #7: Earthquake scientist should assert themselves as
communication leaders.
Earthquake scientists saw their responsibility as one in which they communicate
hazard; risk was the responsibility of emergency responders and risk managers. Hazard
communication contains messages of forecasted numbers of the intensity of an earthquake
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during a certain period of time. Risk communication was much complex, as the participants
saw it, and it involved translating the hazard into a projected cost for the public or
stakeholders (e.g., lives lost, collapsed buildings; Jordan et al., 2011). Following the events
in L’Aquila, participants felt that due to potential legal repercussions, they did not want to
be responsible for having to provide more than a hazard assessment. Further, due to the
complex nature of risk and the many variables that are associated with the way people
perceive risk (Slovic, 2000), providing risk communication would take significant time and
effort that scientists may not afford.
Emerging communication technologies, like OEF, were seen by most participants
as a way to meet their responsibility of communicating hazard to multiple stakeholders
throughout the lifecycle of a crisis. The OEF system would provide public, constant, and
authoritative communication of earthquake hazard (Jordan et al., 2011). OEF’s two guiding
principles, transparency and hazard-risk separation, align with the desires of the earthquake
scientists’ hazard communication responsibilities. OEF would also aid in yielding
“information vacuums” from developing during earthquake risk or crisis (Jordan & Jones,
2010, p. 573). As each individual has their “own cost” associated with the risk (participant
21), current efforts include negotiating with stakeholders their individual thresholds for
action based on the hazard. Negotiating thresholds was seen by the earthquake scientists as
the appropriate means of protecting their identity as hazard communicators and protecting
themselves from repercussions of miscommunication. Based on the findings of this study,
the researcher proposes the following recommendation for earthquake scientists.
Recommendation #8: Provide hazard communication and negotiate risk
communication thresholds.
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Earthquake scientists believed helpful analysis of one’s risk involved outlining the
costs and benefits of providing low probability messages and inciting action or their
economic value. Currently, a formal and well-established procedure has yet to provide a
standard for assessing economic values behind an earthquake forecast. Marzocchi et al.’s
(2015) suggest risk assessment should include a metric for estimated loss and propose the
use of OELF. An estimated loss metric would aid the various agencies in their decisions of
evacuation. Nelson (2014) and Tiedemann (1994) also provide important considerations in
the effort of assessing the economic value of an earthquake message. Based on the findings
of this study, the researcher proposes the following recommendation for earthquake
scientists.
Recommendation #9: Probabilities should be associated with an economic risk
metric.
Earthquake Scientists’ Communication and CERC
The researcher inquired about the earthquake scientist’s perception of their
communication and how it aligned with the recommendations outlined by CERC. The
researcher drew from the themes to gain insight into answering RQ 4. During each part of
the communication facilitation, the researcher identified important considerations for
facilitating communication and education during the pre-crisis stage.
CERC advocates that communicators monitor and recognize the emerging risk.
Monitoring and recognizing emerging risk is usually aided by technology and science; the
process is especially complex for the earthquake scientists. The participants expressed that
while they have the tools available to forecast earthquakes, they are limited by the nature
of the risk itself. Earthquakes are unpredictable, and short-term earthquake forecasting
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yields extremely low probabilities (e.g., one percent chance of an earthquake). Earthquake
forecasting includes identifying and communicating about the location, time, and
magnitude of future fault ruptures (Jordan et al., 2011). Earthquakes are emergent crises
(Parsons, 1996), and, thus, provide little to no warning of their arrival. Thus, monitoring
this risk is a complex process grounded in uncertainty. The participants expressed that nonexperts are largely unaware of the limitations and the uncertainty involved with earthquake
forecasting. One of the goals of OEF is to help non-experts become more familiar with the
low probabilities with which experts must work to make decisions.
The participants recognized that expert-to-expert challenges exist and that not all
earthquake scientists view data in the same light. The participants noted that issues of
comprehending probability are present among scientists. Mulargia and Geller (2003) argue
there are four different definitions of earthquake prediction and that a lack of agreement on
the definition is “one of the main reasons for the lack of consensus on earthquake
predictability in the scientific community” (p. 14). One of the participants noted that this
may be the case because earthquake scientists are “trained for determinism” and look for
the exact law to predict phenomena (participant one). Mulargia and Geller assert that
deterministic prediction involves providing earthquake forecasts with high accuracy and
reliability; such an approach is helpful when extreme actions like evacuations need to take
place.
CERC also advocates that communicators facilitate the general public’s
understanding of risk. During this stage, communicators should educate the public, helping
to raise awareness of the risk and its characteristics. For earthquake scientists, educating
the public meant providing awareness of the nature of earthquakes and how they differ
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from other natural disasters. Further, earthquake scientists perceived that non-experts were
largely unaware of the uncertainty inherent in statistical modeling. Thus, educating the
public should be centered on familiarization with the nature of earthquakes and low
probabilities.
Facilitating preparation strategies for the public is an important component of the
CERC pre-crisis stage. This stage involves preparing the public to respond if the risk
manifests in serious earthquake. For earthquake scientists, facilitating preparing involves
keeping public attention during earthquake quiet periods. Earthquakes occur sporadically,
are unpredictable, and yield extremely low probabilities. When earthquakes are forecasted
in the long-term, earthquake scientists are able to yield higher probability forecasts. Longterm forecasts are provided within a 30-year time frame, however, making it extremely
difficult to create the sense of urgency that is typical in other applications of the CERC
model. Thus, earthquake scientists face a unique situation with preparing the public. The
participants described the effectiveness of education campaigns, such as ShakeOut, in
helping to prepare people and bringing excitement and awareness to earthquake risk
preparedness. The participants also discussed the effects of the recent movie, San Andreas,
on the lay public’s perceptions of earthquake risk. Such communication and education
campaigns, are exceptionally important for earthquake scientists because they help to
facilitate awareness, excitement, and understanding of earthquake risk during “quiet
periods.”
CERC further advises that communicators facilitate changes in behavior. Changing
behavior can be extremely difficult as beliefs about risk are shaped by a host of influences.
Earthquake scientists may find that affecting behavioral change in earthquake prone
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regions, however, may be easier. In such regions, residents may be more apt to engaging
in preparedness and behavioral changes than less earthquake prone regions. For example,
participant 12 discussed that earthquake perception varied between North and South
California, and that South California, a more earthquake prone region, had more accurate
perceptions of the earthquake risk they face. The participants consistently agreed that
campaigns could lead to positive behavioral changes. Further, capitalizing on popular
culture that references earthquakes may be effective in gaining the publics’ attention and
helping them understand appropriate means to prepare. By correcting misperceptions or
reinforcing correct perceptions of the popular culture reference, earthquake scientists can
take advantage of the reference. The participants believed that OEF should be integrated
with such campaigns to increase awareness.
CERC specifically advocates that communicators create and test warning systems
and messages, including recommended response strategies, during the pre-crisis stage.
Important considerations for earthquake scientists during this step of the pre-crisis stage
include dealing with outrage inciters that may arise during emergency-risk and crisis times.
This pre-crisis process also involve negotiating thresholds for warning with stakeholders.
Earthquake forecasting is not, however, conducive to casting alarms. Although earthquake
scientists provide probability statements which imply an increased risk, no particular
response strategy beyond normal readiness is needed. The participants of this study
discussed future technologies, such as EEW, that would enable warning messages within
a couple minutes before the earthquake, allowing persons to process and engage in
protective behavioral actions.
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Another important step of the pre-crisis stage of CERC is facilitating the formation
of alliances for earthquake response. The participants of this study did not provide specific
agencies with whom alliances should be built. Earthquake response usually requires the
help of local and state governments (and sometimes federal, if necessary), emergency
responders, insurance companies, and engineers.
In summary, the pre-crisis recommendations of CERC are relevant for the
earthquake science community’s efforts to communicate OEF messages. Participants in the
study believe the current OEF efforts are meeting CERC’s expectations for monitoring
risk, facilitating public understanding, and advocating response strategies. At the same
time, however, the variance in risk is small and the actions advocated are typically
expressed without a sense of urgency. Thus, the OEF process differs from message designs
using CERC in other risk contexts such as pre-planning for a flu season, responding to a
hurricane warning, or preparing a strategy for responding to a growing wild fire. Further,
the science surrounding OEF is complex and less observable than other disasters where
CERC has been applied. Nevertheless, the general structure of CERC does provide
earthquake scientists with appropriate objectives for pre-crisis planning.
Adding to CERC’s Propositions
The findings of this study also helped to generate further propositions for CERC.
Veil et al. (2008) extracted six propositions of the CERC framework and argued that CERC
is an “integrative framework of risk and crisis communication perspectives that needs
further development” (p. 32s). The current study adds understanding about communicating
technical information to non-experts during the earliest stage of CERC. Based on the
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results of this study, three additional propositions are added to Veil et al.’s (2008) current
list of six. They are as follows:


Risks and crises have the opportunity to present renewed ways of addressing
future, similar risks and crises and bring about better communication and
education in the pre-crisis stage.



Greater amounts of uncertainty surrounding the risk or crisis will call for more
communication between involved parties to facilitate solutions and to clearly
articulate both what can be known and what cannot be known.



Receivers of communication are affected by a number of influences which
shape the way they perceive the message including, but not limited to,
familiarity with the risk/crisis, their level of outrage, and regional
considerations.

These added propositions help to provide further understanding of the conditions under
which CERC works best.
Limitations
Like any research, there are limits to the claims that can be made. The researcher
should be cognizant of these limitations and assure that they follow the standards of ethical
research procedures. There are three primary limitations of this study.
One limitation is the emergent nature of the topic under exploration and,
consequently, the amount of information from scientists the researcher could evoke. As
some of the earthquake scientists were unaware of communication issues present, while
others were extremely aware, it was trying, at times, to generate healthy conversation on
the topic with those less aware. Those scientists that were more aware of the
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communication issues provided abundant information from their perspectives and
experiences with the problem, and the researcher was able to fully explore the topic in
depth from their interviews. The researcher then used the knowledge gained from those
interviews to help guide the interpretation of interview information from less informed
participants.
Another limitation of this study is the contextual forces at play with participant
responses. Specifically, the researcher must also take into consideration that earthquake
scientists responses themselves were affected by context. That is, the challenges expressed
by the earthquake scientists were based on their individual recent experiences and
knowledge of the topic and their feelings towards the research topic and the researcher.
These contextual forces are at play in every research study, however, they are especially
important to highlight in qualitative studies because of the open-ended nature of the
process.
Lastly, another limitation of the study is that the interview sample was limited to
those participants who attended the 2015 SCEC meeting in Palm Springs, California.
Recruiting and meeting with participants in qualitative interview data collection can be
time-consuming and the researcher could encounter issues with gaining entry (Marshall &
Rossman, 2016). Thus, the researcher capitalized on the opportunity to meet with almost
two-dozen earthquake scientists for informant interviews during one of their most
important and well-attended conferences. The participants were extremely willing to speak
with the researcher and negotiate meeting times for the interviews to be conducted. While
the researcher feels that members of SCEC provided valuable insight into the project, she
must acknowledge that these particular earthquake scientists may not be speaking for the
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entire earthquake scientific community. Naturally, organizational ideology influences
important and unimportant perspectives of its members. Thus, perspectives on earthquake
risk may be slightly different for earthquake scientists who are part of other organizations.
Future Research
The findings of this study shine light on areas ripe for future research. The findings
of this study helped provide understanding into the uncertainty present in earthquake
forecasting of which earthquake scientists perceive non-experts are largely unaware. The
findings lead the researcher to wonder, how much uncertainty communication is too much
and can experts lose credibility if too much uncertainty is communicated? And, if scientists
communicate uncertainty in their forecasts, including the limitations of their measures, are
they still able to get people to take action? If so, what kinds of messages containing
components of uncertainty are more effective than others and why? Future research should
also examine the effect that communicating uncertainty has on individual decision making.
Such questions were beyond the scope of the present study, but there exists ample areas for
research examining the relationship between communicating uncertainty and maintaining
credibility. Such a study is especially important considering that during risks and crises,
experts are the first and often most-trusted sources of information.
Researchers should also explore the communication needs of cultures in which OEF
is proposed. Technological and scientific advances, like OEF, are helping to reduce per
capita earthquake risk, however, OEF is expanding into regions most vulnerable to
earthquake risk where little is known how cultural differences will impact risk
communication interpretation. Developing understanding into cultural communication
norms involves exploring the cultural group’s trust towards authoritative sources, means
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of gaining information, and characteristics of their communication. Improved cultural
awareness will help to strengthen communicators’ understanding of the appropriate
communication norms of its users, providing insight into how the group will respond to
such advancements. As geoscientists seek to make partnerships domestically and with
foreign publics and to implement OEF systems in various partner countries (e.g., Chile,
Mexico, Nepal, the government of Burma, and parts of Latin America), the development
of cultural understanding is appropriate, timely, and necessary for providing tailored and
culturally appropriate risk and crisis messages. Developing cultural awareness would also
help determine whether communication technologies of the host country allow such
advancements like OEF and EEW.
Further, developing cultural awareness would aid in considering ways in which the
lay public will process probabilistic information and uncertainty. Probabilistic information
may be better understood if presented in ways in which humans can relate such as images
and storytelling (Slovic, 2010). However, such descriptions are subjective in nature as
culture largely dictates the images and stories which resonate and make sense (Sellnow &
Seeger, 2013). Consequently, understanding communication norms of foreign cultures is
imperative to effective risk and crisis communication (Sellnow et al., 2009). Future
researchers could pose the following research question: What are the unique cultural
communication needs of the regions where earthquake technologies are to be
implemented?
Additionally, the participants of this study indicated the implications of the recent
film, San Andreas, on lay public’s perceptions of earthquakes. While this finding was
unexpected, it raises an important avenue for future researchers to explore: campaigns and
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popular culture influences on risk decision-making. Researchers could conduct pre-andpost tests on individuals exposed to a movie on earthquake risk, examining misperceptions,
how highly the individuals rank the importance and prevalence of earthquake risk pre-andpost-movie, and preparedness steps individuals perceive they should make.
Conclusion
This study helped to uncover communication challenges experienced by scientists
and apply the information to CERC. Earthquake scientists face immense challenges as they
attempt to communicate an uncertain event by its nature, communicate the uncertainty of
the models used to generate their forecasts, provide accurate and understandable hazard
messages to non-experts, navigate among different boundaries of communication, consider
differences in risk perception, develop economic impacts of their messages, and code
switch with non-experts. Implications of the study include having scientists redefine their
role as communication leaders, developing healthy and resilient organizational culture,
taking advantage of pop culture to generate attention to earthquake hazard, and
communicating the various dimensions of uncertainty in earthquake forecasting to less
technical audiences. Given the results of this study, several areas of future research were
outlined such as communicating probability and maintaining credibility and the effect of
popular culture on earthquake awareness and preparation. Such avenues ripe for
exploration for scholars seeking to improve earthquake communication.
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Appendices
Appendix A
A Working Model of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005)
Stage I: Pre-crisis (Risk Messages; Warnings; Preparations)
Communication and education campaigns targeted to both the public and the response
community to facilitate:


Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks



General public understanding of risk



Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event



Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy)



Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat



Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups



Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders



Message development and testing for subsequent stages

Stage II: Initial Event (Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance)
Rapid communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to establish:


Empathy, reassurance, and reduction in emotional turmoil



Designated crisis/agency spokespersons and formal channels and methods of
communication



General and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances, consequences,
and anticipated outcomes based on available information



Reduction of crisis related uncertainty
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Specific understanding of emergency management and medical community
responses



Understanding of self-efficacy and personal response activities (how/where to get
more information)

Stage III: Maintenance (Ongoing uncertainty reduction; Self-efficacy’ reassurance)
Communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to facilitate:


More accurate public understanding of ongoing risks



Understanding of background factors and issues broad-based support and
cooperation with response and recovery efforts



Feedback from affected publics and correction of misunderstandings/rumors



Ongoing explanation and reiteration of self-efficacy and personal response
activities (how/where to get more information) begun in stage II



Informed decision making by the public based on understanding of risks/benefits

Stage IV: Resolution (Updates regarding resolution; Discussions about cause and new
risks/new understandings of risk)
Public communication and campaigns directed toward the general public and affected
groups seeking to:


Inform and persuade about ongoing clean-up, remediation, recovery, and rebuilding
efforts



Facilitate broad based, honest, and open discussion and resolution of issue
regarding cause, blame, responsibility, and adequacy of response.



Improve/create pubic understanding of new risks and new understandings of risk
as well as new risk avoidance behaviors and response procedures
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Promote the activities and capabilities of agencies and organizations to reinforce
positive corporate identity and image

Stage V: Evaluation (Discussions of adequacy of response; Consensus about lessons
and new understandings of risks)
Communication directed toward agencies and the response community to:


Evaluate and assess responses, including communication effectiveness



Document, formalize, and communicate lessons learned



Determine specific actions to improve crisis communication and crisis response
capability



Create linkages to pre-crisis activities (stage I).
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Appendix B
Interview Questions
General Challenges during the Pre-Crisis Stage of CERC


Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks
o To what extent does current technology allow for EQ forecasting?



General public understanding of risk
o To what extent does the public understand the limitations of EQ
forecasting?



Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event
o To what extent do current information campaigns such as ShakeOut
prepare people to protect themselves when an EQ occurs? How might
EQ early forecasting align with a program such as ShakeOut?



Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy)
o To what extent do you believe such advance training can instill positive
behavioral changes for self-protection during an EQ? How might EQ
forecasting make a positive contribution to this process?



Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat, such as evacuation
notices, take shelter warnings, product recalls, etc.
o What is the most important information to communicate in an EQ
forecast message?



Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups
o In your opinion, what agencies, organizations, and groups should
collaborate on developing an EQ forecasting plan?
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Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders
o To what extent do you believe such collaboration could develop
consensual recommendations—particularly between experts and first
responders?



Message development and testing for subsequent stages
o What type of message testing would be most helpful regarding EQ
forecasting?

Communication Challenges


What do you perceive are the key communication challenges about earthquake
forecasting?



What implications did the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake disaster have on
earthquake forecasting?



What are key takeaways for scientists from the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake
disaster?



What strategies would you recommend for improving the communication of
earthquake forecasting?

Communicating Probability to the Public


How often do you have to make probabilistic statements to the public when
earthquake forecasting?



What forms (i.e., storytelling, numbers, combination of storytelling and
numbers, etc.) of communicating earthquake probability do you believe to be
better understood by the general public than others?
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What advice would you give to other scientists on communicating probability
to the general public?



What workshops or seminars are held to inform scientists about how to
communicate probability to the general public? How might these be helpful to
preventing misinterpretation of probabilistic messages by the public?



What challenges do you face in communicating about earthquakes to the
general public?



How do you believe effectively communicating probabilistic statements to the
public to be important or unimportant to your field?



What other information do you believe to be important for me to know about
communicating about earthquakes?

Demographic Questions


How many years of experience do you have in your field?



How much experience do you have with earthquake forecasting?



What is your current position?

Other Questions


May I contact you for follow-up questions?
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Appendix C
Log of Interview Data Gathering Activities
Date

Place

Activity

9/12/15

Palm Springs, CA

F2F Interviews

Challenges
Experienced

9/13/15

Palm Springs, CA

F2F Interviews

Challenges
Experienced

9/14/15

Palm Springs, CA

F2F Interviews

Challenges
Experienced

9/15/15

Palm Springs, CA

F2F Interviews

Challenges
Experienced

2/9/16

Skype

F2F Interview

Probing Questions
on Communication

2/10/16

Telephone

Phone Interview

Probing Questions
on Communication
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Explored
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